

**SECURITY-SECTOR REFORM  
AND TRANSPARENCY-BUILDING**

**Needs and Options for Ukraine and Moldova**

2004

HARMONIE PAPER 17

Security-Sector Reform and Transparency-Building  
Needs and Options for Ukraine and Moldova

The contributors to this work are David Greenwood, Peter Volten, and others.

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The Centre for European Security Studies is an independent and non-profit foundation engaged in research, education and training on foreign policy and security affairs affecting the whole of Europe. A key mission is to promote democratic structures and decision-making procedures in this field, especially throughout Central and Eastern Europe where it works to support those organisations and individuals striving to establish civil societies under the rule of law. By facilitating a comprehensive process of learning, it aims to contribute to mutual understanding on all security matters, thus helping to build a stable all-European order.

## PREFACE

In 2004-5 the Centre for European Security Studies (CESS) is holding a series of policy workshops as part of a programme with the self-explanatory title *Needs and Options for Security-Sector Transparency and Reform in Ukraine and Moldova* (NOSTRUM, for short). This is an exercise funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Netherlands. It is being conducted in collaboration with the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies named after Olexander Razumkov (UCEPS, or the Razumkov Centre) and Moldova's Institute for Public Policy (IPP).

The workshops represent the second phase of the NOSTRUM venture. The first phase occupied the period July-November 2003 and involved initial planning, preparatory meetings and some exploratory research on 'needs and options'. The preparatory meetings were held in Chisinau and Kiev. The exploratory research was conducted for, and reviewed at, a Roundtable convened in Odessa (at the end of November).

This *Harmonie Paper* comprises the material specially commissioned for the Odessa gathering (Parts B and C) plus chapters on policy priorities derived from that material (Part D). (Part A is a brief Introduction which incorporates a summary of the contributed papers.)

The 'priorities' chapters have been written by CESS's Director and Research Director, Peter Volten and David Greenwood – who acted as Moderators at the November Roundtable – and they represent possible points of departure for the policy workshops of NOSTRUM's second phase.

The heart of this text, though, is the preceding contributed work. This consists of original essays offering different perspectives on security-sector transparency-building and reform relevant to the circumstances of Ukraine and Moldova. To be specific, analyses for Odessa were solicited from

- knowledgeable individuals in three 'neighbourhood' states – Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia – that have not only recent reform experience to share but also a record of accomplishment in this regard sufficient to earn them accession to NATO (papers in Part B here);  
and
- acknowledged experts from the two 'target' countries themselves *plus* respected international commentators on Moldovan and Ukrainian security-sector affairs (papers in Part C).

There is a wealth of information and insight in these pieces. Each is valuable in its own right and not just as an input to NOSTRUM agenda-setting. Hence this publication.

To all contributing authors the Centre for European Security Studies owes a substantial debt of gratitude for their effort on our behalf. Thanks are due also to colleagues Jos Boonstra and Merijn Hartog, who are co-managing the NOSTRUM exercise as a whole; and to Joke Venema, who prepared this text for the printer.

Margriet Drent  
Executive Director, CESS

Groningen  
29 February 2004

The contributed material in Parts B and C is prepared here as submitted, apart from some layout – and language – editing. This explains the variations to be found in use of hyphens, italics, capital letters and inverted commas.

This Preface and Chapters I and XV have been translated into local languages for our Moldovan readers.

This Preface and Chapters I and XVI have been translated into Ukrainian.

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## **Part A    Introduction**





## I. NEEDS AND OPTIONS FOR UKRAINE AND MOLDOVA

David Greenwood

At the beginning of 2004 three small states of the former Soviet Union stand at the threshold of NATO accession and membership of the European Union (EU). By the middle of the year the Baltic nations – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – will have fulfilled their European vocation (as will Poland, a NATO member since 1999, and Slovakia). A pair of other erstwhile Eastern bloc countries – Bulgaria and Romania – will also join NATO in mid-2004 and have high hopes of admission to the EU later in the decade.

Where does this leave the three westernmost states of the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States, and in particular the odd couple – Ukraine and Moldova – that have also in their different ways declared a clear European ‘vocation’ (which the other member of the trio, Belarus, has not)?

The short, and candid, answer is that nobody knows. However, much thought is being given to this matter, especially where security is concerned.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, one thing we do know is that neither the mighty Ukraine nor little Moldova is likely to be able to develop satisfactory Western connections while their military forces and other ‘armed structures of the state’ remain largely unreformed and while their conduct of security affairs continues to be characterised by a conspicuous lack of transparency. On top of that, of course, such shortcomings are obviously obstacles to the two countries’ overall progress, quite apart from national aspirations to join the European mainstream.

What in this respect do Ukraine and Moldova need to do? And what concrete policy options for security-sector reform and transparency-building commend themselves? These are the questions addressed in the present study, with a view to formulating a practical policy agenda for each country.

### Perspectives

To help answer the questions we sought views on ‘needs’ and ‘options’ from three sources: first, national experts of high standing, able to bring to their analyses detailed knowledge and understanding of local conditions and circumstances; secondly, a select number of well-informed and well-regarded ‘outside’ observers of Ukrainian and Moldovan security affairs; and, thirdly, analysts from three neighbouring or

<sup>1</sup> See, for example, Judy Batt and others, *Partners and neighbours: a CFSP for a wider Europe*, Chaillot Papers No. 64, (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, September 2003), especially Chapter 2 – by Dov Lynch, one of the contributors to this book – plus the annexed texts of such key documents as the European Commission’s Communication on *Wider Europe* (11 March 2003) and the European Council’s Conclusions *Wider Europe – New Neighbourhood* (18 June 2003). There is also some material on this theme in Alyson Bailes, Oleksiy Melnyk and Ian Anthony, *Relics of Cold War: Europe’s Challenge, Ukraine’s Experience*, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 6, (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, November 2003). Oleksiy Melnyk is another contributor to the present volume.

neighbourhood states – Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria – who were asked to reflect on their own countries’ recent experience of security-sector reform (general and specific), highlighting any lessons learned (and mistakes made) that policy-makers in Kiev and Chisinau might be wise to take into account.

The result is a wealth of fascinating material. The contributions of the ‘neighbourhood’ authors are, perhaps, of particular interest. To be sure, some of these pieces are long on description and short on critical evaluation. In others there is a suspicion that, with an international readership in mind, a felt need to present national accomplishment in the best possible light may have affected the writing. Here and there instructive messages for Ukraine and Moldova emerge only if one is prepared to read between the lines. For all that, each essay has an authentic flavour, something often lacking in Western prescriptions based on ‘ideal type’ models of security-sector practice (or, worse, outright theoretical abstractions).

There are self-evident gains from juxtaposing the views on needs and options (and imperatives) for Ukraine and Moldova of domestic experts on the one hand, international commentators on the other. The local perception of problems and policy possibilities is where the construction of any agenda for action begins: ‘you start from where you are’ (actually from where you *think* you are). What the outsider brings to the debate is, first and foremost, clarity of vision uncluttered by mystique – the classic ‘naked emperor’ role – and, hopefully, disinterested judgement. In the present context this last is needed most clearly in the case of Moldova, because of the Transdnistria dispute.<sup>2</sup>

### **The Experience of Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia**

The six ‘neighbourhood’ perspectives – three pairs of chapters – make up Part B below (Chapters II-VII). The first essay in each country-couple offers a general survey of the relevant state’s reform experience. The second deals with a specific feature to which attention is drawn as an example of good regional practice (or effective improvisation) that might be of particular interest to decision-makers in either Ukraine or Moldova (possibly both).

#### *Bulgaria*

The contributions of our Bulgarian authors are exemplary in conforming to this pattern. In a thorough and vigorous account of recent history the ‘general survey’ writer, Valery Ratchev, highlights the problems and prejudices – and the political pusillanimity – that prevailed in his country throughout the first half of the 1990s; and

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<sup>2</sup> The word ‘Transdnistria’ is used here for Moldova’s breakaway ‘para-state’ because it is generally accepted in diplomatic and academic circles, though the Republic’s own nomenclature is different. See the International Crisis Group’s publication *Moldova: No Quick Fix*, ICG Europe Report No. 147, Chisinau and Brussels, 12 August 2003, p.3. In the contributed papers in Parts B and C the form favoured by the respective authors has been retained.

then goes on to record the progress made, at least in the military domain, once determined leaders took the levers of power in Sofia. (However there is a great deal of unfinished business, he says, where non-military security-sector organisations are concerned.) As for the 'special feature' piece, one of the principal architects of Bulgaria's post-1997 force reduction, rationalisation and restructuring effort, Todor Tagarev, provides an admirably lucid explanation of the origins and development of an Integrated Defence Resources Management System (IDRMS) that is now a key tool – arguably *the* key tool – for resource allocation and budget execution as the country proceeds through further military transformation on its way to NATO membership. It is the institutionalisation of the IDRMS that is a signal accomplishment, Tagarev says: a product of reform that will facilitate – is already facilitating – continuing reform and, also, represents a most important contribution to transparency-building in defence.

Ratchev highlights a number of 'lessons learned' from Bulgarian experience. He gives particular prominence to the following (author's *order* retained).

- Security-sector reform needs strong and continuous political management, based on a common understanding among politicians, professionals and society on the major issues of the national security vision, strategy and policy.
- Sustaining the momentum of reform depends on the commitment and effectiveness of ministers and top executives, who must be prepared to fight not only organisational inertia but also entrenched opposition.
- Redefinition of what constitutes professionalism in the contemporary environment is necessary to ensure that security-sector staffs at all levels are equipped to deal with new security and political realities.<sup>3</sup>
- Substantial management capacity and competence are needed for effective and timely reforms.
- Change is turbulent; and maintaining the motivation of personnel – uniformed and civilian, throughout the defence organisation – is a formidable challenge and requires considerable effort.
- The legal foundation of the security-sector reform process requires constant attention and development.
- The core of reform is definition of security-sector organisations' new paradigm(s): the forces' rationale, roles and missions.
- Effort must, however, also be put into effective arrangements for public information, as the process unfolds *and* when the 'new model' is up and running.
- The same applies to provision for security-sector organisations' all-round accountability to elected representatives and other civil society institutions, an obligation that top decision-makers, senior officials, commanders and managers especially should respect.

These are the considered observations of a thoughtful and articulate observer of his

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<sup>3</sup> The author does not say as much, but in these first three items on the checklist he pinpoints the factors that did *not* obtain in Bulgaria before 1997-99.

country's recent security-sector reform and transparency-building effort: Kiev and Chisinau take note.<sup>4</sup>

Inspection of Ratchev's enumeration of 'lessons learned' – especially the early entries in the listing – prompts one obvious observation. If there is a single 'golden rule' for progress in security-sector reform (certainly military reform) it is that without the right *people* the process goes nowhere, may not even get underway. What Todor Tagarev has to say in the following chapter supports this, but puts an important gloss on the judgement: it helps if the reformers can devise and develop *tools* for the job; and the consolidation of change is greatly assisted if their approach to decision-making can be successfully embedded in the procedures of the administration.

The management tool that Tagarev describes – the IDRMS (see above) – has served Bulgaria well in this regard, and something like it might be the answer for others still facing big transformation challenges (for example, Ukraine). Would-be followers of Sofia's example should, though, register the prerequisites for an effective system.

- It must be *comprehensive*, covering all defence activities, expenditures and sources of finance (state budget funds, own revenues, foreign military assistance, and so on.).
- It should allow for the efficient and straightforward translation of costed defence programmes into conventional budget submissions.
- All planning documents ought to incorporate easily understood and assessable performance measurement indicators.
- For a NATO-membership aspirant the set-up should be compatible with NATO's defence procedures so far as possible.
- The system must be sufficiently flexible to accommodate contingencies and unforeseen changes in economic, financial and social circumstances (even allowing in-year programme reviews and updates).
- It should provide for broad organisational participation, but with clear loci of decision-making authority making well-documented decisions available to all resource managers in a timely manner.

Further to this last point, Tagarev adds that it is important even in the system's development phase to involve representatives of all future players from all branches of the defence administration and the senior military authorities, in particular budgeting professionals. The finance ministry, the legislature and the national audit office, and the office of the Head of State (the Supreme Commander in Chief) should be engaged as well. What must be paramount, though, is that the designed management system adequately implements all the main principles listed. Finally, echoing Ratchev's sentiment, Todor Tagarev says that 'the personal involvement of a

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<sup>4</sup> Writing at end-2003, with his country engaged in a further Strategic Defence Review, Ratchev also has a great deal to say about what this latest exercise needs to accomplish and how in general the Bulgarian defence effort should evolve through the early years of its NATO membership (from mid-2004). Most of these observations are uncontroversial – counsels of perfection, some might say – but they are too numerous to summarise here. We recognise, though, that a wise commentator's views on 'what must now be done' or 'what we must now be careful *not* to do' may be every bit as instructive as 'lessons learned' firmly based on the evidence of experience.

senior resource manager – the Minister of Defence or a designated deputy minister – is indispensable’ for the setting-up of a system and its successful operation. People matter.

In addition to the points summarised above, both our Bulgarian authors acknowledge that the country had useful external assistance as it grappled with ‘change management’: bilateral help, especially from the Americans; and, most important, from 1999/2000 to 2003/2004 the feedback received as part of NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP) process.

### *Romania*

There are many similarities between the post-Cold War reform experience of Bulgaria and that of neighbouring Romania. Both countries reduced their defence efforts in the first half of the 1990s, but retained ‘legacy’ force structures, obsolescent weapons, redundant facilities and superfluous top brass. Neither embarked on earnest reform until a welcome conjuncture: strong personalities appeared on the scene – the Kostov administration’s defence team in Sofia, the Iliescu-Nastase-Pascu partnership in Bucharest; and the prospect of joining NATO finally became real – which had the effect of not only concentrating minds but also bringing with it externally monitored and assisted preparation for accession under the MAP scheme. (In addition, of course, both countries steadily earned favour with NATO – and with the United States especially – in 1999 and after, initially by being supportive throughout the Kosovo crisis and conflict, later by demonstrating the value of their real estate as staging ground for force deployments to Afghanistan, Central Asia generally and the Middle East.)

Needless to say, there is more to the Romanian story than this. As Adrian Pop’s account tells us, in the early post-Cold War years lack of vision, confusion and wishful thinking were commonplace. Throughout Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) security-sector reform was a tough learning process and it is only with hindsight that it is *easy* to see what had to be done. ‘The countries belonging to the former Soviet space could and should benefit from the lessons learnt along the way – the hard way – by the CEE countries,’ he says. Moreover in Romania necessary foundations were laid in this period: important steps towards establishing civilian control of armed forces and restructuring them; and, after 1994, engagement in interoperability-oriented programmes under the aegis of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP).

Still, as Pop acknowledges, reshaping military formations and transforming a defence organisation are two quite different things. The latter did not get underway until a raft of old assumptions were set aside; and it proved easier to do that once Romania was engaged in the MAP process. The inaugural 1999/2000 cycle exposed, our writer notes, ‘serious dysfunctional features: unrealistic planning; discrepancy between objectives and resources; lack of co-ordination between the departments and services of the defence organisation; lack of funds; and a reversed personnel pyramid’. The good news is that the last is now largely corrected; the other shortcomings have

been addressed; and the Ministry of National Defence (MND) believes that it can deliver against its 2003-2007 prospectus (focused on an *Objective Force 2007* with an active strength of 75,000 military men and 15,000 civilians).

There is also more to security-sector reform than reorganising defence. Now overdue in Romania, Adrian Pop thinks, are (1) a wide-ranging review of the division of labour between law-enforcement and intelligence agencies as well as between the domestic and foreign branches of the latter; and (2) effort to promote – under strict political guidance – greater inter-agency co-operation among the defence establishment, the law-enforcement and intelligence agencies (domestic and foreign) plus various military and civilian institutions.

The second Romanian piece in Part B of this volume complements the first. Tudor Munteanu describes the country's arrangements for democratic control of the armed forces and, as a senior military man, has his own perspective on restructuring and reform. His chapter also offers helpful detail on current defence priorities.

However, Munteanu's contribution holds special interest so far as the present exercise is concerned because of the material it contains on how Romania has made special institutional provision for (a) the management of executive-legislature relations, with particular reference to defence, and (b) the dissemination of public information about military affairs. It is authoritative material too: at the MND in Bucharest General Munteanu's job title is Deputy Under-Secretary of Defence for Relations with the Parliament, Legal Harmonisation and Public Relations; and he works for a State Secretary (Deputy Minister) for Parliamentary Liaison.

There are very few defence ministries that have made the business of two-way communication with elected representatives – largely, but by no means exclusively, to smooth the passage of legislation – the responsibility of a top office-holder with high-ranking staff. It pays dividends, however, according to the Romanian experience, judging by the way in which the legal aspects of preparation for NATO accession have been handled and the nature of the relationship between the MND and the Standing Committees for Defence, Public Order and National Security (the oversight bodies). For that reason it is a 'special feature' of Romania's institutional arrangements for handling security-sector reform and transparency building about which Ukraine and Moldova – and perhaps also 'other countries belonging to the former Soviet space' – might want to learn more. As General Munteanu himself puts it: 'military transparency is the key which unlocks the door to successful implementation of military reform'.

Interestingly, in the Munteanu essay there is also passing reference to the set-up at the Romanian MND for tackling resource allocation and resources management, the matters dealt with in Bulgaria using the IDRMS described by Todor Tagarev. There is a similar system. In Bucharest they call it their Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation System (PPBES).

## Slovakia

Against the background of the material from Bulgaria and Romania, that on Slovakia promotes a distinct sense of ‘*déjà vu* all over again’. Ivo Samson’s general piece quotes the following characterisation of attention to security-sector reform in the country’s first decade.

1993 – 1995: time of identifying the problems

1996 – 1998: continuity of reform *attempts*

1999 – 2002/3: transition from declamations to real reform

Gabriel Kopecky’s contribution – on the urgent ‘defence review’ initiated at the beginning of 2001 – makes clear that even the eventual ‘transition’ to action was slow to gather momentum. The critical conjuncture did not occur until that time, when Jozef Stank was appointed Minister of Defence and the powers-that-be in Bratislava realised that the state of the armed forces was such that joining the post-Cold War ‘second wave’ of NATO enlargement was far from assured.

In the event, of course, Slovakia was a ‘second wave’ invitee at NATO’s November 2002 Summit in Prague, heralding accession in mid-2004. Presentation of the *Force 2010* blueprint for the country’s future defences – the outcome of Stank’s urgent review – presumably satisfied the sceptics in member-states. Not everyone is entirely happy, however, with the strategy documents upon which this prospectus is based (also refreshed in the 2001 review). Samson thinks they still contain some dubious threat assessments, not to mention too many ‘generalisations and clichés’ and ‘overlapping goals’ and ‘tautological definitions’: in other words, they need further refreshment. Moreover, the *Force 2010* text is a portfolio of promissory notes – this is how good it’s going to be – and Slovakia has earned something of a reputation for failing to do what it has said it will do.

Thus, if we are interested in ‘lessons learned’ from the Slovak experience (as we are), the clearest to emerge is that this is probably *not* the way to tackle a security-sector reform challenge. Ivo Samson does not say this explicitly; but it is the sentiment implicit in his observations. Gabriel Kopecky might concur, perhaps, taking a decade-long view. On the other hand, the central message of his contribution is clear: if circumstances require that you do an urgent defence review, after years of procrastination, there is a lot to be said for doing it the way we did it.

Kopecky describes ‘the way we did it’ at the beginning and end of his chapter. (In-between he presents material on what the outcomes were.)

- Minister Stank established a Steering Committee (SC) and put his State Secretary in the chair, with the Chief of the General Staff as deputy-chair. The SC supervised five Working Groups (WGs), under the Deputy Chief of the General Staff’s direction. Membership of the WGs included advisers from the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and France.
- This apparatus was tasked to (a) refresh the *Military Strategy of the Slovak Republic*; (b) develop a concept for the armed forces plus force structure and other prescriptions for dissemination in a document entitled *The Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic – Model 2010* (antecedent of the eventual *Force 2010*

- blueprint); and (c) draw up a concrete *Long-term Plan for the Structure and Development of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic*. It was also given the job of producing a new organisational structure of the defence ministry.
- A methodology was developed ‘to provide discipline and focus to the work’. Essentially this involved the systematic examination of trade-offs among capabilities, cost, and risk. On the basis of ‘the current threat assessment’ it was possible to concentrate attention on ‘planning efforts to counter the more likely threat of Regional Armed Conflict’ (the yardstick Ivo Samson considers dubious).
  - All study products went for discussion and final approval to the SC which during the review met monthly or as needed. Between SC meetings work was evaluated and coordinated by an Integration Team, comprising all team leaders plus top officials and top brass. The Minister of Defence himself visited Integration Team meetings frequently. All proposals had to be presented in such a way that members of the National Assembly might understand them clearly. It was agreed that all documents, except a few very sensitive ones, should be unclassified
  - When work at SC level was finished, an approved document was sent to the Minister. Submission of the final document *Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic – Model 2010* marked the last stage of work at the defence ministry. There followed approval by the State Defense Council, a special body of ministers chaired by the prime minister.

This major text subsequently received Parliamentary approval. Around 70 per cent of elected representatives voted ‘for’ it, testimony to the care taken to explain official thinking to the legislature throughout the review exercise.

This process, it is worth remembering, yielded a blueprint and promissory notes. Business might not have been done so expeditiously if ‘immediate action’ decisions had been involved. Gabriel Kopecky’s insider’s view is none the less illuminating, in several ways. Noteworthy for present purposes are that it confirms the value of ministerial drive and input, of the systematic examination of capability/cost/risk trade-offs when considering alternative force configurations (cf. Tagarev on the genesis of Bulgaria’s *Plan 2004*), and of maintaining transparency of the process *vis à vis* the legislators who have ‘the power of the purse’ and to whom decision-makers are in the last analysis accountable (cf. Munteanu on executive-legislature relations in Romania).

The glaring omission from our material on Slovakia is information and insight on what, if anything, has been done there to reform police forces, security services, domestic and foreign intelligence agencies (or non-military security-sector organisations). There is ‘unfinished business’ in Bulgaria, a contributor says. It is the same in Romania. Is it the case in the Slovak Republic also? Our authors’ silence on the subject suggests that perhaps it is.



## Perceptions in and of Moldova and Ukraine

Following these *neighbourhood* perspectives in our volume (Part B) are the contributions to the work by *local* authors and by our chosen '*outside*' commentators (Part C). There are seven chapters altogether in this Part: two by Moldovans (Chapters VIII and IX), two by Ukrainians (Chapters XIII and XIV), and alongside these – actually in-between them – the three other pieces (Chapters X-XII).

### *Moldovan views*

In the Republic of Moldova there is interest in security-sector transparency building and reform for all the usual reasons associated with shedding a post-Soviet legacy, furthering democratisation and completing what Nicolae Chirtoaca calls the 'unfinished construction of the nation and the state'. Moreover, some positive developments have taken place in the 'proper' Moldova, as a Polish commentator calls it.<sup>5</sup> (In breakaway Transdnistria there is evidence of none.)

Reform in the Republic has been slow and superficial, however, partly because of an imperfect understanding of what is required. Chirtoaca cites apparent satisfaction with nominal civilian control of the military. He also finds not only a lack of consensus among stakeholders about 'next steps' but also little domestic impetus for further headway. True, a new *Concept of Military Reform* appeared in 2002 but, while its prescriptions for rationalising the armed forces are satisfactory, other features are not. In particular a veil of ambiguity lies over the matter of where responsibility for implementation rests. (Also, there have been no counterpart documents on police and judicial reform.)

Looking ahead, regarding the domestic agenda, the things that Nicolae Chirtoaca would like to see are

- a strengthening of the civilian oversight and management of the armed forces and security services, to which end he advocates enhancing civilian expertise within all the relevant ministries, raising the profile of the relevant parliamentary oversight committees, and establishing independent research institutes specializing in defence and security issues 'to work in direct contact with the decision-making structures';
- much greater transparency in security-sector affairs, because 'a lack of transparency creates the dangerous trend towards politicisation and abuse of the military and security services by the authorities and political groupings';
- the more active involvement in monitoring the security sector of institutions and organisations of civil society (including the media), especially in using increased transparency of budgeting and improved auditing mechanisms to

<sup>5</sup> Jacek Wróbel, whose 'Transnistria' (*sic*) in *Armed Conflicts in the post-Soviet region*, CES Studies No. 9, (Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies, June 2003), is an excellent concise overview of the dispute.

help reduce ‘the level of corruption and waste of resources in security-sector programmes’;

and

- greater regional and sub-regional (international) co-operation, not least because this should ‘yield knowledge transfer and contribute to the change of mentality of participating Moldovan civilians and military’.

In addition, of course, Chirtoaca has views on the Transdnistrian dispute which impinges on the domestic reform agenda: its persistence creates uncertainties over the content of reform and it absorbs politicians’ energy and attention. (Basically he expresses foreboding about a possible termination of the ‘frozen conflict’ that effectively legitimises the secessionist regime and, in this and other ways, gives Moscow ‘a permanent lever of influence’ in the running of his country.)

The piece here by our second Moldovan contributor, Vlad Lupan, covers much the same ground as Nicolae Chirtoaca’s but with different emphases. Lupan also has things to say about his country’s early security-sector reform efforts, but usefully records the transformation of some ‘old Soviet structures’ (the KGB and Militia) and the setting-up of a new Ministry of Interior with its own interior troops (Carabinieri). He too has looked at the 2002 *Concept of Military Reform*, but judges it more positively. He has picked up, for example, a reference to ‘democratic command and control’ as a subject on which Moldova plans dialogue with others’ armed forces; and he notes that there is a commitment to ‘creation of a civilian and military command structure of the Armed Forces with a detailed delimitation of the attributions in the sphere of political, administrative and military command’. (Not until 2005-2008, though.)

As for the future, Vlad Lupan, thinks security-sector reform (SSR) needs external stimulus and will benefit from international support.

‘Thus, the enlargement of NATO and the European Union up to the borders of Moldova, the recently-declared EU policy on [its] wider neighbourhood and the expressed strategic goal of Moldova to integrate in EU might be those factors that could provide new solutions and give a new momentum to SSR.’

He adds that ‘a future Transnistrian conflict resolution, as well as some positive signals from the EU on its greater and more direct involvement in Moldovan affairs ... would give some additional impetus’. (On the prospects for that ‘conflict resolution’ Lupan is studiously non-committal.)

### *Independent commentaries*

More direct EU involvement in Moldovan affairs generally and in the resolution of the Transdnistrian conflict particularly are the dominant themes in the first of the ‘outside’ contributions to this text.<sup>6</sup> Its author, Dov Lynch, is close to EU thinking on pursuit of the ‘Wider Europe’ agenda and has thought a great deal about the Transdnistria issue. His piece demonstrates this clearly.

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<sup>6</sup> ‘Outside’ meaning here outside Moldova, Ukraine and the immediate neighbourhood.

Lynch's essential message here is that nobody should be surprised that the latest efforts to end the deadlock over Moldova's breakaway 'republic' have ground to a halt (end-2003). 'The negotiations have gone on ice', he writes, so we still have a "frozen" conflict. Still, he thinks there is a way forward, based on, among other things, the following.

- The resumption of discussions on a new constitution *in parallel with* the exploration of options for provision of security guarantees through a "peace consolidation force". This last notion is important, Lynch argues, because any new security arrangement 'must work against the artificial militarisation that has emerged since 1992'. The force should have a civilian and police focus, he says. Most important, he thinks that the EU can and should take the lead in both 'designing and directing new security arrangements' and providing whatever forces might be necessary to police them.
- Further measures to press the powers-that-be in Tiraspol towards settlement. ('Sticks must be combined with carrots', Lynch says.) Options here include freezing of assets and 'the institution of an EU-wide "refusal-to-deal" with companies active on the left bank [i.e. in Transdniestria]'.

The 'other things' in the Lynch prescription include insistence that the Russians honour their troop withdrawal commitment; and perseverance with efforts to obtain from Ukraine a firm commitment to co-operate in border management.

Russia's interests and motives in the latest negotiations and *démarches* concerning Transdniestria, Ukraine's position on the border management question and in general, the opportunities presented by the EU's newly expressed commitment to engage more actively with its eastern neighbours (because it wants stable and well-governed countries on its eastern frontiers) – these themes are all prominent in the second of our 'outside' contributions.

Alex Rahr's essay is brimful of ideas by about the meaning for Moldova and Ukraine of the fact that Russia's former "near abroad" will become part of the EU's "near abroad" from mid-2004. Both countries would like to 'emancipate themselves from the dominant Russian neighbour by means of closer ties with the West', he notes; and he sees several opportunities for them to enhance their strategic cooperation with the EU particularly but also with NATO. For example, Ukraine could take a stronger mediator role in the Transdniestria conflict and do both itself and Moldova a favour by improving border control on their 400km of common frontier. (The very existence of the breakaway republic is largely dependent on its trade with Ukraine and transit of goods through Ukraine.) Collaboration here might lead to development of other forms of cross-border co-operation. This is 'one of the areas in which effective transformation is possible', Rahr says, 'and will be favourably perceived and supported by the EU [because it] stimulates economic growth and higher standards of living on both sides of the border and assists to improve conditions for the investment climate'. 'Ukraine and Moldova could then be promoted into the European communication and transportation networks', he thinks.

For its part, Rahr believes, the EU should develop a security partnership with Ukraine and Moldova within the framework of its European Security and Defence

Policy (ESDP). This notion appeals because he sees the OSCE as having become weaker in its role as the main instrument of peace and stability in the post-Soviet space. The development of a more modern and robust ESDP-mechanism might, he argues, better suit the conflict situations in Moldova and other states of the former USSR.

However, Ukraine continues ‘to face most serious obstacles and challenges on its way to full-fledged integration’, Rahr writes, and ‘many of them are home-made’. Among these he cites security-sector reform, or rather the lack of it. ‘The restructuring of Ukraine’s military forces has not shown positive results’, he says, and ‘the bureaucracy is still locked in former Soviet thinking’. Nor has the country yet placed civil-military relations on a satisfactory footing. ‘Only a radical rethinking of the leadership, like in Romania and Bulgaria in the second half of the 1990s, can bring a breakthrough’, Rahr concludes.

The third and last of the independent commentaries in Part C addresses directly the question of security-sector reform in Ukraine, except that James Sherr says ‘*transformation*, not reform, is what is needed’. This is because of the tenacity of the Soviet legacy across the sector – though less in the armed forces than in other ‘security and power structures’ – and an overarching need generally to change the relationship between state and society in the country.<sup>7</sup>

As this is written (end-2003), the powers-that-be in Kiev are looking, again, at the future shape and size of the armed forces in a far-reaching review initiated by recently-appointed Defence Minister Marchuk (and due for completion in mid-2004). The central task is to get planned provision and likely resource availability on a stable footing. It will not be easy, according to James Sherr; partly because it never is; partly because a couple of special considerations complicate contemporary calculations. First, although aspiring to NATO membership, Ukraine cannot yet presume that it will be admitted. Secondly, the country cannot assume that the days of Russian mischief-making are over (witness the 2003 Tuzla crisis).

What the present leadership has shown little interest in, however, is overdue reform – or transformation – of the state’s many non-military security-sector organisations. ‘Today’, Sherr reminds us, ‘these structures include Internal Troops and a vast array of specialist forces within the domain of the MVS (Ministry of Interior) and *militsia* (police), the civilian and military components of the SBU (Security Service of Ukraine), troops of the State Committee on Defence of State Borders, Ministry of Emergency Situations, State Customs Service, Tax Police, and

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<sup>7</sup> At the same time, Sherr draws attention to some important *accomplishments*. ‘The fact that troops of the Soviet Armed Forces, MVD and KGB numbering 1.4 million men were substantially reduced and thoroughly resubordinated – all of this without conflict and upheaval – was a contribution to European order second only to the country’s unilateral nuclear disarmament’, he writes, referring to the early 1990s. He notes also that ‘a critical mass of state officials, security professionals and independent experts understand the dangers inherent in the Soviet legacy as well as the present post-Soviet status quo’ and have been able to exert some influence on defence decision-making since the later 1990s. It is important also, Sherr argues, to recognise the significance of the NATO-Ukraine relationship that has developed over the years, which represents ‘an astonishing record for a military establishment which viewed (and to a fair extent still views) transparency as a threat to departmental interests and national security.’

the Main Directorate for Struggle against Organised Crime and Corruption'. Moreover, the core structures – the MVS and SBU – function much as their antecedents did in Soviet times: as instruments of control over society (now at the service of who knows whom). Thus, Sherr writes, they are 'on the cutting edge of the relationship between state and society and subject to all its strains and distortions'; and it is crucial, therefore, that they be made accountable and that their financing be made transparent. 'If the state cannot fund *militsia*, border guards, customs officers and tax police', he says, 'somebody else will'.

Sherr goes on to comment on the dysfunctional nature of Ukraine's (inherited) administrative culture and attitude to public information. He concludes, however, on his central themes. The imperative of transformation is recognised in the military field, but there are tough choices ahead. It is imperative that transformation is extended to the wider security sector, not least because this challenge 'is directly connected to the most important challenge of all: diminishing the gap between state and society in Ukraine'.

#### *Ukrainian voices*

Following Sherr's analysis, and concluding Part C, are two views from Kiev: a chapter by Grigoriy Perepelitsya; and a chapter that is the joint work of Oleksiy Melnyk and Leonid Polyakov. Interestingly, these Ukrainian authors concur in Sherr's overall assessment that, so far as their country's security sector is concerned, in 2004/2005 we should be talking not so much about 'needs' and 'options' for reform, more about *imperatives*.

In Perepelitsya's opinion action is called for in both the armed forces themselves and the institutions of democratic control. For him it is imperative because he wants Ukraine to commit itself to joining NATO – the sooner the better – and thinks that the country will not be considered a serious candidate unless it is already clearly committed to root-and-branch reform. Once a candidate, it will have the benefit of stimulus and assistance from the MAP process. In the meantime it has the Ukraine-NATO Action Plan arrangement as an aid to self-discipline; and it has not responded to that as it should have done, he says.

He notes, for example, the many shortfalls in meeting Action Plan targets that were reported in mid-2003; and he foresees continuing difficulties for Ukraine in meeting key military objectives. These are (1) showing that the country can make an appropriate contribution to collective defence *and* for contingency operations; (2) indicating a willingness and ability progressively to improve its capabilities; and (3) meeting standardisation and interoperability objectives. On the third of these points, the present leadership's continuing insistence on equipment deals with Russia and/or domestic procurement could be problematical.

Given this reasoning it comes as something of a surprise to find that, pending completion of the major review that Defence Minister Marchuk is conducting, Perepelitsya's priorities for 2004/5 would include a campaign to muster both domestic

and international support for Ukraine's NATO candidacy, devising a border regime acceptable to the EU, 'reinforcing control' over the Russians' military presence(s) in the country and 'creating preconditions' for their withdrawal from Sevastopol, achieving NATO connectivity in a couple of areas (airspace management and communications), and establishing a well-balanced system of military-industrial co-operation (see previous paragraph) – but *nothing specific* in the domain of security-sector reform. On this, all he offers is 'optimisation of the structure and function of the military organization of the state' (which could mean anything or nothing).

On transparency-building and the 'democratic control' issue generally, however, Grigoriy Perepelitsya is less elusive. He explains that the legal base for a satisfactory regime exists, thanks to several statutes including a 2003 Law, but he would like to see

- Additional 'normative documents' to regulate decisions on definite issues and strengthen the position of civilian officials and experts in their dealings with the uniformed military;
- More civilian appointments throughout the defence organization with the position of 'civil bodies in the Armed Forces of Ukraine' properly elaborated; and;
- Exact definition of the powers of the (civilian) minister and his deputies.

Perepelitsya's advocacy here is related to concern about the powers of the Presidency and the Council of National Security and Defence of Ukraine (CNSD). He cites the danger of 'substitution of democratic principles with authoritarian methods ... when civilian ministers and civil personnel of force structures can be appointed just according to the principle of personal devotion to the President or loyalty to the party [whose leaders make up the President's entourage]'. This anxiety also underlies our author's wish to see

- Improvement in the control exercised over the intelligence service(s) and special forces.

Significantly none of these points expressly calls for legislative oversight (so that it is to how civil direction and control are exercised that they are addressed rather than democratic control in the fullest sense of the phrase). The reason is that the Ukrainian Rada and its 'parties' bear little resemblance to the elected representatives of any state west of Kiev.

Melnyk and Polyakov would echo their fellow-countryman's desire – and Sherr's – to see Ukraine's non-military security-sector structures brought under democratic control. These 'remain basically unreformed from the time of their creation in the early 1990s', they write. If efforts *were* made to carry reform into this area, however, it is likely that the initiative would receive 'considerable' public support, they believe. Is there any direction from which stimulus might come?

Because of the organisations' engagement in the continuous struggle for political power in Ukraine and the parallel process of redistribution of property, the likeliest source is external – the EU, maybe NATO. Certainly it appears that the country's own leadership is not yet serious about, for example, democratising and improving the professionalism of the police in order to provide real security to its

citizens against the criminal world. This might alter, however, if that latent popular support were to grow in parallel with a recognition among the Kiev elite that continued inaction might prejudice EU and NATO membership aspirations.

It is that kind of 'squeeze' – internal plus external pressure – that is most likely to break the logjam that has held up *military* reform in Ukraine for so long. Melnyk and Polyakov trace the record of negligence here. During the early years of Ukraine's independence, the political elite concentrated its efforts on the subordination of military formations – removing them as a political factor in domestic struggles – rather than reforms that would have addressed the real needs of the Armed Forces and defence policy. This neglect was assisted by the non-existent role of civil society in the early 1990s, which prevented the Armed Forces' popularity in society from significantly influencing the political agenda. In structural terms, it took years for the leadership to realise that the Soviet military heritage of some 800,000 military personnel and huge amounts of equipment was more of a liability than an asset.

Thus, say Melnyk and Polyakov, throughout the 1990s 'the Ukrainian military was basically left to reform itself as it saw fit, within the framework of shrinking budgets.' 'The failure to make sufficient reductions in force structure in the face of declining resources led', they add, 'to a situation where over 80 per cent of the MoD budget was (and still is) spent on the maintenance of personnel, leaving little left for either investment or maintaining the readiness of current forces'. Also the military remained imbued with the Soviet mindset and hamstrung by Soviet standards. The first serious engagements with NATO in the second half of the decade made a little difference, but not a lot. For instance, officers were able to take courses in Euro-Atlantic Integration, but there was no thorough-going review of curricula and training at military education institutions. 'The side-by-side existence of two standards – NATO and Soviet – causes systemic tensions that waste resources and reduce overall effectiveness', our authors write.

This was also a period of false starts in defence reform, which became habit-forming. On top of that, it was not a learning process. Even after a series of reform efforts – as shown by the evolution of programmes such as the 'State Programme of Reformation and Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine through 2005' (adopted in 2000) to the 'Concept for the Structure of the Armed Forces-2010' (adopted in 2001) to the 'State Programme of Transition of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to Manning with Contracted Servicemen' (adopted in 2002) – Ukraine has yet to address the need for systemic transformation, preferring to focus instead on quantitative factors (and step-by-step reductions to ever-shrinking targets). 'As a result', Melnyk and Polyakov say, 'current plans are still unrealistic'.

What, then, do these analysts think should happen now? What do they have to say about 'needs' and about 'options' for Ukraine in the short-to-medium term?

Fundamental to their thinking is the proposition that 'reform can only succeed if it can get in front of the current cycle of step-by-step reductions and ever-thinner distribution of scanty resources'. 'The Ukrainian authorities have recently made promising declarations', they say, 'but the associated actions are still inconsistent or non-existent.'

‘What is needed is a concentration of resources and consistency of reform measures, founded on strong political will and clear definition of priorities. But in the absence of a direct and visible large military threat, the country’s leadership, which is concerned primarily about short-term political issues, is unlikely to become sincerely concerned about addressing long-term issues related to military reform.’

‘Two factors that could overcome this lack of interest’, they continue, ‘are pressure either from the Ukrainian public and civil society and/or from Ukraine’s democratic partners in the West.’

The question is: pressure of what sort? Our contributors’ answer embodies the notion of creating a virtuous circle. There should be a stronger insistence by NATO on the fulfilment of some of the Organisation’s key expectations and requirements if Ukraine is in earnest about its membership aspirations; and by the EU on evidence that Kiev takes seriously the ‘good governance’ elements of the Union’s candidacy conditions. ‘Both the Western partners and civil society in Ukraine should consider that progress in defence reform will help highlight the urgency of democratising the entire system of state governance, including reforms in the political and economic spheres’ say Melnyk and Polyakov. As these occur, the way for further defence reform will become easier. There may be fewer false starts.

Responsibility for sustaining the process should not be placed wholly on NATO and the EU, of course. It ought to be stressed constantly in Ukraine that realising the country’s declared intention to join those organisations depends on far-reaching SSR. Three key issues will need to be addressed by a comprehensive and systemic approach:

- (1) establishing democratic norms in the security sector;
- (2) ensuring a security system that meets modern needs at affordable cost;
- and last, but not least,
- (3) attending to political factors.

In the area of democratic standards – for NATO and EU membership – Ukraine will need to establish that it is a law-governed democracy in which human rights and political freedoms are fully respected *and* meet the more specific requirements for the security sector, including civilian direction and democratic civil control, ensuring effective border regimes (that simultaneously form a barrier to criminal activity and allow the free movement of legitimate people and goods across the border), and standards of law enforcement behaviour.

Melnyk and Polyakov admit that to date the influence of NATO procedures on internal processes in Ukraine is mostly limited to the Armed Forces. To effectively promote change, Ukraine’s co-operation with an enlarging NATO and EU will need to better match, they recognize, wider SSR priorities embracing the non-military area (a high priority for both Perepelitsya and Sherr, remember).

However, Melnyk and Polyakov conclude with a reminder that this process can only be effective if Ukraine gives priority to SSR and acts in systematic way. They say

‘Action cannot be limited to agreeing an Action Plan with NATO and the EU (and perhaps eventually participation in MAP); it must be supported by national



procedures that are aimed at supporting a process of systemic transformation. These national procedures must: clearly identify national security interests and link them to tools (structures) and resources (budget and personnel); bring together planning (via the President), budgeting (via the Government and parliament) and execution (responsibility); and develop political and societal consensus on security needs and the price to be paid.'

Further, they think that linking democratisation and internal political reform (which the public supports) to NATO/EU accession (about which the public is ambivalent, or even hostile) will be crucial to changing attitudes and thus to the effectiveness of SSR in Ukraine.

### **Agenda-setting**

From the wealth of material in Parts B and C of this volume – neighbourhood perspectives and some perceptions 'in and of' Moldova and Ukraine – we have tried to distil essentials. These are presented in Part D as statements of priority actions for the two countries in the short-to-medium term: an *Agenda for Moldova* (Chapter XV) and an *Agenda for Ukraine* (Chapter XVI).



## **Part B      Perspectives: Neighbourhood Experience**



## II. BULGARIA: LESSONS OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

Valeri Ratchev<sup>8</sup>

Although the issues of security sector and defence reform became very popular during the last decade, still there is consensus neither on the spectrum of institutions and issues that should be covered by the process nor on what “reform” is and what it should encompass. Broadly, in the case of Bulgaria we identified through the method of “probe-fault” two different approaches towards reforms. One stresses that the reform is mainly an aspect of the overall democratisation process of the country and so it is an issue of political responsibility and control. The other approach argues that reform is an issue of mainly professional performance and, in terms of this, should be left primarily to the hands (and heads) of the security sector staff. Obviously the ideal formula should consist of an optimal mixture of both approaches. The core of security sector reform in Bulgaria is in redefinition of the political role, judicial basis, operational missions and organisation of the Special Services, the Armed Forces, and the other institutions from the sector<sup>9</sup>. Important is also the aspect that security and defence reform should be considered as well as *a specific episode in the emerging democratic civil-military relations*. This is mainly because the relations between citizens and the state are changing in such a way that all three parties involved in civil-military relations – political elite, security sector professionals and civil society – must adjust themselves and adopt new cultural models of conduct and mutual relations.

Similar to other East European countries, Bulgaria lacks practical and theoretical models for such large-scale transformations. However, *the experience of the last decade is enormous indeed, and analysing it would be a great contribution to the art of political and strategic management in future*. Whether this experience might prove useful for other countries with different political realities and historical background is an issue of methodology. The historic traditions, political, and strategic culture are the most influential common denominators in explaining and analysing the persistence of different political, social and professional processes in the context of radical security sector reforms. Anyway, despite of the differences in order to become

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<sup>8</sup> This article expresses personal evaluations and opinions of the author that do not necessarily reflect any Bulgarian official position. They have been developed and updated during the last two-three years. Early versions of particular ideas and theses have been presented at conferences and published by the NATO Defense College and the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). See also *Security Sector Reform Coalition Report #6 titled NATO Membership and the Challenges Facing the Bulgarian Parliament* (Sofia: November, 2003).

<sup>9</sup> Here the “security sector” is in accordance with DCAF’s approach and consists of the Bulgarian Army (traditional name for the Armed Forces, incl. Military Police and Counterintelligence, and Military Information Service), National Intelligence Service (foreign intelligence), National Security Service (counterintelligence), National Police Service, National Service of Gendarmerie (paramilitary force with police functions), National Border Police Service (control of the ground and maritime borders), National Guard Service (for guarding VIP and important civilian objects), National Service for Combating Organised Crime and National Service of Fire and Emergency Safety.

a generator of stability, the armed forces and security services must be integrated in the democratic political systems. They must be kept under effective democratic control and should be transformed into real instruments not only for national but also international democratic security policy.

### **Transformation Imperatives**

Within the new political and security environment of the countries in transition the ideology of transforming former “powerful organisations” has three principal imperatives. From the point of intra-societal democratic development *security sector reform is a substantial element of the political transition of the country*. Depolitisation of professional service, introduction of civilian political leadership at the ministerial level of governing, expansion of the use of civilian expertise, and gradual enhancement of transparency and accountability are more or less common for the Eastern European countries during the last decade. They were supplemented by efforts to stimulate the rise and maturity of a new political culture, social mentality and organisational behaviour<sup>10</sup>. It becomes increasingly obvious that the borrowing of law, or adapting institutions, and applying external rules for civil-military connections from countries with developed democratic cultures, does not lead to an automatic restructuring in values, psychological attitudes, and political behaviour in post-totalitarian societies. The reason why this happens so often lies in the specific features of the prevailing political culture and its functional environment.

The other imperative is that at the same time *national security organisations' reform has a purely functional (operational) aspect*, related to the adequacy of their capacities to meet society's requirements for security in the new sensitive environment. Forces of any type should have essential capacity to deal with situations with probability rates as of 95 per cent as well as with those whose probability of occurrence is 5 per cent or even lower. The political definition of the reforms includes building and maintaining capacities to meet the four main functions: sustaining the population and the state authorities, responding to international and local crises, protecting the territorial sovereignty of the country, taking part in collective and co-operative security efforts.

Last but not least in terms of significance is the fact that for the countries, which are striving for membership in NATO and EU *security sector reform relations has turned into issue of foreign policy*. The enlargement of these organisations is more closely related to democratic evolution of society, economic and political divergences,

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<sup>10</sup> The political culture characterises the qualitative level at which political relations function. It includes political knowledge and values, plus the sustainable patterns of political, social and organisational behaviour. One of the “objective laws” to which its action is subject is that of inertial cultural effect. This law suggests that each political generation inherits from the preceding one a certain volume of knowledge, values, and behaviour patterns. A period of transition will tend to see the endurance of values and behaviour patterns in civil-military relations that are typical of totalitarian society; the mono-logical nature of communication, the persistence of ideological fears, the tendency to place group (social, corporate, or political) interests above the national ones, and so on.

and transatlantic relations than to the “pure” defence in its classic *Clausewitzian* formula. There is no doubt that the aim of NATO enlargement is neither to become better prepared for total defence nor to prevent some new continental war. The real point in this context is that the institution of liberal democratic civil-military relations and the transformation of the military establishments of the applicant countries have turned from internal issues into issues of foreign policy<sup>11</sup>.

Within these imperatives and on the basis of the real Eastern European countries’ experience a list of basic requirements to the security sector reform could be drawn in order to facilitate the extraction of useful lessons.<sup>12</sup> The main criterion for reform of national security organisations is that while they should be effective and efficient in carrying out their duties, they should do so on the basis of well-considered national security and defence strategies, be under democratic control, and act on the basis of realistic, credible and affordable plans. In more detail, this implies:

- *Up-to-date security and defence strategies*, which have been publicly debated and approved by the national parliament. These should clearly define the risks and challenges facing the country, and set out the role of the defence and other forces, the types of mission which it is envisaged they should perform, and the way in which they are to be managed;
- *Modern organisational structures*, both within defence and more widely within government, to allow the necessary coordination of national security decision-making, including for crisis management;
- *Adequate national funding arrangements*, commensurate with what the country can afford, providing as far as possible predictable provision from year to year, and allowing scope for efficient management;
- *Credible resource-based plans*, arrived at following analysis and prioritisation of tasks and missions. Plans must be realistically costed, formulated in sufficient detail, and rigorously implemented in order to control what is done and how resources are used;
- *Appropriate military structures*, sized, trained and equipped to meet national and international obligations and objectives;
- *Appropriate legislative underpinning* to support national plans and international objectives, for example to enable forces to deploy abroad;
- *Effective management of human resources*, both military and civilian, including to train personnel for new tasks and to deal with redundancies where necessary;
- *Accountability* to national parliaments and publics, both in the narrow, financial sense and more generally for security and defence policies and operations;
- *Adequate security arrangements and access to intelligence*, to facilitate exchange of classified information within government and internationally, and to support security and defence operations;

<sup>11</sup> For this reason “the big bang expansion” was accepted with more enthusiasm from politicians, diplomats and societies in the West than from their military.

<sup>12</sup> The following list with requirements is extracted from a large number of articles, documents, and speeches, presented since 1995 but mainly between 2000 and 2003.

- *Effective arrangements for public information*, both to ensure transparency in respect of national policies and security forces activities and to respond to points of public and media concern. Links to defence- and security-related academic and non-governmental organisations should also be in place, in order to develop better public understanding of defence.

This is a formidable checklist of requirements for any country.

## **Political System and Policy of Reforms**

Among observers there is probably a unanimously shared opinion that the security sector reform in Bulgaria has been painful, relatively slow but successful. “Lost years” were followed by radical and deep reforms. The irreversible development in the security sector and especially in defence has been recognised by the western countries and institutions. Between 2004 and 2007 the country will join each organisation that has been aimed. In spite of this one could point to shortcomings in many areas. Rather than giving an overview about problems the following observations are addressed to those wishing to learn from the mistakes and good practices of others.

### *Political system*

The constitutional system and judicial definition of relationship among the various centres of authority have a decisive impact on both policy formulation and democratic control over the sector. In Bulgaria political power is distributed in accordance with the Constitution of 1991 among four relatively independent institutions: Parliament, Government, President, and judiciary. This formula is quite common in Europe. However in Bulgaria it came as a result of the “round table”, which carried out the “velvet revolution” overthrowing communism. As a result a balance was sought among these centres. In regard to security, defence and armed forces, this balance is one of parity rather than optimal distribution of functions.

Particularly important are the relations within the triangle Parliament (Bulgaria is “parliamentarian republic”), the President (directly elected head of the state, and supreme commander in peace and war time), and the Government (responsible for the executive policy). The fact that the members of the Parliament and the President have equal electoral status means that the Parliament does not exert control over the President, but the President has not a right on legislative initiative. The President as a head of the state, signs treaties, appoints generals and admirals from the Armed Forces and Security Services endorses strategic defence plans and so on, but he is doing this only after governmental proposals. All these functions are elements of the strategic management of the state, which officially are excluded from the political process due to the specific status of the President. And being excluded from this process, they cannot be kept under Parliamentary control.



These facts shortly illustrate the impact of the ideology of “balanced centres of political power” applied during the new constitutional building process of 1990/91. Even further, to guarantee the balance indeed the security sector organisations are also in some degree distributed among these centres of political power. Thus the National Security Service (counterintelligence) and the National Guard Service (which provides protection to VIP personalities and strategic infrastructure such as nuclear power plants, ministries, and so on) are under direct control of the President. And since the President himself is not under the control of the Parliament, his subordinates are also beyond this control. In view of the mentioned presidential lack of legislative initiative, these organisations still have no legal framework of their own.

### *Policy of Reforms*

#### Defence

The reform *Plan 2004* was designed in 1998-1999 and approved in 2000 in order to make the national defence system adequate to the new political and international realities by achieving the best possible results with the scarce resources allocated for defence; to transform the Ministry of Defence into a modern defence administration, adequate to the requirements of democratic society and market economy; to make the Armed Forces adequate to the strategic environment and capable of meeting the challenges of new types of conflicts, and to reach an initial level of interoperability with NATO and a capacity for effective contribution in crises response operations and collective defence. This should also turn the Armed Forces into an effective instrument of the national strategy to join NATO and EU.

*Plan 2004* is reaching its completion: it achieved the initial reorganisation of the army, releasing it from its extrinsic functions, responsibilities and activities; it also introduced new missions and tasks. The political and organisational role of this process was related to preparing the army for a radically changed internal and international environment and, above all, for NATO membership. The Strategic Review of Defence, initiated by the Government in 2003, should conceptualise programming and push it into creating the long-term image of the Bulgarian army in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

The Strategic Review Political Framework adopted by the Government contains some important initial guidelines as to the planning of forces. The analysis of the current state of, and opportunities for, defence indicates a lack of risk of a large scale aggression against Bulgaria, a low probability of the necessity for full mobilisation in the context of defence of the country and a lasting trend towards expanding the scale and intensity of international peacekeeping and conflict prevention operations. It is on these grounds and in accordance with NATO trends that the future forces are seen as ‘capable of deployment’ and ‘capable of defence of the national territory’. Interoperability has been defined as a priority for the international operation forces. On the other hand, the resources for the overall modernisation of the army (equipment, infrastructure, communications, training,

living standards, health and education) have been fixed without any sound argumentation and are not bound with an assessment of what part of the planning can be achieved. In the context of the strategic perspective, this situation hides the risk of having the army split permanently into two parts: a small part (called package of deployment forces) characterised by a high degree of professionalisation and modernisation, and a large part of forces for 'territorial defence' with a relatively low combat capacity.

Creating the concept of a 'unified army' (including its reserve or mobilisation components) presents a better alternative. Such an army will have a high impact on military morale. Limitations in resources will be reflected by introducing categories of formations according to their capabilities for deployment. These categories will be crucial to the prioritisation process in the programmes for modernisation and professionalisation. There will also be additional inner stimuli for those willing to serve in formations with a high degree of readiness for military involvement and in this way the lost willingness for career mobility towards more prestigious, promising and better paid positions will be restored.

### Police Institutions

In contrast to defence and armed forces the institutions for internal security in Bulgaria were not transformed through comprehensive and co-ordinated plans. The reason obviously is a complex rooted in the more (than the army) invisible structures of the interior services, their deep engagement in all social, industrial and diplomatic affairs, and, not on the last place, the more or less recognised intention of every new political power to benefit from the co-operation or the control over the secret services in favour of partisan or business interests. Due to the fact that the security concerns of the population were associated with activities other than defence, especially after the end of intensive combat in Serbia, the citizens' expectations were to increase internal security, have a more reliable and less corrupt police, capable effectively to fight burgeoning organised crime and corruption. As in other East European countries in Bulgaria also the entire security agenda has moved from the main external security provider, the armed forces to internal security providers<sup>13</sup>. In sum, the decline of external threat went in parallel with the very limited increase of the prestige of the armed forces. However, with the strengthening of democracy and civil society, step-by-step measures were undertaken by different governments in order to put the police sector under democratic control, to adapt the interior services to the new security environment (characterised by significant shift from external defence towards internal anti-criminal and corruption activities), to strength the role of judiciary, and to increase the role of emerging civil society for the public and individual security.

Reform of the interior sector from the very beginning was marked by two-tracks parallel pressures that reflect the specific case of Bulgaria. One is the truism that the secret services, in one or another degree took part (many believe that it has been significant, and even dominative) in the so called "velvet transition of power".

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<sup>13</sup> Dunay P., *'Did Not, Does Not, Will Not' Or Why Defence Reform Continues To Be the Weakest Element of Hungary's Transformation* (Geneva Centre for Security Policy: Geneva, 2003).

Other factor is the monstrous eruption of criminality during the first years of “the wild capitalism” which became international under the dark shadow of the wars in and the embargo against Yugoslavia, the dissolution of the Soviet Union-market and the flagrant activation of the trans-Balkan road of drug, human and other trafficking. The result was that the expected and natural pressure for democratisation of the police sector receded giving priority to institutional effectiveness. This dualism had and still has a place most of all in the public perceptions. The reality shows that the provoked delay in democratisation and modernisation only deepened the problems in the sector. At the threshold of NATO and EU membership, despite that a lot of serious improvements have been implemented, Bulgarian interior sector still needs deep reforms: from amendments in the Constitution, through passing specialised bills for the “secret services”, up to European type of reorganisation of police sector from quasi-military type into real “civil service”.

Currently, the main task in preventing terrorism is to limit the possibilities for financing or any other support activities of international terrorist organisations. The Government decision on the *Ratification of the Convention on Suppression of Financing Terrorism* led to amendments to the *Penal Code* and other existing and expected domestic legislation into compliance with the provisions of Articles 4, 5, 8, and 18 of the Convention. Also, a *Plan for Detecting and Preventing Terrorist Activities on the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria* is in implementation. Its focus is mainly on establishing a strict regime and control over generally hazardous substances by extending the requirements to persons who apply for and hold firearms or handle explosives and other generally hazardous substances and enhancing the control over them, actively countering crimes related to the use of explosives through operative measures and control at sites where explosives, strong poisons, and radioactive and other generally hazardous substances are kept.

Bulgaria is also a party to the key international conventions in the fields of transnational organised crime, illicit narcotic drugs trafficking, money laundering, illicit traffic of arms, and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially lethal materials. The Government is obliged to refuse permissions for foreign trade transactions in arms and dual-use goods and technologies with countries against which sanctions have been imposed by international organisations in relation to exports to certain states and regions. Especially the arms export control policy was totally redefined after the ambitions to join NATO and the European Union became a security policy driving factor. Sharing the common approach towards the arms control, policy of non-proliferation and risk reduction, Bulgaria participates in regimes such as the *Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Control for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies*, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee on controlling nuclear materials and technology, and the Australia Group on controlling chemical and biological weapons material and technology. Bulgaria has applied for membership to the *Missile Technology Control Regime* but already applies its guidelines. Despite these preparations and largely expressed political readiness strictly to follow them the so called ‘TEREM’ affair (concerns the illegal export to Syria of dual use spare parts from the branch office of state owned defence industrial company

‘TEREM’) exposed how far is the state system of control from expected effectiveness. Coming as it did, just days before the NATO Summit in Prague, it was a piece of exquisite timing that Machiavelli would have been proud of. Some observers in Sofia even ask: ‘was this affair a hopeless act of Bulgarian mis-management or was it a sublime performance of political machination designed to discredit certain members of the Government’? And if the former, then how could such arrogant behaviour be allowed to continue?<sup>14</sup>

Overall, the evaluation of police services reform is positive but sounds different from the standing point of the politicians and citizen. From political point of view issues like departisation, parliamentary oversight, political civil leadership and transparency are in dominant degree resolved. Much more difficult is with the legislative background. The 2003 Parliamentary autumn session started with debates on amendments even in the Constitution that are designed to open space for a completely new “European” type of both division of labour between services and branches of judiciary and the prosecution and related legislation. However, as in the other countries from the region, systematic comprehensive redesign remains to be done. People reflect this fact two ways. From one side they systematically express total dissatisfaction from the work of police. Despite this they support every successful investigation of corruption and organised crime and are ready to give confidence vote to every police chief capable to deal with an “iron hand”.

#### National security services

The issues of the intelligence and security agencies’ activities are definitely the most specific and complex in the realm of security issues. The multifaceted nature of the phenomenon is inevitably reflected on the definition of the balance and the borderline of the intelligence activity and the scope and mechanism of the democratic oversight and control of the respective agencies. This particular complexity underscores the persisting need of broader education of the public on the basics of the issue to provide it with adequate instruments of understanding the problems and implementing the oversight.

During the communist regime, exactly before the change in 1989 the national security services were concentrated within the Ministry of Interior – all of them except the Intelligence department of the General Staff of Bulgarian Army. With the dismissal from power of the last communist leader Mr. Todor Zhivkov on 10 November 1989 among the first priority issues was the restructuring of the national security services. On 5 February 1990 “First Department” was removed from the Ministry of Interior and the *National Intelligence Service* was established. Approximately the same period the other security services were integrated into a new one called *National Service for Defence of the Constitution* within the Ministry of Interior. In 1991 the Great National Assembly, called to approve a new constitution, passed the Ministry of Interior Act that determined only one of the security services –

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<sup>14</sup> The Principal of the company is the MoD and it is to perform not only overhauls of armament and machinery, but also produce spare parts that are necessary for these repairs (as a result the Prime Minister sacked two of the Deputy Defence Ministers and the board of directors of TEREM). See <http://www.csees.net>

*National Security Service* – to be prerogative of the executive power. The *Military counter-intelligence* was subordinated to the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces together with the *Military Intelligence*. Both services after several reorganisations were transferred under civilian minister's control.

Generally concluding, the national security services are still to be regulated from legislative and democratic control point of view. NATO and EU membership requirements provide sufficiently clear frame but probably it could not been enough. There are four factors that cause special concern in NATO's respective circles in connection with Bulgaria's (and other new members') intelligence services reform.

The first factor depends on the degree of achieving civic democratic control over the intelligence services and their operations. In this connection, it is important to motivate the civil society to educate themselves on the issues of intelligence in order to be able to control it better. This makes it necessary to demystify intelligence while preserving and increasing its efficiency in the service of the country's defence and the exerted civic democratic control. It is also necessary to assist the formation of a political culture that supports the legitimate role of intelligence under conditions of democracy and does not permit the leakage of intelligence information for private or political goals. At the same time, this culture should not allow intelligence to roam free by drawing social and political dividends from its concentrated informational might. Finally, there is the issue of selection, training and overall preparation of professional agents – those who specialise as professional servants of the state. Everyone should understand clearly that this profession – unlike many others under conditions of democracy – is to be subjected to professional regulated control and, only very rarely, to external regulations. However, given the possible danger of these professionals' impunity in conditions of transition to a fully-fledged democracy, there is a need for a more concrete form of accountability and control by external units and governmental and civil structures familiar with the task specificity and complexity. Yet even in conditions of a more settled democratic society, there will be a need to cope in an intelligent manner with the dilemma of democratic control over intelligence: such control is to be exerted but this should not happen at the expense of the efficient functioning of the intelligence services in their efforts to defend the nation and the state.

The second factor depends on the degree to which the intelligence services reform has been harmonised and synchronised with the standard procedures of western intelligence services. A question of key importance in this context is that of the early retirement of *high-ranking officers* remaining from the times of totalitarian communism, as well as the recruitment of officers that have a pro-western orientation and have not been discredited. One may say that this is a matter of simple party political analysis that should not provoke dramatic responses from any direction.

The third factor is dependent on the degree to which the link between national and Russian intelligence and counter-intelligence services has been severed. The problem is that the US and NATO possess evidence of conducted disinformation campaigns and of Russian intelligence gathering information from the new countries, members and aspiring members of the Alliance. These facts tie in logically with the

continuing declarations of top-level Russian officials that NATO enlargement is a mistake and Russia perceives it as a hostile act. It is naïve to expect that our future NATO allies will become 'less alert' in this area, even if they act as friends or even allies with Russia on a number of issues or because we do not go far enough in our analyses and activities in this area. Our sovereign conduct following 1989 means, above all, an independent, many-sided and in-depth strategic analysis and assessment of the security situation and an adequate response to it. It turns out that one important component of this situation includes the opinions, perceptions and assessments of our allies that we should also study carefully. In addition, we need to formulate independently our positions according to the demands of the new situation without necessarily expecting the corrective power of allied opinion. The positive content of our links with Russia will apparently have to be promoted by other ways and channels: e.g. in the context of multilateral shared efforts against terrorism instead of free use of our national sovereignty by skilful intelligence quarters.

The fourth factor depends on the degree to which intelligence and counter-intelligence have been ensured sufficient budgets and other resources in order to function efficiently. In the case of Bulgaria, there was some additional concern recently that the trafficking in arms towards the Middle East and dictatorial or terrorist-bound states may have something to do with an insufficiency of the reform and adequate control of the intelligence and counter-intelligence services.

### **Lessons Learned from the Policy of Reforms in Bulgaria**

The policy for preparation of the country for NATO and European Union membership has been and is the environment wherein the deepest changes in Bulgarian society and in the security sector organisations are being formed and realized. This "environment" to a great extent sets the parameters and determines the pace of reforms, formulates advisable criteria and makes regular review and assessment. So the entire success and problems of the integration policy should be viewed in the light of the strategic perspective for full integration of Bulgaria and the Bulgarian people into the European and Atlantic political, social, economical and security systems. In a social, political and organisational aspect the integration policy in its essence is contribution to strengthening democracy and development of civil society; participation in the international efforts in the fight against common security threats; and reform of the security sector organisations themselves.

The success in these three aspects in particular is one of the most important and even crucial arguments to receive an invitation for membership in the European Union and NATO. The security sector organisations should be reorganized and placed under democratic control in order to ensure both their efficiency and empathy to the common process of democratisation and democratic development. An important condition for the success of such a strategy is the learning of correct lessons from the experience gained in the past dozen years and their interpretation in the context of NATO membership.

Security sector reform needs strong and continues political management, based on unanimous understanding between politicians, society and professionals on the major issues of the national security vision, strategy and policy. The principal political-professional consensus on the need and macro parameters of security and defence organisations' reform is crucial for its success. This is one of the greatest difficulties in reform planning and implementation. It needed more than seven years for such a consensus to be achieved in Bulgaria. The issue became symbolic for the incompatibility between the hangover from the Warsaw Pact political and strategic culture and the approach to national security based on "European common values". Periodically in 1994, 1997, 1999, 2001, and again now in 2003<sup>15</sup> the public debate was revitalised around the parameters of the reforms in different security organisations, especially the division of labour between them, the level of the democratic control, and even their constitutional subordination to different "centres of political power". Consensus was reached when both sides – politicians and professionals - matured to understand that the successful creation of the new national security sector should be based on realistic evaluation of their essential role in the emerging international and internal realities, shedding both memories from the past and illusions about the future, and strictly accounting for every security and defence related expenditure.

In practice, security sector transformation was initiated and performed separately for each individual organisation since results are achieved fast due to the existing regulatory framework and, most of all, to the mechanisms of resource provision. It is essential, however, that reforms be carried out by following a single concept and consensus-based political, regulatory, organisational and social principles. What this means on an operating level is that we need an overall transformation of the security sector by following a single concept and possible amendments to the Constitution, a series of laws, structural and staff alterations, a new system of staff recruitment, training and development, introduction of integrated information systems, intensified civil control and reintegration of the national security system into the overall structure of the state. In this way, a level of 'strategic community' can be reached that will bring us closer to NATO members' practices.

The new concept of reform and development of the security sector should contain two defining components. The first one is *democratic and civil control* in all decisions and processes of the sector reform. The second one is the principle of *efficiency and effectiveness* as a criterion for the functioning of individual organisations and the sector as a whole. Even if organically intertwined, these two pillars of the new security sector reform concept have their specific characteristics, problems and requirements. Conceptualising the sector and finding solutions to individual problems in the different reform areas should also be included in the responsibilities and priorities of Parliament not only before becoming a member but also (and to a greater extent even) after receiving membership.

<sup>15</sup> A comprehensive Strategic Defence Review should be performed until April 2004 in order to draw the parameters of the security sector and especially the armed forces as those of a NATO member country. For more information on the issue visit the web-site of the Ministry of Defence ([www.md.government.bg](http://www.md.government.bg)).

The key for security sector reform are the figures of ministers and other political executives. In the case of Bulgaria the role of the minister is to rein in disparate interests in the defence and police establishment and shape a reform plan to suit the overall goals of himself and his administration. Given their limited time and resources, the task is enormous, in some ways impossible, but the performance of the ministers is vitally important for design and implementation of reform plans. The existing organisational system of the security sector departments is not meeting the requirements of modern management. The accumulation of political, administrative, command and staff functions within one and the same structures is not meeting the contemporary ideas for efficient management. The issue pertaining to the political appointments, including in the services, reporting to the President is not yet fully clear. From the Council of Ministers point of view the planning and implementation of reforms at the same time in several or in most of the organisations also seems hard to manage. The analysis of the reorganisations in the Ministry of Interior and in the Armed Forces shows that the lack of an initial integrated concept for the security sector has made the processes rather moving apart than focused. Instead of optimisation of objectives, functional reallocation and development of complementary capabilities the result was duplication, accumulation of similar capabilities, loss of people and many other negative results.

Redefinition of the new professionalism should make the security sector's staff adequate to the new security and political realities. The basic obstacle in their behaviour is that they should not only think of national security with high responsibility, but also understand that the essential threats to national security are more complex than ever before. The most difficult results that have been reached in this context in Bulgaria are based on the culture to think that Bulgarian national security depends on the security of the others and most of all of the neighbours. As a result the definition of the term "defence" was changed in order to involve issues like "international military co-operation", "confidence and security building measures", "multinational formations", "conflict prevention", and "crisis management". Interoperability for the Armed Forces became an issue related not only with NATO membership but with the "international responsibility" of the country as well. A new division of labour between the national security sector organisations is still needed to achieve inter-agency co-operation effect, and higher efficiency besides avoiding overlapping.

Serious management capacity is needed for effective and timely reforms. From governmental point of view security sector reform is extremely large set of issues that attracts political attention and resources, and needs time to be prepared, motivated, promoted, defended and implemented. In Bulgaria it was identified that the national political, civilian and professional capacity to manage successfully the multitude of reorganisation processes, which have begun simultaneously, is limited. Issues like drawing packages of laws, design of cross-agency arrangements, change of organisational models, transition from conscript to voluntary service, massive downsizing of the personnel, garrisons and combat equipment in the army, and many



others need not only of well prepared personalities but of teams of experts on every level – political, institutional and performance.

The core of effective policing reforms is in an optimum use of civilian and uniformed expertise. It should be measured by the extent to which the uniformed and civilian personnel work together on operational planning, resource allocation and management. This is not (only) an issue of “administrative civilian control”. The practice in Bulgaria shows that the sharing of expertise among the uniformed and civilians in the resource planning and management process is the best way to avoid one-sided decisions on issues not only related to the budget, but also to those on deployment of security forces, closing army bases, procurement and acquisition, specialised professional education, and professionalisation of soldiers’ service in the army<sup>16</sup>. An extremely important driving factor is the fact of chronic lack of well-prepared civilians that can do the job professionally enough. The reason for it is mainly the systematic decrease of the attractiveness of army and police employment for young people, mostly due to the permanent reductions, structural changes, and the visible risk that make the profession unstable. Because of this an important and inseparable part of the reform process is an accelerated focused training of experts. In this context Bulgaria at early stage recognised the value of foreign consultants on a permanent basis. They have serious contribution to the design and implementation of reform plans of the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior, Customs, and others.

The legal foundation of the security sector reform requires constant attention and development. The painful experience in Bulgaria shows that the defence reform needs a strategy-based judicial basis within a democratic frame, and permanent improvement to keep the package of regulations adequate to the arising new army and its officer corps. This issue is invariably present in governmental programmes and parliamentary agendas since there is an apparent lack of harmony between important components of the current legislation and the needs arising from internal democratic and functionally-operative processes, and from Bulgaria’s international ambitions. The new package of laws should provide a legal solution to issues such as allied responsibilities of the country and ways to execute them, armed forces new roles and missions and mechanisms for their realisation, military professionalism characteristics (including its moral dimension), turning the security sector organisations into modern managerial institutions, regulating transparency and other items of democratic oversight. This task requires exceptional political commitment, a European vision and taking into account the realities and prospects for using the armed forces in various conditions and situations. There is a risk in the delay of political work on the promised new package of laws to transfer the initiative into the hands of experts, which, based on experience so far, means imposing departmental approaches and making pointless the political process of law making.

<sup>16</sup> Professionalisation of the soldiers’ service in the Bulgarian Armed Forces gives priority to the units, designated for NATO-led Peace support operations and especially to deployable forces. In accordance with the Annual Report on the National Defence and Armed Forces 2002 the Land Forces have hired approximately 3700 soldiers, in the Air Force the level of professionalisation is 26 per cent, and in the Navy 81 per cent as the warships staff is fully on contract.

The core of reform is the definition of security sector organisations' new paradigm. The first stage of security reforms in the country followed the Constitutional paradigm as of 1990-1991. Then the vision of the country's future was based on "neutrality" (or on "non-alignment" at least) and the *cliché* was "all-azimuth defence". The difference between 1991 and 2003 is that back in 1991 the armed forces all around the world served the exclusive goal of guaranteeing the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. Hence they were alike! In 2003, every open, liberal and sovereign state faces the common threat of being subjected to, or used for, the purposes of terrorism. State sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity for the purposes of which the armed forces were *de facto* created can be defended mostly through integration, participation in international cooperation and contribution to multilateral efforts. This is to be expected given that our *new enemy has no political sovereignty*. Terrorism threatens the political systems and ways of life of societies. It is not a case of threatening state sovereignty any more – neither is it territorial integrity and certainly not independence.

Transformation means more effectiveness. The definition of a new paradigm followed by reorganisation and downsizing are not enough for successful reforms. Without making the army, police and intelligence more effective with less personnel the value and support of the reform will be immediately lost. Downsizing is only precondition for better allocation of resources. Downsizing itself does not produce a "modern army". Modernisation and re-equipment, new training environment including modelling and simulations and multinational exercises, performance evaluation, lessons learned system and other attributes of modern effectiveness are the pillars of reforms<sup>17</sup>. Debate on these issues is different than on downsizing of personnel and discharge of old arms. Political, social and business attention is also quite different. It requires more strategy and long-term planning than any other aspect of the reform. Most of the countries in transition, Bulgaria included, can suggest a very few good examples even only in designing strategic modernisation. There are real threats of over-politicisation or unacceptable professional influence, of losing strategic perspective while doing successful small steps, and also of going out of the time frame for reforms.

Keeping the personnel motivation turns out to be the most laborious effort. Effective management of human resources, both uniformed and civilian, is critical for defence reform from any point of view. The large-scale downsizing of military personnel that is envisaged by the defence reform is unquestionably the issue with the highest social importance. Military downsizing exacerbates the already severe unemployment problem in the country. Any political party or government that assumes the responsibility to further proceed with reorganisation of national defence will face public backlash in the process of closing down garrisons, barracks, and military installations and cutting thousands of jobs. More than 28,000 uniformed people and 4,000 civilian employees left the Bulgarian defence system in the period

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<sup>17</sup> Much information in these issues could be obtained from Minchev, O, Ratchev V. Lessenski M. (eds.) Bulgaria for NATO 2002, (Sofia: IRIS, 2002). The electronic version of the book is on [www.iris-bg.org](http://www.iris-bg.org)

of 2000-2003 and keeping personnel morale and motivation high turns out to be the most laborious task. A formula must be found to improve the standard of living and the quality of service in the military. An approach to attract and retain trained civil staff is also necessary.

Several programmes with national and international financial support were launched to help military personnel adapt to civilian life. The MoD *Resettlement Programme 2000-2004* was developed with the support international donations, NATO expertise and NGO active engagement. The Programme was introduced at the *Working Table 3* of the *Stability Pact for South East Europe*. It was designed to provide resettlement support to the servicemen during the last 180 days of their service and to continue this support for the former military personnel as long as it is needed. More than 99 per cent of the discharged servicemen are eligible to the Programme. Despite these figures several independent opinions evaluate the effectiveness of the applied approach at up to 10 per cent!

Effective arrangements for public information should be provided simultaneously with an enlarged and strengthened accountability to national parliament and public, both in the narrow financial sense, and more generally for security and defence policies and operations. A possible solution of this problem is to establish an environment and practices to build, use and maintain a network of non-government organisations, research centres in the academic community, which have (or could create) the required analytical competence. Different activities could be included within these efforts: introduction in the specifics of parliamentary work, provision of the necessary information, assignment of permanent tasks, organisation of cooperation with foreign and local organisation on topical legislative practice problems, publication of the results of research, analytical work and the projects for changes in the legislative regulation. The preliminary systematisation and specification of the foreign relations, security and defence policy priority areas is an important condition for good organisation of the expert activity. The provision of competent expertise in service of the Commission could considerably improve the efficiency of its legislative work and the quality of its decisions.

The role of business for efficient civil control should be substantiated and realized. The business in its capacity of employer and public procurement contractor in good of security has direct or indirect serious interests in and influence on the security policy development and implementation. The degree of transparency in the realisation of these roles, which is comparable to that of the academic and the non-government sector, is an important indicator of civil control efficiency. The absence of an association of Bulgaria's defence industry as an exponent of the interests and ideas of the business leaders in this specific field of great significance to the national security impedes the realisation of the important role of the defence industry in the processes of civil control over the sector.

The mass media, inquiry journalism in particular, are an exceptionally important instrument of support of the members of parliament in exercising their right and obligation for control over the security sector. In view of that, the improved awareness about the work of the commissions, the organisation of public hearings of

representatives of the executive and outside experts with the participation of the mass media are all prerequisites for intensified contribution of journalists.

## **Conclusion**

The Bulgarian society has reached a national consensus on democratisation of the security institutions. Even though the sectoral reform is not finished yet (even it is far from finishing in terms of bettering the division of labour, adjusting the legislation, rearmament, interoperability, professionalisation, and so on), it has extremely and significantly contributed to the process of overall democratisation of the society.

From this point of view the standing point for analysing Bulgarian security sector reform and policy on accelerated preparation for full-fledged membership in NATO could be maximalist or minimalist one. Those who would like to see integration efforts to be unreservedly first priority will focus on issues like the speed of reforms, definition of “centre of gravity” of transformations, promotion of “the right people on right positions now”, a priority of membership related legislative and military measures, and so on. The others, that believe that the domestic agenda is more important will lay on the positive evaluations that came from NATO and member countries’ officials and will accept lower speed of organisational reforms in order more resources for structural reforms in economy and direct social policy to be provided. From this point of observation the establishment of firm civil control is presented as more important than fast creating of security sector capabilities adequate to “the new war” requirements.

However, the conclusion of the presented observations is that the security sector is an essential component between instruments of national and international security policy and strategy. Significantly changed security environment and the responsible contribution to the war against globalised terrorism require deep modernisation of all military and “soft” instruments, in national and international context. Security sector organisations became multifunctional international factors, providing the politicians with more capacity for effectiveness. It does not matter how different are the positions between the countries from the Euro-Atlantic space on issues like terrorism, preemption and dissuasion we should not permit the politicised terror to draw the global security agenda. In this responsibility there are not small and big countries and everyone has capacity and responsibility to contribute. No doubt this mission is the core in the entrance of the new millennium. Effective security organisations, adequate to the character of threats, legal arrangements and large public confidence and support, are crucial for success. Security sector reform in Bulgaria is about this.

### III. BULGARIA: INTEGRATED DEFENCE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Todor Tagarev

At the beginning of the 1990s most post-communist countries found themselves needing to adapt their heavily oversized defence establishments to the post-Cold war realities without having adequate national procedures, tools and expertise. The notion of the democratic civilian control over the armed forces was slowly introduced, but General Staffs remained the primary organisations, if not the only ones, thinking how to adapt military establishments to the 1990s security environment. Defence budgets were declining not so much as a result of rigorous planning and risk assessment, but under the pressure of diminishing GDPs in the first years of transition to market economies. As a result of delayed reforms and shrinking budgets, the militaries were quickly losing their traditional capabilities without increasing the capabilities to participate in peace operations.

For Bulgaria, as one of the post-communist countries in transition to democracy, these problems became most acute with the economic crisis in 1996 and early 1997, followed by the February 1997 decision of the interim government of the Union of Democratic Forces to prepare the country for NATO membership. Only then the national defence leadership turned directly to the challenge of transforming the armed forces so that they became both affordable and appropriate to the new strategic environment<sup>18</sup>.

This paper provides analysis of the Bulgarian experience in establishing and institutionalising an advanced defence resource management system to help in this.<sup>19</sup> Prior to that, we take a brief look at the importance of establishing the affordability requirement in the practice of political defence decision-making. Both parts of the paper relate closely to the concept and the practice of democratic control of defence: this relation is examined directly in the concluding section of the paper.

#### **‘Defence Planning’ in 1990-1998**

In the beginning of the 1990s, Bulgaria introduced the main legislative requirements for implementation of the democratic principle of civilian control over the armed forces. However, the first civilian defence ministers did not have considerable

<sup>18</sup> Much to the dismay of defence reformers, acceptability to society – or the ‘third A’ condition in David Greenwood’s formula – was not rigorously considered. For definition refer to Margriet Drent, David Greenwood, Sander Huisman and Peter Volten, *Organising National Defences for NATO Membership: The Unexamined Dimension of Aspirants’ Readiness for Entry*, Harmonie Paper # 15 (Groningen, The Netherlands: Centre for European Security Studies, November 2001).

<sup>19</sup> The focus of this report is on the first steps of introducing advanced defence resource management. In-depth analysis of the current challenges are presented in the article Bisserka Boudinova, “Transparency in Defence Resource Management - Problems and Solutions,” *Information & Security: An International Journal* 11 (2003): 73-91, [http://www.isn.ethz.ch/onlinepubli/publihouse/infosecurity/volume\\_11/A4/A4\\_index.htm](http://www.isn.ethz.ch/onlinepubli/publihouse/infosecurity/volume_11/A4/A4_index.htm) (28 Oct. 2003).

expertise in defence matters and were in office for relatively short terms. Therefore, for a number of years the General Staff of the Bulgarian Armed Forces was the primary organisation expected to adapt the military establishment to the post-Cold war realities. It can be assumed that thinking on defence reform started approximately in 1991. In 1992 the Bulgarian Armed Forces made a token transition from ‘army-divisional’ to a ‘corps-brigade’ force structure. The then defence minister presented this transition as ‘NATO-style defence reform.’ In the following three years the national security debate was focused on the dilemma ‘West vs. East’<sup>20</sup> and the accession to the Partnership for Peace Programme. In 1995 the Cabinet approved a draft Concept for National Security, followed by a Concept for Reforming the Bulgarian Army till the Year 2010. But if until 1995 the attention of the Bulgarian politicians to defence was marginal, in 1996—the year of the economic crisis—defence was not even on the societal agenda. Thus, for six years since the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the defence leadership did not come up with a plan how to adapt the national defence to the new strategic environment.

In February 1997, the Provisional Government appointed by President Stoyanov declared the intention of Bulgaria to join NATO. In March the same year the declaration was followed by a Programme for NATO Accession. Approximately one year later the Cabinet approved a top-secret plan for reforming the military establishment, known as Plan 2010. There is no evidence to suggest that civilians, including the defence minister and his deputies, played any substantial role in the preparation of Plan 2010. It is safe to assume that no planning guidance was issued, other than ‘to prepare the armed forces for NATO integration,’ and no resource constraints were set in advance. The plan was limited in scope, examining the Bulgarian Army per se and leaving untouched Cold War militarised relics. Plan 2010 called for downsizing the peacetime personnel of the Bulgarian Army to 75 000 people. However, the sole most influential factor for downsizing was the demographic trend that limited the number of young male Bulgarian citizens potentially available for mandatory conscript service, while the length of the conscript service had been already shortened from 24 to 18 months. Civil authorities did not assess Plan 2010 in essence. It was not constrained by expected resources. To the best of the author’s knowledge, there were no attempts to cost the plan. Further, it did not envision changes in missions and tasks of the armed forces, preserved the 1992 organisational structure, and called for keeping all major weapon systems in the limits set by the CFE Treaty. For all practical purposes, the planned force structure for 2010 was a somewhat smaller version of the force structure of the Bulgarian Army of the 1980s.

Also around 1994-1996 the Ministry of Defence developed another – accompanying – document. Referred to as the “Programme for Rearmament and Modernisation of the Bulgarian Armed Forces till 2015,” this called for more than 20 billion US dollars for rearmament – several times more than any reasonable forecast accounting for fiscal realities. The governmental approval of Plan 2010 only confirmed the NATO concerns, expressed the previous year by a senior NATO advisor, that “there is no Central and Eastern European country that has the effective

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<sup>20</sup>With loud support for the exotic option of neutrality.

army it needs and no government that can evaluate what kind of defence it requires, nor what size, nor evaluate the proposals of its generals.”<sup>21</sup>

Given the explicit governmental programme for NATO accession, the approval of Plan 2010 further proved that the NATO message did not reach the intended audience in Bulgaria. Initial claims that Plan 2010 is adequate to NATO integration requirements were quickly countered by the impartial professional estimate of a seasoned observer of defence policies of Central and Eastern European countries.<sup>22</sup> Dr. Jeffrey Simon from the US Institute for National Strategic Studies concluded that Bulgarian governmental and military officials lack ‘an understanding of how far behind they are, as well as what they need to do, to seek [NATO] integration.’ A follow-up study sponsored by the UK Ministry of Defence found that *there is a lack of realism and coherence between budgets and defence plans*. Furthermore, *the credibility of the relation between plans and budgets is repeatedly undermined* since ‘plans, once endorsed, are regularly found to be unaffordable within allocated budgets and ... MoD has to adopt a significantly different force posture from that agreed by Parliament in order to *meet affordability constraints*.’<sup>23</sup> The decision making process by itself was found ‘highly inconsistent and unpredictable’ and there was no mention of a structured and clear defence planning process. In sum, although defence policy was subject to civilian control in principle, civilians in Parliament and Government lacked sufficient expertise to establish a defence planning process or to assess principal defence planning decisions. Not surprisingly, in lacking civilian control the military acted in a very cautious conservative manner. Also, civilians were not able to undertake their share of responsibility for difficult decisions. There was no relation between the Plan 2010 and the Concept for National Security, approved by the Bulgarian Parliament only one month earlier. The resulting Plan 2010, although a step in the right direction, did not provide reform objectives adequate to national defence and NATO integration requirements.

### **Affordability Considerations in Major Defence Reform Decisions**

It did not take long for the political leadership to realise that, since affordability was not an issue in the preparation of Plan 2010, the prospectus was doomed. At the end of 1998 a comprehensive defence reform study was launched.<sup>24</sup> One of the study teams was tasked with the overall analysis and preparation of the final

<sup>21</sup> Chris Donnelly, “Defence Transformation in the New Democracies: A Framework for Tackling the Problem,” *NATO Review* 45, 1 (1997), 15-19, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1997/9701-4.htm>> (24 Oct. 2003).

<sup>22</sup> Jeffrey Simon, “Bulgaria and NATO: 7 Lost Years,” *Strategic Forum* 142 (Washington, DC: INSS, National Defense University, May 1998).

<sup>23</sup> *Parliamentary Oversight and Democratic Control of the Bulgarian Armed Forces and MoD*, Final Report, Study No. 3/98 (London: Directorate of Consultancy and Management Services, UK MoD, 5 October 1998), p. 23. Emphasis added.

<sup>24</sup> Conducted jointly with a US Government team.

recommendations from the study<sup>25</sup>. This team rigorously implemented qualitative and quantitative methods for defence and force planning while searching for a model for the Bulgarian armed forces that best addressed the requirements of national security and defence.<sup>26</sup> The planning process was not threat based, but capability based, and searched for a model with the highest possible combat potential *within the forecasted resource constraints*.

At the first stage, the team designed hypothetical but realistic models of the armed forces with personnel strength from thirty to ninety thousand people, and with 100 percent manning (no mobilisation potential) under valid training requirements. The cost and the combat potential of each model were then estimated.<sup>27</sup> At this stage it was established that, given the forecasted resources, the optimal model of the Bulgarian armed forces, including the formations directly subordinated to the Ministry of Defence, would have a peacetime personnel strength of between 45,000 and 55,000 people. In the second stage, the team designed twelve models with varying ratios of active duty and reserve personnel, various proportions among the services as well as among the branches within a service, and varying proportions between resources for sustaining and modernisation of the armed forces. It was established that the optimum model for performing expected missions was a force with 50,000 military and civilian peacetime personnel in the Ministry of Defence; 45,000 of them in the armed forces.

Results were presented first to Government and the President and then (in April 1999), voting on the Military Doctrine, the Parliament decided to limit by 2004 the personnel strength of the armed forces to 45,000. That was the first realistic and thus realisable framework decision on post-Cold war force posture of Bulgaria.

The transition to that force model also had to be realistic. The same team in the Ministry of Defence, in coordination with other ministries, designed several transition models with varying rates of downsizing and, respectively, defence budget projections. The chosen model served as a basis for the ministerial guidance to prepare the “Plan for Organisational Development of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria till the Year 2004.”

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<sup>25</sup> A joint team of civilians and military officers, based in the Ministry of Defence. For details refer to Todor Tagarev, *Control, Cooperation, Expertise: Civilians and the Military in Bulgarian Defence Planning Experience*, ISIS Research Reports # 14 (Sofia: Institute for Security and International Studies, 2003), <[http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isis/Publications/research\\_reports/research\\_report\\_14.htm](http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isis/Publications/research_reports/research_report_14.htm)> (28 Oct. 2003).

<sup>26</sup> For details refer to Dobromir Totev and Pavlin Roussanov, “Implementing the Defense Resource Management Model (DRMM) in the Development of the New Bulgarian Military Doctrine and The Plan for Organizational Structure and Development of the MoD by the Year 2004,” CD-ROM Proceedings, *Applications of Operations Analysis Techniques to Defense Issues* (Garmish, Germany: George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies, 14-17 March 2000).

<sup>27</sup> Indicator of combat capability accounting for manning, equipment and training levels, as well as for characteristics of major weapon systems. It was estimated using the Defence Resource Management Model (DRMM) – US model adapted to Bulgarian needs in 1995-1996.



## Lessons learned in designing the Bulgarian defence resource management system

The reform plan tasked the Ministry of Defence to introduce an integrated system for planning, programme development and budgeting within the Ministry and the armed forces. The expectation was that such a comprehensive approach would allow for objective, effective and transparent allocation of defence resources, subject to civilian control. The integrated system spans a 6-year planning period. It balances national security objectives and long-term requirements with short-term priorities. The programming phase – the nucleus of the integrated planning system – relates available and forecasted resources to defence capabilities, as well as long-term plans to budget. Furthermore, it attributes decision-making authority to the responsible and accountable persons and permits higher transparency of the planning process, making it open to civilian control. Finally, allowing implementation of capabilities-based planning in a manner compatible with the NATO planning system, it should be sufficiently flexible to incorporate high levels of uncertainty (economic, financial and budget forecasts, labour and other costs, organisational, and so on.) in a transitioning country.

The first version of the new Bulgarian defence resource management system was introduced in May 2000. Figure 1 depicts the major planning documents, information flows and organisational roles involved, structured in three main resource planning phases of ‘planning,’ ‘programming,’ and ‘budgeting.’<sup>28</sup>

The Bulgarian experience points to the following most important *prerequisites* for an effective defence resource management system:

- It shall be *comprehensive*, covering all defence activities (including military participation in operations abroad), expenditures (incl. separation allowances, etc.), and financial sources (subsidy from the state budget, own revenues, foreign military assistance, etc.);
- It shall allow for efficient and straightforward translation of defence programmes into budgets;
- All planning documents shall incorporate easily understood and assessable *performance measurement indicators*;
- It shall be sufficiently compatible with the NATO defence planning procedures, i.e., following the six-year planning horizon, programme and budget structure of the PfP “Interoperability Survey,” keeping the information on past years plans and implementation results, timeframe, and so on;
- It shall be sufficiently flexible to account for contingencies and unforeseen changes of economic, financial and social factors. We assess as correct the early 2000 decision to introduce a one-year planning cycle (unlike the NATO two-year cycle), to allow in-year programme reviews and updates that may be regular (quarterly or every six months) or ‘event triggered’;

<sup>28</sup> The timeline of all major activities is presented in Dobromir Totev, “Bulgarian Defence Resource Management System - Vehicle for Transparency in Defence Planning and Budgeting,” in *Transparency in Defence Policy, Military Budgeting and Procurement*, ed., Todor Tagarev (Sofia: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and Association George C. Marshall - Bulgaria, 2002), pp. 71-84.




Figure 1: Planning, programming and budgeting in the Bulgarian Ministry of Defence

- It shall provide for broad organisational participation but clear decision making authority and well documented decisions, available to all ‘resource managers’ in a timely manner.

Further, it is important to involve in the development phase representatives of all envisioned future players not only from all branches of the defence administration and the senior military authorities, in particular budgeters, but also from the finance ministry, the legislature, and the national audit office, the office of the President (the Supreme Commander in Chief) and elsewhere. However, it is even more important to guarantee, that the designed resource management system adequately implements all main principles (listed above).

The personal involvement of a senior ‘resource manager’ – the Minister of Defence or a designated deputy minister – is indispensable for the design of an adequate resource management system and its successful implementation. Certainly, the leadership shall benefit from adequate in-house expert support and, possibly, consultations with experienced western partners.<sup>29</sup>

The developers of the Bulgarian defence resource management system called the first version PPBS – ‘Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System.’ Subsequent experience proved that this was not a good choice. The name invited

<sup>29</sup> The official interaction with the NATO planning structures is essential. Of high value in the Bulgarian case was also the support by the US Institute for Defense Analysis, Alexandria, Virginia <<http://www.ida.org/>>, organised in a small number of specially tailored programmes.

allusions to the complexities and intricacies of American practice that were used, with some degree of success, by opponents to the introduction of transparent, democratically controlled defence resource management. This is the main reason why the updated version was called an *Integrated Defence Resource Management System* (IDRMS).

### **Lessons learned during IDRMS implementation**

The experience from the first two years of IDRMS implementation allows us to draw the following main lessons<sup>30</sup>:

- The first prerequisite for successful implementation is to persuade both the leadership and other players in resource management of the need to transition to a different planning philosophy and procedures. Useful in that respect might be to assure support of the relevant legislative committees and of the office of the President (who, in the case of Bulgaria, is designated in the Constitution as ‘Supreme Commander in Chief’ of the armed forces).
- All participants in IDRMS implementation, in particular programmers, should be trained in advance. A two-day practical course prior to each programming cycle was found very useful.<sup>31</sup> Since initially academic support was not available, the designers of the IDRMS led the first courses.
- Organisational resistance is to be expected. The introduction of a new type of resource management inevitably leads to redistribution of ‘power’ (decision making authority). It is not possible to devise a single formula for overcoming this resistance, but support from the senior leadership is imperative.
- In addition, there have been attempts to blame IDRMS for the lack of funding for a particular activity or organisation. In this respect, it is important to explain in advance that IDRMS does not bring additional money. It just distributes available (expected) defence resources among highest priority requirements in a transparent manner.
- Wonders cannot be expected during the first implementation cycle. Given uncertainty and insufficient information, resistance and learning requirements, around 90 percent coverage and accuracy in the first implementation cycle may be considered a success. Be sure to have an opportunity for in-year programme review in order to account for changing constraints and unforeseen events.
- Prioritisation, incorporated in IDRMS in a formal way, might be very useful to support decisions on resource distribution among competing requirements.

<sup>30</sup> Details are provided in Todor Tagarev with Dobromir Totev and Tilcho Ivanov, “Managing Resources for Defence and Security,” Chapter V in *Programme for Integration of the Republic of Bulgaria into NATO*, ed., Konstantin Dimitrov and Velizar Shalamanov (Sofia: Institute for Euroatlantic Security, February 2003), <[http://www.ieas-bg.org/project\\_01/eng/egl5.html](http://www.ieas-bg.org/project_01/eng/egl5.html)> (29 Oct. 2003).

<sup>31</sup> The education and training in defence resource management is a topic that deserves special treatment.

- To this end it is important that programme teams devise qualitatively different programme alternatives, e.g. alternative ways to achieve an objective in the programming guidance.
- The necessary effort must be made to cost the programmes and programme alternatives correctly and to check the costing during the first phases of the programme review (before submitting programmes for review by senior decision making bodies).
- Adequate information support to all phases of defence resource management, but in particular to programming, is key. The success of IDRMS implementation may hang on the efficient handling of the planning process and related information.

The implementation may be greatly supported if the performance of the defence establishment, including the armed forces, is assessed according to programmes (results achieved and not just the money spent). For example, the legislature requests that the Chairman of the Council of Ministers annually presents to Parliament a *Report on the Status of Defence and the Armed Forces*. A further requirement to present that report in a programmatic form may be a major driving force for adequate IDRMS implementation. Likewise, IDRMS implementation may be facilitated given a legislative request that the government submits draft budgets and budget execution reports accompanied by major defence programme documents.

Planners in any country should do so, of course, taking account of their own national circumstances and prepared to ‘learn by doing’. For example, after the first IDRMS implementation cycle, the Bulgarian MoD made an important change in the programme structure. A capability-oriented structure of 21 main programmes, that was theoretically sound, was replaced by an organisationally bound structure of 13 main programmes that was estimated as better manageable<sup>32</sup>. During adaptation outside (foreign) support may be quite useful, especially when advice is implemented carefully respecting local culture and experience.

The final lesson, and the most important one, is that implementation cannot be successful unless the senior resource manager – the Minister of Defence or a designated deputy minister – *acts* in concordance with IDRMS requirements.

### **Conclusion: General observations from the Bulgarian experience**

An IDRMS is a very efficient tool to manage defence transformation, providing for transparency of decision making, democratic control and accountability of elected officials. Indeed, it is probably the only available tool to implement effectively *capabilities-based planning* and to assess implementation of plans, programmes, and budgets.

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<sup>32</sup> See for example Todor Tagarev, *Transparent Defence Planning for Effective Democratic Control, PfP Planning Symposium 2001*, IS/DPAO.959.1 (Oberammergau, Germany, 18–19 January 2001). <[http://pforum.isn.ethz.ch/events/index.cfm?action=doc\\_detail&eventID=175&docID=275](http://pforum.isn.ethz.ch/events/index.cfm?action=doc_detail&eventID=175&docID=275)> (30 Oct. 2003).

In particular, the introduction of the programming phase is seen as crucial to relate defence policy to money allocations, assuring 'value for money' budgeting and, potentially, effective democratic oversight of armed forces. The IDRMS implementation can be strongly facilitated if the Parliament requests submission of the draft defence budget accompanied by adequate programme description, as well as programme-based performance reports by the executive power.

However, the essential condition for successful defence transformation is the political will for reform, manifest in the Bulgarian case by the commitment to preparation for NATO integration, sufficient to overcome resistance to change. The existence of a most advanced IDRMS and experts of highest qualification cannot substitute for political will and supportive civil-military relations. There is no need to wait for IDRMS institutionalisation in order to make rough (first-order) decisions on force level and force structure that is affordable, appropriate, acceptable. While supported by quantitative analysis, the major Bulgarian defence reform decisions in the beginning of 1999 were *not* based on results of an existing IDRMS system.



#### IV. ROMANIA: REFORMING THE SECURITY SECTOR

Adrian Pop

As an offspring of both defence and security experts, the concept of security sector reform (SSR) originates in a more comprehensive, constructivist approach towards security, which underlines the fact that the latter is basically an inter-subjective or socially constructed reality.<sup>33</sup> Whereas the term sector points to the relationship between defence and other governmental and non-governmental security organisations, the term reform entails a whole new design of the military forces according to the new post-Cold War missions, ranging from preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and peace enforcement to humanitarian intervention and post-conflict rehabilitation.<sup>34</sup>

To this wider, internationally oriented understanding of the security regime in Europe and elsewhere has heavily contributed the changed post-Cold War and post-9/11 security environment, which has objectively required a gradual shifting of traditional national allegiances and responsibilities towards more international tasks and duties.

Nothing about that kind of development was self-evident by the time the painful and sometimes erratic transition of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) towards the rule of law and market economy began. The lack of vision, confusion and wishful thinking was pervasive both East and West. Retrospectively, it is easy to say what had to be done. However, the SSR in CEE was more the product of a learning process than one of a clear-cut design. From the latter perspective, the countries belonging to the former Soviet space could and should benefit from the lessons learnt along the way – the hard way – by the CEE countries.

There is plenty of evidence that a series of factors have hindered the speedy implementation of the SSR in CEE. Among them, one could enumerate: bureaucratic resistance against change, especially on the part of the General Staff; lack of experience among the military in planning, programming and budgeting; shortage of expertise among civilians within the defence establishment and security agencies; little interest on security and defence matters on the part of the people at large; the difficulty of setting up workable civil-military relations (CMR); the inaction and muddling through of the defence organisation and the military; the lack of an appropriate legislative framework for carrying out reform; the lack of coherence and the absence of co-ordination between the different levels of the security and defence establishment as a whole; and the prevailing model of “democracy without choice” in CEE.

<sup>33</sup> Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), pp. 203-207.

<sup>34</sup> For an overview of the SSR issue see Jane Chanaa, *Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges and Prospects*, Adelphi Paper No. 344 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002). See also Centre for European Security Studies, *Security and Defence in South-Eastern Europe*, Harmonie Papers No. 16 (Groningen: CESS, 2003), pp. 33-35.

## Legacy of the Past

In Romania as elsewhere in CEE, the legacy of the communist past at the end of the Cold War was enormous and omnipresent. There were more than 300,000 men in uniform, out of which 171,000 were in the armed forces. Romania deployed 3,200 main battle tanks and about 300 combat aircraft. For this oversized military and army equipment Romania spent \$7 billion, i.e. one-eighth of its \$56 billion GNP.

Initially, the first impulses towards implementing a democratic system of control of the military were given by the so-called Committee of Action to Democratise the Army (CADA), which pressed for the removing from office of those officers compromised by their links with the Ceausescu regime, for promotion on the basis of merit, downsizing and professionalisation of the Romanian armed forces. Another significant factor that contributed to the launching of the army's restructuring was the signing, in 1990, of the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty, which initiated a decrease in the number of military personnel and various types of armaments. For the new spirit of transparency which gradually started to penetrate the army, the confidence-building Hungarian-Romanian Open Skies agreement signed on 11 May 1991 is also worth mentioning.<sup>35</sup>

However, there was still the problem of the legacy of the infamous and much-hated *Securitate* (Department of State Security). That is why one of the first actions taken by the new political power after December 1989 was to put the intelligence structures under the MoD's jurisdiction. According to the official data of the General Staff, by the time of revolution the overall number of people working for the Department of State Security was 15,312, of which 10,114 were officers.<sup>36</sup>

Soon after that, two new intelligence services were set up with domestic and foreign areas of responsibilities respectively. Unfortunately, though, the agencies suffered by a twofold lack of legitimacy due to the fact that the new Constitution was not adopted yet and among their staff the "old guard" prevailed.<sup>37</sup>

This initial phase of the defence and security structures' reshaping in Romania ended up, in 1991, with the adoption of the new Constitution, which laid the basis of a democratic institutional set up.

Throughout the second period, between 1992 and 1996, several important steps were made towards establishing civilian control of armed forces. In 1992, the National Defence College was established – under the chairmanship of the defence minister – for training high-ranking army and police officers, as well as civil servants, representatives of the Parliament and political parties on national, regional and

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<sup>35</sup> András Ujj, *Problematic Features of Civilian Control Over the Hungarian Defence Structure*, EFP Working Paper No. 5 (Groningen: CESS, June 2001), p. 7

<sup>36</sup> *Critica securităţii pure* [The Critique of Pure Security], micro-project PHARE (Bucharest: "Academia Caţavencu", 1997), p. 5.

<sup>37</sup> Liviu Muresan, *The Security Sector Reform-A Chance for the Euro-Atlantic Integration of Romania*. Paper prepared for a Workshop on Security Sector Reform in Central and Eastern Europe: Criteria of Success and Failure sponsored by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 22-23 November 2001.



international security issues. In 1993, a civilian deputy defence minister was appointed, and in 1994 the first civilian minister of defence was nominated.

In addition, in 1992 a National Agency for the Control of Strategic Exports (ANCEX) was set up, administratively subordinated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), for non-proliferation and export control enforcement purposes.<sup>38</sup>

In the area of the restructuring of the Romanian armed forces, the first step was the elimination of regiment-division echelons and their reorganisation into a battalion-brigade-army corps structure. The downsizing of the armed forces in 1994 permitted the elimination of the army echelon as well. In addition, having been the first East European country to join the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in January 1994, Romania started to implement its interoperability-oriented programmes.

## Defence Organisation Reform

However, as restructuring of the armed forces does not mean the reform of the defence organisation, one could say that the latter really started in Romania with the creation of mission-specific differentiated structures, such as surveillance and early warning units and rapid reaction forces. Thus, the setting up of the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) on 1 March 1997 heralded future force structures for crisis management operations in a multinational environment.

Throughout the third transformation stage, between 1997 and 2000, most of the army's reform efforts were made according to the annual orders of the country's Supreme Defence Council. For instance, decision-making was both simplified and made more efficient by the reorganisation of the MoD in accordance with the Governmental Decree no. 110/1997. As a result, the central directorates with general attributions for the armed forces were subordinated to the minister and his staff. New structures were added to the previously reorganised Department for Defence Policy to enhance its capacities in the domains of Euro-Atlantic integration preparedness, defence policy planning, and the management of civil-military relations. The elements of the General Staff and the service branches were restructured on a modular basis in accordance with similar structures of NATO states.

In 1999, the Government drafted a new *National Security Strategy* and a *White Book of the Government – Romanian Army 2010*. But due to the constant squabbling among coalition partners, the two political documents were approved by the Parliament only in 2000. In that year, the National Office for Security was established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), as a specialised governmental structure in charge of issuing security clearance for Romanian officials that will be allowed access to classified NATO information. Last but not least, in 2001, a law on the demilitarisation of the police was passed by the Parliament, consecrating the new status of policemen as civil servants.

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<sup>38</sup> For a certain period of time, the agency functioned under the label of the National Agency for the Control of Strategic Exports and Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (ANCESIAC). See [www.ancex.ro](http://www.ancex.ro) and [www.ancesiac.ro](http://www.ancesiac.ro), respectively.

The first MAP cycle (1999-2000) exposed a series of serious dysfunctional features: unrealistic planning; discrepancy between objectives and resources; lack of co-ordination between the departments and services of the defence organisation; lack of funds; and a reversed personnel pyramid. As far as the latter is concerned, in 2000, when the fourth reform stage started, there was a surplus of about 450 generals, 1,700 colonels, 3,800 lieutenant colonels and 5,000 majors. Through an extensive programme of training and governmental financial support to facilitate employment in the civilian sector, the inverse pyramid was readjusted to a large extent by 2003 when the fourth stage ended. This was accomplished in accordance with the *Programme Force 2003* planning, which envisaged a pyramidal structure of personnel with an officer/NCO ratio of 1:2.4; and facilitated by a *Military Career Guide*, implemented since June 2001, as well as the provision of social protection, assistance and training for officers who leave the army, in order to help them enter the civilian job market.

At the time of writing (end-2003), the authorised strength of the active and civilian personnel of the Romanian Armed Forces is 140,000, out of which 112,000 are military men and 28,000 civilians<sup>39</sup>. *Programme Force 2003* complies with the military missions identified in the *National Security Strategy* and the priorities established by the Government, i.e. to develop a force able to defend the national territory and to solve a possible crisis in favour of the national interest of Romania, to develop efficient command and control structures able to turn rapidly from peace to war, to develop a balanced force package (active, territorial and reserve) to react quickly against the possible threats, to establish a mobilisation system able to generate forces in case of national crises, and to develop joint operational forces for land, air and maritime operations. The active forces have a readiness of 7 to 30 days, the minimum manning level being 80 per cent. The territorial forces have a lower readiness of 90 days, and their manned level is between 30 and 70 per cent. In order to achieve this force structure, 186 units and large units have been disbanded, 162 have been transformed and 270 have been reorganised.

Some 80 per cent of Romanian air forces, 70 per cent of naval forces and a considerable number of land forces units designated for NATO-led operations have already NATO compatible communication systems.

The future force structure, *Objective Force 2007*, which is to be implemented throughout a fifth transformation stage, between 2003 and 2007, is the force Romania can afford. Smaller, leaner and better equipped than *Programme Force 2003*, it will comprise 75,000 military men and 15,000 civilians. The active forces are scheduled to have a readiness of 24 to 72 hours within Romanian territory and 30 days outside the country, whereas the territorial forces are going to have a readiness of 30-90 days. It will allow for a rapid reaction capability in a possible future conflict, which will secure the time needed for augmenting the territorial forces and allied intervention. Emphasis will be placed on operational mountain troops, paratroopers, aviation, artillery, navy, and infantry.

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<sup>39</sup> Peter M.E. Volten, "Romanian Security and Defence Policy Reform from a Western Perspective", in *The Romanian Journal of Society and Politics*, Volume 2, Number 2, October 2002, p. 24.

The issue of human resources management has been integrated within the framework of the general reform of the Romanian army. In order to have the right men in the right jobs at the right time, all projects in this field have been designed on medium or long term. The rethinking of the human resource management system has been based on adopting the personnel pyramid model; continuing the process of the military's gradual turning into a fully professional body by 2007; boosting attractively the military career by adapting it to practices existent in modern armies; and setting up a system of professional retraining and integration into the civilian job market of those which leave the army (as noted earlier).

Additionally, identifying personnel with the appropriate language skills, experience and qualifications – in order to have an effective national representation at NATO and to fill a number of posts in Alliance structures – has been a major undertaking. As a result, a commission has been set up within the Romanian MoD to co-ordinate this process and select a pool of civil servants, military officers and non-commissioned officers with the necessary backgrounds.

Regarding capabilities, Romania has focused on increasing the interoperability, deployability and sustainability of its forces earmarked for peace-support operations and article V missions. All forces earmarked for collective-defence or PfP operations are also available, as required, for operations in or outside Romanian territory, on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, Romania is willing and able to participate in all NATO's new force structures, including the NATO Response Force (NRF), NATO's elite rapid-reaction force, officially launched in mid-October 2003 in the Dutch city of Brunssum, which combines integrated land, sea, air and special forces. From the force package made available for peace-support operations, Romania already has the capacity to deploy and sustain 1,500 troops in operations abroad.

Further, the country has put a special emphasis on identifying Host Nation Support capabilities. The Romanian catalogue in the area includes four airports for air operation support, two ports with excellent harbour facilities, naval support facilities and other facilities that may be available to NATO forces.

Romania is also committed to substantially contribute to efforts aimed at reducing dangers arising from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, sensitive related materials and their means of delivery. The October 2003 NATO exercise in Pitesti, focused on handling a possible radioactive contamination scenario, is just one recent example that Romania is determined to honour its commitments in that field.

Concerning defence planning, Romania already has a NATO-compatible system and is now taking steps to prepare for the rigours of NATO force planning. This involves improving decision-making explicitly to link Romania's responsibilities with the country's limited resources. In this way, the country's defence budget is now pegged to GDP forecasts and based on the government's commitment to ensure a proper level of defence spending, i.e. 2.38 per cent.

The MFA-chaired National Commission for Romania's Integration into NATO secures the overall co-ordination and supervision of the planning, analysis and review process.

## Civil-Military Relations

Civilian control over the military and the setting up of democratic mechanisms for overseeing the military are important indicators of the quality of a democratisation process. The new civil-military relations (CMR) agenda encompasses a move from a state-centred traditional security-oriented approach to a democratic consolidation process with a broader understanding of security, which includes greater effectiveness and efficiency in CMR arrangements.

In Romania, the Law 45/1994 regarding national defence stipulates that the leadership of the national defence system is ensured by the Parliament, the President of Romania, the country's Supreme Defence Council, the Government, the MoD and “public authorities that have responsibilities in national defence domain” (article 7). Among these there is a clear-cut division of labour. From 1994 onwards, the defence ministers have been civilians.

The Parliament is the only authority competent to adopt the defence legislation, as well as any resolution of major importance in the defence field: declaring partial or general mobilisation; declaring the state of war; suspending or ceasing the military hostilities; regulating the state of siege and of emergency. The main bodies of the Parliament exercising control over the military are the two Committees for Defence, Public Order and National Security, one in Senate and the other in the Chamber of Deputies. There are three occasions in which the two committees work together: hearings for the nominations of the Cabinet members designated to run the military; the approval of the budget; and the approval of military exercises on national territory. Hearings are the principal instrument for exercising parliamentary control over the different branches of the military. Periodically or whenever the need arises, committee members invite representatives of the governmental institutions within their area of responsibility to come and testify with regard to specific problems related to the activity of their sectors. A crucial instrument of parliamentary control is the budget, but its efficiency is considerably reduced by in-built as well as economic limitations.<sup>40</sup> Another instrument is the ad hoc inquiry. If the Parliament decides that a certain situation requires special parliamentary investigation, in parallel to one undertaken by specific branches of the Government, the members can either mandate the permanent Committees or create an entirely new special commission, with the aim of complementing the work performed by the executive in this respect.

The President of Romania is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and also the Head of the Country's Supreme Defence Council. This position gives him a major influence on national security affairs. The President promulgates the laws regarding the military institution, voted by the Parliament. Subject to parliamentary approval, he can also declare the general or partial mobilisation and the state of siege or emergency. It is the President who confers decorations and honour titles, as well as the ranks of marshal, general and admiral.

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<sup>40</sup> Centre for European Security Studies, *Organising National Defences for NATO Membership. The Unexamined Dimension of Aspirants' Readiness for Entry*, Harmonie Papers No. 15 (Groningen: CESS, 2001), pp. 110-111.

The Country's Supreme Defence Council (CSDC) organises and co-ordinates the activities related to national defence and security in a unitary manner, reporting to the Parliament once a year. The Council plays a central role in the preparation of the main security documents and actually approves them as binding decisions, thus being *de facto* the most important participant in the decision-making process. The secret services are also part of the CSDC structure, their Directors being appointed by the President. A presidential Counsellor runs the CSDC on a day-to-day basis as its Secretary. The main duty of this body is to analyse the major problems in the security and national defence fields and to present proposals for their settlement to the Parliament and the President.

The Government co-ordinates the activity of the MoD for maintaining the capabilities of the country's defence, ensures the necessary defence resources, elaborates budgetary norms, regulates the armed forces' activity through resolutions and rulings, and initiates authoritative documents and draft laws regarding the military field.

In order to co-ordinate all defence-related legislative activities with other public bodies as well as NGOs, and harmonise the national defence legislation with the relevant NATO and EU member states legislation, a Department for Parliamentary Relations, Legislative Harmonisation and Public Relations was set up within the MoD in 2001 (about which there is more in Chapter V below).

Apart from the control exercised by the above mentioned institutions, there is a control of the military exercised by the Constitutional Court, which checks up the legal and constitutional aspects of the laws and regulations applied to the national defence and public order field; and the Audit Court, which checks up the budget execution.

Academic expertise in security, defence, and international relations includes university research centres such as the Centre for Euro-Atlantic Studies of the University of Bucharest, think-tanks such as the MoD-run Institute for Political Studies of Defence and Military History and the Centre for Strategic Security Studies, or the MFA-run Romanian Institute for International Studies "Nicolae Titulescu". There are several NGOs dealing with security issues, too, including the EURISC Foundation, the "Manfred Wörner" Euro-Atlantic Association, the George C. Marshall Association Romania and the NATO House, which together form the Romanian chapter of the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA).<sup>41</sup> One problem with the security-oriented Romanian NGOs is that more often than not their expertise is not seriously taken into consideration by decision-makers. Only a few NGOs have some influence over the Government and this is because of their special relationships with the power structures. It is the case of the "Manfred Wörner" Euro-Atlantic Association, led by a MoD State Secretary, and of the NATO House, run by a counsellor of the Prime Minister. The above-mentioned situation poses the problem of *de facto* non-NGO status of such organisations and raises serious doubts about their political neutrality.

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<sup>41</sup> Marian Zulean, "From Warsaw to Prague: The Dynamics of Civil-Military Relations in Romania after 1989", *Romanian Journal of Society and Politics*, Volume 2, Number 2, October 2002, pp. 76-79.

A positive but unfortunately rare example of a public-private co-operation in the area of security is the Information Centre for the Security Culture set up by the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI) in partnership with the EURISC Foundation in September 2003.

However, all in all, the security community outside the government is rather meagre. There is little to no rotation of security experts from academia to the government and back to academia as in the West. Debates on security and defence issues are insufficient, and the level of expertise in the media on such issues is rather low.

## **Military Education**

Military education reform is an integral part of the defence reform and NATO accession process.

The management of training in the Romanian armed forces has moved to a U.S./U.K. model. Similarly to the previously operational Regional Training Centre for staff officers established in Bucharest within the Advanced Military Studies Academy, brought into existence with United Kingdom assistance, a Regional Centre for Defence Resources Management was formally set up, with U.S. support, in April 1999. Located at the Academy of Aviation and Anti-Aircraft Defence in Brasov and devised in co-operation with the Defence Resources Management programme in Monterrey, California, the Regional Centre for Defence Resources Management has started to operate in 2000 under the aegis of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). It is a practical, “hands-on” training institution modelled on programmes for American junior officers, which is open to leading staff and specialists from East Central and South East Europe who have completed civilian or military university education. The aim of this post-graduate Centre is the upgrading of the training for military and civilian personnel in charge of planning and administration of defence resources, and their chief constituents: the planning of defence, the management of human resources, and the management of other resources that contribute to defence. By setting up this Centre, Romania has been integrated into the “PfP Training Centres” network, thus contributing to the achievement of the standards of interoperability of defence systems of East Central and South Eastern European countries with NATO member countries’ defence systems.

Aiming at improving the decision-making process through modern simulation and modelling methods, the Romanian MoD proposed to set up a simulation centre. The Training Simulation Centre has been established within the Higher Military Studies Academy and has become operational in 2002. Several other higher education institutions active in the area of security and defence are worth mentioning. In the framework of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI) a National Institute for Intelligence was set up in 1992, later on, in 2000, relabelled the National Intelligence Academy. Since 2002, a National Intelligence College within the National Intelligence Academy was established also for training high-ranking civil servants on

intelligence matters. A highly appreciated postgraduate programme is the one-year-and-a-half MA programme in International Relations organised since 1997 by the Faculty of History and the Centre for Euro-Atlantic Studies at the University of Bucharest. Since January 2003, the National School for Political and Administrative Studies in Bucharest has been organising a NATO Senior Executive Programme in co-operation with the NATO Defence College in Rome and the George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies in Garmish-Partenkirchen. This course offers tailored training for civil servants and military personnel to prepare them for posts linked to NATO and positions within the Alliance itself.<sup>42</sup>

In addition, following the US model, in 2003 a National Defence University was set up in Bucharest, uniting in an overall framework the already existing MoD-run academic and research institutions. Furthermore, an impressive number of officers and civilians working for the military took part in foreign languages or security-related courses (most of them in English) at different military and civilian institutions abroad.

## **The Way Ahead**

The Romanian military still needs to focus its contribution to NATO in terms of niche capabilities – alpine units, military police, de-mining and military intelligence sub-units – and infrastructure facilities for air, sea and land operations.

Preparing for NATO membership as well as for a future active involvement in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy/European Security and Defence Policy (CFSP/ESDP) is an intergovernmental, interdepartmental and interdisciplinary matter. As a result, establishing functional horizontal contacts between governmental officials and various security agencies is imperative.

Since the new threats and especially that of terrorism have blurred the boundaries between internal and external security, Romania also needs to launch a wide-ranging review of the division of labour between law-enforcement and intelligence agencies as well as between the domestic and foreign branches of the latter. In addition, the country must actively promote inter-agency security co-operation under strict political guidance between the defence establishment, the law-enforcement and intelligence agencies, between the domestic and foreign branches of the latter as well as between various military and civilian institutions. It must also effect changes in defence research and development, with priority given to high-tech intelligence systems.

The issue of remaining agents of former state security structures in positions of authority has to be tackled properly for NATO to have confidence in the ability of Romania to handle classified and sensitive information. Two scandals have only

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<sup>42</sup> For more on all of this, see Adrian Pop, "Romania's Challenge", *NATO Review*, Spring 2003, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue1/english/analysis.html>

reinforced the need for handling properly that particular sensitive issue.<sup>43</sup> These are (a) one concerning the Protection and Anti-Corruption Independent Service of the Ministry of Justice, whose former head, Marian Ureche, had to present his resignation after being shown by the press as being involved in political police activities before 1989; and (b) the one related to the General Directorate of Intelligence and Internal Protection of the Administration and Interior Ministry, which is still staffed mainly by ex-Securitate agents, and which has a history of exceeding its intelligence remit being solely under the Government's control.

Finally, of course, civil society has a major role to play in the area of SSR. The forging of a new security culture based on a genuine partnership between government and civil society is particularly needed in the case of Romania. A public-private partnership (PPP) in the area of security will likely create a new awareness on the part of the population of the need for its active involvement in countering the new security threats.

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<sup>43</sup> Bogdan Comaroni, "Vânătoarea de vulpi" [The Hunting of Foxes], *Evenimentul Zilei*, 4 November 2003. See also Iulian Anghel, "Spectrul Securității îl alungă pe generalul Marian Ureche de la șefia SIPA" [The Specter of Securitate Discharges General Marian Ureche as SIPA Chief], *Ziarul Financiar*, 5 November 2003.



## V. ROMANIA: REFORM AND PARLIMENTARY RELATIONS

Tudor Munteanu

As this is written, Romania is poised to accede to NATO. The country demonstrated its readiness for entry by, among other things, putting in place sound arrangements for the democratic control of armed forces, reforming and restructuring those forces (a process that will continue for some time yet) and revising the domestic legal framework for military provision. Innovative approaches to parliamentary liaison and public information characterised the preparations. These are elucidated in the later sections of this paper.

### Democratic control of the Armed Forces

In Romania democratic control is exercised not only over the military, but also over the public order and national security forces.

*Parliamentary control* is comprehensive, complex and effective, based on elected representatives' position as a public authority in the society. According to the Constitution, the Parliament is not only the supreme representative body of the Romanian people, but also the legislative authority of the country. Its role consists in establishing the legislative framework for the Armed Forces, which sets out the role of the Armed Forces, their size and organisation, as well as the strategic requirements and the priorities for certain periods of time. According to the constitutional provisions the Parliament shall approve laws regarding: the budget, the structure of the national defence system, economy and territory for defence, status of the military personnel, the regime of state of siege and emergency, ratification of the treaties and international agreements in this field or other legal acts regarding the Armed Forces. Also the Parliament appoints the Romanian Intelligence Service director and exercises its control over the activity of this agency.

The legislature also performs oversight functions. It examines the annual report of the activity carried out by the Supreme Council for National Defence and it has the power to issue certain measures to be taken by this body. The parliamentary committees for Defence, Public Order and National Defence examine all the bills, Government emergency ordinances, Government decisions and legislative proposals regarding the Armed Forces activity. Important also are questions and interpellations/inquiries asked by Senators and Representatives, to which Government members (including minister of National Defence) have to answer in due time.

*Civilian direction* is exercised by the executive branch. The President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Chairman of the Supreme Council for National Defence (see below). The President has the power to declare the partial or general mobilisation of the Armed Forces. Another Presidential prerogative is the

declaration of the state of siege or emergency (subject to the Parliament's approval in 5 days).

The Government has important responsibilities which derive from its constitutional role: to ensure the implementation of the country's domestic and foreign policy and to exercise the general management of public administration. A special role is played by the Prime-Minister, who is by law the vice-president of the Supreme Council for National Defence.

The Supreme Council for National Defence organizes and coordinates the activities regarding the country's defence and national security. The Council analyses and proposes, at the request of the President of Romania, measures at the declaration of state of siege or emergency in the entire country or in certain counties, and at the declaration of mobilisation (partial or general) of the Armed Forces. The Council analyses and proposes the promotion of Romania's national security strategy, the military strategy and advises on defence-related legislative drafts.

Both the executive and the legislature thus have a voice in defence policy making and planning, from defining the military's role to allocating the resources and assessing the results, from managerial plans and details to the strategic vision that encompasses changes in the international environment and re-definitions of the concepts of power and security. (Our national documents, which give guidelines in defence and security areas are: the National Security Strategy, the White Paper, and the National Military Strategy.)

Important too is the fact that military offices and civil officers work together harmoniously in implementing policy. A topical illustration is the internal co-ordination mechanisms set up to manage reform of the Armed Forces and preparation for NATO integration (including participation in MAP). A hierarchy of civilian and military structures, committees, bodies and various (ad-hoc) working groups is in place, to ensure co-ordination of the decision making process. Overall coordination of planning, analysis and review is the responsibility of the National Commission for Romania's Integration into NATO, chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and is monitored by the Prime Minister. The most senior committee set up to deal with military issues is the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) chaired by the Minister of National Defence. Subordinate to this structure is the NATO Integration Committee chaired by the State Secretary for Euro-Atlantic Integration and Defence Policy, which is charged with overseeing all matters associated with the restructuring and reform process (including MAP). There are also some ad-hoc working groups in the Ministry of National Defence and General Staff in an effort to promote consistency and transparency across all the structures of the Armed Forces.

Finally under this heading, all defence activities are subject to *external oversight*. Here NGOs play an important role by addressing petitions, notifying certain illegal aspects and asking for information about specific cases or favourable solutions. Also, NGOs cooperate with the Ministry of National Defence in various ways, as organizing national and international seminars, or promoting the efforts made for joining EU and NATO. Moreover, the issue concerning the human rights

has become a central concern of the Romanian Ministry of National Defence also due to the aspects signalled by these organisations.

### **Reform and the Restructuring of the Romanian Armed Forces**

The first two stages in restructuring and reshaping the Romanian Armed Forces lasted between 1990 and 1999 and aimed at a radical transformation to a modern, western style military. Many of their prescriptions, though, were overtaken by events. A third restructuring stage (2000-2003) marked a qualitative change of approach by implementing the provisions of the first Multiannual Planning Cycle and of the Program Force 2003 document that provided a force structure in the limit of 112, 000 military and 28,000 civilians. The period also saw the launching and running of Romanian Annual National Programs I-IV that brought coherence to the reform of the Armed Forces, and our preparation for NATO membership. The current stage (2003-2007) is linked with the Objectives Force 2007 Concept: to provide a leaner, modern, well equipped, trained and more affordable force in the limit of 90,000 personnel (75,000 military and 15,000 civilians).

This was not an easy ride for the Romanian military since we had to run this process coping with the unprecedented dynamics of the new wind of change towards a new security paradigm. We had to deal with substantial changes and restructuring under some very difficult circumstances. The resources needed were not always available, and we had to downsize our forces in an unfavourable economic environment. Due to the lack of experience, our vision on objectives to be accomplished was not always very clear. So, in these circumstances the real challenge was to take decisions, notably those important decisions with serious impact on the development of the process concerned, but also with a serious impact on the people, on other sectors of the country such as health and education or on the social policy of the Government.

After a too long period of endeavours and straggling efforts it seems to me that now we are on the right path. The 2002/3 MAP cycle's objectives and their implementation – together with the prior achievements within the MAP process – provided the appropriate framework for receiving, by Romania, the invitation to join NATO. The progress recorded in the objectives' implementation also provided the right support for accession discussions and for the ratification of the Accession Protocols by the NATO countries' parliaments. Romania was able to accomplish a high percentage of its objectives during the this MAP cycle because the experience gained in earlier ones led to more realistic planning and a better correlation of objectives and resources.

The 2003/4 MAP Cycle is of paramount importance to Romania because it will not only prepare us for full NATO membership, but it will also assist us in adjusting our military reform priorities and ensure that they reflect the needs of NATO in this new security environment. Political and public support for the reform agenda remains high and the Government is strongly committed to ensuring the best

conditions for completion of our reform programme. To this aim, a defence budget profile reaching 2.38 per cent of GDP was established for 2002 and 2003, and this same level is planned for the period 2004-2006. The priority areas for this cycle are consistent with the June 2003 NAC Defence Ministerial decisions and guidance, and have been selected to ensure fulfilment of NATO's requirements for invitees. The military reform priorities reflect Romania's commitment towards enhancing NATO capabilities and focus on the development of a new, more flexible and more effective force structure, improved deployability and sustainability, and preparing forces for the whole range of NATO missions.

### **The way ahead**

Implementation will not come rapidly, but in accordance with a timetable for Completion of Reform (due to be completed in May 2004) and a long-term Armed Forces Restructuring Plan (due to *start* in 2004). Immediate priorities cover

1. Defence Planning
2. Participation in the full spectrum of NATO-led operations
3. Force Restructuring
4. Host Nation Support
5. Airspace Management and Air Defence
6. Personnel Training and Development
7. Personnel Management
8. Procurement
9. Disposal of Excess Equipment and Infrastructure

In addition, continuing work has to be done in revising the domestic legal framework, using the machinery to expedite this whose creation is a notable special feature of Romania's recent defence reform.

*1. Defence planning.* The Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation System (PPBES) will be further improved and adapted to meet NATO's defence planning requirements. The gist of the current defence planning exercise is to complete the Strategic Defence Review (the fundamental review of Objective Force 2007). The 2004 defence budget will represent 2.38 per cent of GDP and we are committed to support our defence reform programme, by maintaining this level of expenditure at least to 2006. Taking into account annual GDP growth of approximately 4.5 per cent, we expect that our defence budget will continue to increase in real terms through the current defence planning period.

Further this level of defence expenditure should be sufficient to support reform and restructuring plans, to implement NATO Force Goals, begin a modest investment and modernisation programme, and make some needed improvements to infrastructure. Approximately 25-35 per cent of the defence budget is planned to be earmarked for modernisation of the new force structure, with a view to improving the

interoperability, combat effectiveness, deployability, sustainability and survivability of the forces earmarked for NATO missions.

*2. Participation in the full spectrum of NATO-led operations and in the international fight against terrorism.* In 2003 participation in overseas missions exceeded planned provision. Forces participating in all missions abroad are part of the force package Romania will make available for the full range of NATO missions starting in 2004. In the new global environment directly affected by non-conventional risks from terrorism to organized crime, illegal trafficking and WMD proliferation, the fight against terrorism is a priority for Romania and we continue to expand our capabilities to counter terrorism. A concept for establishment of a Special Forces battalion has been developed and we will begin to stand up this unit in 2004.

We have given a special attention to NBC defence capabilities. The new NBC defence concept and doctrine, reflecting NATO standards and procedures, has been completed and is pending approval.

*3. Force Restructuring.* As regards the forces' restructuring and operationalisation, we have continued to restructure our forces by disbanding, re-organizing, establishing or re-locating units in accordance with the current force structure plans. We have also focused on maintaining the readiness level of units declared for NATO missions, and on increasing the combat capabilities of the forces scheduled to be operationally ready by the end of 2003. All of these forces achieved an increased level of readiness despite manning problems in some of these units (especially NCOs). The operationalisation process of some units was, however, affected by the cost of the Iraq mission. These units are now programmed to become operational in 2004. A Strategic Defence Review (SDR) has validated Objective Force 2007 plans. Implementation plans for the new force structure will be approved in the first quarter of 2004. Affordability will be the key challenge for the final force structure option. Romania is giving special emphasis to ensuring the deployability of units by upgrading and procuring additional C-130 aircraft and maintaining the agreements with civilian companies for sea and airlift, and is examining the possibility of further enhancement of these capabilities. Consistent with the results of the SDR and in accordance with NATO needs, the forces Romania is prepared to consider available upon accession include mountain troops, paratroopers, military police, reconnaissance troops, UAV and NBC capabilities and forces. In the longer run NATO is seeking from Romania a deployable division and contributions to special forces and multinational formations.

*4. Host Nation Support.* The HNS Capabilities Catalogue was submitted to NATO at the beginning of 2003 and the concept and procedures to provide HNS are being developed by an inter-ministerial working group. Romania's capabilities are continuing to be improved following experience gained by hosting allies' rotation to the Balkans and Middle East. The HNS concept and procedures that are currently being developed will be finalized and supported by additional necessary national legislation. We will further improve the arrangements and review requirements for

railheads, airports and seaports and other infrastructure facilities for the reception and onward movement of allied forces.

Also, we will continue to modernize the firing ranges, training facilities and the airports and seaports which are needed for allied deployments.

*5. Airspace Management and Air Defence.* Within the air space management and air defence area, important additional steps have been taken towards the integration of Romania's air space into the NATO air space control system. The Air Sovereignty Operations Centre (ASOC) has achieved initial operational capability, and the initial interface between ASOC and the NATO Integrated and Extended Air Defence System (NATINEADS) has been achieved. The ASOC has also a connection interface for NATO Air Early Warning & Command (NAEW&C) aircraft. Romania is ready to be integrated into NATINEADS and has undertaken to streamline the decision process to facilitate its ability to police Romanian airspace.

*6. Personnel Training and Development* focused on English language and NATO staff procedures training to ensure that Romania can effectively man all of its national and international positions at the various NATO HQs; revision of curricula to teach NATO concepts and operational procedures; six brigades (company through brigade staff) and three battalion-size units were trained; the training of NCOs; and the revision of all joint training regulations to encompass NATO strategies, doctrines, procedures and standards.

*7. Personnel Management.* In the area of human resources management, the Military Career Guide remains the main instrument for achieving the pyramidal personnel structure and effective military personnel career management. In parallel, most of the regulations concerning human resources management, especially regarding the civilian personnel management, individual military career management and the improvement of quality life of personnel, are being reviewed to ensure that they reflect NATO personnel management standards. Compensatory packages and re-conversion programmes shall be provided to discharged personnel.

*8. Procurement.* In the short to medium term force plans primarily seek to ensure NATO standard communication and communication security. Over the longer term they seek to improve Romanian capabilities to deploy and support its forces, and to enhance the forces' combat capabilities.

*9. Disposal of Excess Equipment and Infrastructure.* The Sales Agency will continue to dispose of excess equipment. Excess equipment will continue to be identified during the restructuring process and destroyed or sold in accordance with international regulations and agreements. Redundant infrastructure will be transferred to state institutions and local authorities.

## Legislation and Parliamentary Relations

Adopting the NATO *acquis*, and passing related secondary legislation represents a huge working process of legal harmonisation. In 2001, as Romania continued moving toward full NATO integration and European Union membership, it became obvious that a more efficient mode of cooperation with the Parliament was required for the timely harmonisation of Romania's then-current legislative framework with the established laws and legal procedures of NATO member states. To accomplish this, the Government created the Ministry for Parliamentary Relations as the special authority of the central Governmental administration. Right now it is a department not a ministry and the head of it is a delegate-minister, also member of the Government.

This Department for Relations with the Parliament (DRP) has a number of critical functions, including responsibility for planning, coordinating, and ensuring that proper legislative procedures are followed for each and every item of Government-initiated law. In addition, the DRP is charged with developing an efficient programme of liaison between corresponding Governmental and Parliamentary organisations, and within the Government itself.

In a further innovation, a State Secretary (Deputy Minister) for Parliamentary Liaison was appointed within every ministry. This innovation increased the quality and efficiency of the DRP dramatically. The Minister for Parliamentary Liaison convenes monthly meetings with all state secretaries for Parliamentary Liaison who correlate and coordinate their legislative activities in order to provide a more effective and efficient legislative process.

Within the Romanian Ministry of National Defence (MND), the Department for Parliamentary Relations is charged with implementing the defence-related legislative process. This Department provides not only the general liaison between the Ministry and Parliament, it also coordinates all defence-related legislative activities directly with other public authorities and non-governmental organisations, including the drafting and submitting of bills. In addition, this Department has the very important task of harmonizing these important actions with those of the NATO and EU member states.

Prior to 2001, ministerial representatives did not participate in Parliamentary debates concerning their ministries' draft legislation. Today, however, ministerial representatives participate fully and efficiently. As such, they may present the reasoning behind – and answer questions regarding – specific legislation, as well as pointing out key aspects of particular interest to the Parliamentarians. Either the Minister of National Defence or the State Secretary for Parliamentary Liaison must be present when defence-related legislation is officially submitted for debate and approval to a Plenum of the two Chambers of Parliament.

In addition the MND often hosts official meetings between its key leaders and members of the Standing Committees for Defence, Public Order, and National Security. These meetings regularly demonstrate their value in close cooperation that results when all parties are involved with the legislative process from its inception within the ministry to its debate and passage in Parliament.

The activities of the Department for Parliamentary Relations and Legislative Harmonisation have contributed significantly to the improved quality and increased efficiency of all defence-related legislation proposed by the MND. It has proven extremely adapted at interfacing in these areas with the Parliament, with other governmental organs, and with the public in general. Greater attention is now paid to liaison with national and international non-governmental organisations, especially when the goal is the adoption or passage of draft legislation that is systematic, cohesive, and harmonized both internally with prior legislation and externally with the legislation of EU and NATO member states.

The harmonisation of defence-related legislation with NATO member-states laws has its ground in *Chapter V – Legal Issues* from *Romania's National Program for NATO Accession* and the *Timetable for Completion of Reforms*.

The main objective of this activity is to remove any legal impediments that would hamper the fulfilment of commitments: rapid deployment of troops over borders, entry of Allied troops into the national territory, efficient cooperation in fulfilling the missions, and so on.

Besides these main objectives, in pre-accession stage there are also other activities that need to be achieved, such as: reorganisation and re-structuring of the Armed Forces, reconsideration of the system for the preparation of population, national economy and territory for defence, participation of Armed Forces in peace support operations, in PfP activities, as well as contribution with personnel in multi-national military structures.

We could say that harmonisation of legal framework to NATO accession requirements started in 1994, after Romania had accepted the PfP framework-document. Right after that, in 1995, Romania concluded the PfP Status of Forces Agreements (PfP SOFA) and protocols.

Besides PfP-SOFA, the legal status of forces on Romanian territory was also established by concluding bilateral agreements with USA, UK and France. At the same time, it was taken into consideration the creation of the necessary legal framework for the logistic support of troops that conduct exercises or other missions on national territory.

The legal framework for participation of armed forces in military missions and collective defence – and for a simplified procedure in granting approval for participation in exercises and joint operations – was made by amending the *Law no. 45/1994 on national defence*.

The creation of a NATO compatible structure, able to fulfil the new missions, led to a complex restructuring process, which also implied major changes in the legislation on management of human resources. As a result, the *Status of Military Personnel* was modified and the *Military Career Guide* was adopted, which aimed at the creation of a pyramidal structure. The restructuring process was supported by the adoption of legislation for social protection of military personnel: the *Law no. 164/2001 on State military pensions*, the *Government Ordinance no. 7/1998 on certain social protection measures for military and civil personnel, applicable during the restructuring process of large units*.



The will to have professional Armed Forces and training improvement according to NATO standards required broad conversions in training methods and standards. For this purpose, STANAGs on personnel training were enforced, even at institutional level. Based on the *Government Decision no. 1287/2003* was established the National Defence University, and according to the provisions of the *Government Decision no.466/1999*, a Regional Centre for Defence Resources Management was created.

*The Law no. 182/2002 on protection of classified information* and the four Government Decisions for the enforcement of protectionist measures, as well as the *Government Decision no. 835/2002 establishing the National Security Authority* were also duly adopted. I have to mention also the Law no. 257/2001 on the measures to be taken against aircraft that use Romanian air space without clearance and the Law on the preparation of national economy and territory for defence.

Under the coordination of the National Committee for Romania's Integration into NATO, the compatibility of the national constitutional framework with the provisions of Art. 5 of the North-Atlantic Treaty has been studied. This is the article which stipulates that an armed attack against one or more of allies shall be considered an attack against them all. The conclusions of the study pointed out that the 1991 Constitutional provisions are compatible to NATO stipulations and other agreements; but it has been decided that, in the context of revision of the Fundamental Law, NATO integration should however have a specific Constitutional basis. As a consequence, the specialists from the MND made proposals and supported the amendments to certain constitutional texts so in the future we would have constitutional ground and flexibility for other necessary changes in defence-related legislation based on the revised Romanian Constitution, in force from October 2003.

The modified Constitution gives new legal grounds for military obligations. The text no longer stipulates the obligation of Romanian male citizens to military service. An organic law shall stipulate the conditions for the fulfilment of military duties, applicable to all Romanian citizens, regardless of gender. This phrase allows the regulation of military duties according to the military alliances Romania will become a part to and of military training requirements. The age limit for recruitment is still between 20 and 35 years old, except for volunteers. This is in accordance with the requirements of a professional army.

To have a Constitutional expression of Romania's commitments to NATO structures and to further developments in the process of Romania's preparation to join the European Union, the revised Constitution says that: "According to the law and international treaties Romania is a part to, the Armed Forces shall contribute to collective defence within military alliance systems and shall participate in peacekeeping or peace making operations". In the spirit of these provisions, the MND has submitted for approval the draft Law on participation of armed forces in missions abroad. Based on the provisions laid down in the revised Constitution, within another bill is in preparation establishing the conditions in which foreign troops can enter into, station, conduct operations or transit Romanian territory.

Another improvement is the establishment of a Constitutional basis for the elaboration of a new status of military personnel. The MND specialists are working to a new draft Rule in this field, in order to ensure a more effective management of human resources and enforcement of new principles that NATO member-states military personnel are already accustomed to.

A further important amendment to the Constitution is the introduction of art. 145, according to which Romania's accession to NATO shall be made by a law passed in joint session of the two Chambers of Parliament, with a majority of two-thirds from the total number of Deputies and Senators. This is a very specific Constitutional basis for NATO accession.

### **Public information: ensuring transparency**

Restructuring and modernisation depend on public support and confidence in the credibility of our Armed Forces. Building this confidence and credibility is the main goal of the Directorate of Public Relations (DPR) of the Ministry of National Defence. Traditionally, public trust in the Romanian Armed Forces has constantly exceeded 70 per cent, supporting the evolution and modernisation of our military structures during preparation for NATO accession and Euro-Atlantic integration.

As the public image of the Armed Forces is a component of its combat capability, gaining and maintaining continued public support for its actions are strategic objectives. Any decrease in public support could detrimentally influence our capability to fulfil basic missions. An example would be restricting public funding for military infrastructure, training or, as we have seen in some other NATO candidate countries, peace support operations.

Public information is a mandatory activity of the military, resulting from the citizen's right to be informed granted by the Romanian Constitution. As a public institution the Armed Forces are bound by law to ensure all citizens have free access to unclassified defence-related information. In practice, our experience shows that military transparency is the key which unlocks the door of successful implementation of military reform.

Making use of the citizen's right to information granted by the Constitution and Freedom of Information Law, our civilian media represent a complementary means of exercising democratic oversight of the military. In Romania, the Armed Forces' media dialogue is both permanent and effective. Primarily through the actions of the DPR, the taxpayer is kept informed of how public funds are spent for defence-related matters, as well as on a variety of other relevant topics such as our ongoing military reform efforts, military training, combat readiness, housing conditions, Partnership for Peace (PfP) participation and the ongoing NATO accession process.

Within the Romanian MND, the Directorate of Public Relations (DPR) has functioned, in one form or another, since 1991. Now a part of the Ministry's Department of Parliamentary Relations, Legislative Harmonisation and Public Relations, this organisation has developed a unique and special relationship with our

civilian media. The main objectives of the DPR are to ensure transmission of correct and complete defence-related information (both internally and externally), promote the 'special relationship' Romanian Armed Forces have within society, and promote a proper image of the Romanian military that develops increased public support for, and raises public interest in, defence-related issues.

Media activities include publishing press releases, organizing regular press briefings and press conferences, distributing weekly information bulletins on the upcoming scheduled military activities, periodically inviting journalists to observe various military exercises and deployments, arranging and publishing interviews with key military leaders and other specific activities such as international conferences, workshops, seminars, debates and roundtable discussions on topics of mutual interest.

In addition, the DPR prepares promotional materials and bulletins, publishes military reviews, prepares special TV and radio programmes about military topics of special public interest such as coverage of its extensive NATO support and overseas peace support operations in nations such as Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and, most recently, Afghanistan (where Romania was the first NATO candidate nation with troops on the ground under coalition command), Kuwait and Iraq. The Directorate of Public Relations also makes direct contact with well-known national and international leaders and other famous personalities, as well as with local communities and authorities across the country.

In Romania, an operational debate system of national scale was developed to discuss defence and security-related issues. It is here that periodical national seminars have been organized with such topics as: "The Armed Forces and Society", "The Military Career and Youth in the Armed Forces", "The Transparency of Security - Security of Transparency", and "The Defence of Transparency - Transparency of Defence", and so on. All of these debates demonstrated to the Romanian public the value and imperative of democratic control of the military by discussing major issues confronting the military in the reform process and, last but not least, educating the people by facilitating the flow of communication between society and the Armed Forces.

In 2002 and 2003 the overall image of the military was positive (81.01 per cent) and improved as compared to 2001 (78.00 per cent) and to 2000 (76.98 per cent), and it matches closely the people's trust in the Armed Forces. This ascending trend may be explained by media interest in the capability of the Romanian military to cooperate with NATO forces under all circumstances. The interest grew significantly mainly after the '9/11' terrorist attacks (2001), and following the US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq 2002 and 2003, but also due to generally increased transparency of the military and intensified media coverage of military activities.



## VI. SLOVAKIA: GETTING REAL ABOUT SECURITY

Ivo Samson

The Slovak Republic is an example of a successful comeback in terms of NATO aspirations. Although it was excluded from the first round of NATO integration in Madrid and not even mentioned there as a possible candidate for the second round of Eastern enlargement, during the discussions in 1999 and 2000 about qualified candidates for that next enlargement, it started to be seen as the most probable next NATO newcomer. This change of fortune was brought about by progress in political and military reforms in accordance with the instrument offered to candidate countries at the 1999 Washington Summit: the Membership Action Plan (MAP) procedure.

The problem Slovakia experienced in the past was a discrepancy between declamatory and declaratory objectives on the one side, and the real political output – the *realpolitik* – on the other.<sup>44</sup> Since independence in 1993, all Slovak governments have unambiguously declared their intention to gain full membership in Western institutions such as NATO and the EU. Unfortunately, the governments' declarations were contradicted in 1994 – 1998 by repeated violations of Western democratic norms, negating any chance the country had to join transatlantic political and security structures in the short term.

At the beginning of 1993, the day it became an independent state, the Slovak Republic shared the same opportunities as the Czech Republic – plus neighbouring Poland and Hungary – to continue the political and economic transitions necessary to secure invitations to join those structures. Beginning at the end of 1994, however, policy decisions taken by the then government provoked mild criticism, then sharp criticism, and finally clear warnings from the West that Slovakia was going to spoil its NATO and EU integration chances.<sup>45</sup> This while three of Slovakia's neighbours were proceeding well on the track to both NATO and EU. At the 1997 NATO meeting in Madrid it became clear officially what was known even before: that after Slovakia's refusal to get rid of the so-called "democratic deficits", criticism and warnings were replaced by the decisions to exclude Slovakia from the first wave of post-Cold war NATO enlargement.<sup>46</sup>

### Threat perceptions

In the 1990s, Slovakia was not in a position in which it would be endangered by armed attack. Economic coercion and/or political pressure, however, were

<sup>44</sup> Samson, Ivo: 'Declamations, Declarations and the realpolitik in the Current Slovak Foreign Policy' *Perspectives* (Prague), No. 6-7/1997.

<sup>45</sup> It concerns the so called third government led by Vladimir Meciar (1994-98).

<sup>46</sup> Samson, Ivo: "The Security and Foreign Policy of Slovakia in the First Years of Independence". Published in German as: *Die Sicherheits- und Aussenpolitik der Slowakei in den ersten Jahren der Unabhaengigkeit*, Baden-Baden 2000, Nomos Verlag, 299 pp.

conceivable and Slovakia had to balance national security interests with a secure political and economic coexistence among its direct or indirect neighbours in order that the society might pursue its development. The former Minister of Defence of the Slovak Republic<sup>47</sup> summarized the opinion of security experts in 2000, at the time Slovakia had already started another attempt to meet NATO admission criteria.<sup>48</sup> The following goals can be noted as an example of thinking two years before the official invitation to NATO in November 2002.

- The development of international relations in the European region can be characterized as a dynamic process of transition from possible confrontation to gradual creation of new models of co-operation. In spite of the fact that the Slovak Republic need not face direct military threat to its territorial integrity and sovereignty, new security challenges, risks and threats are arising.
- The greatest security risks which can have significant destruction impact upon the society and the State are the threats connected with international terrorism, uncontrolled proliferation of mass destruction weapons, migration, mass spread of drugs or organized crime.
- The ethnic conflicts based on nationalism, territorial disputes or extension of latent armed conflicts are especially dangerous. These and many other facts effect the rationale, size, structure, armament and character of the armed forces.
- The Government of the Slovak Republic takes into account the new geopolitical situation in the Central European area, where more than 86 per cent of the state's borders are neighbouring with NATO countries.
- The increased integration efforts to become Alliance member, and the complicated situation in the country that negatively influences the effective provision of the defensive capability of the state, has set an aim to reform the Armed Forces and to assert the optimum variant of guaranteeing the security of the State, based on acquiring full-fledged NATO membership.

The reform of armies together with the decrease of the number of armament, manpower and introduction of progressive elements is a worldwide trend. The Slovak Republic did not want to lag behind in this process.

Besides "security risks" official Slovak documents also use the term "security challenges". One of the crucial challenges was the participation of Slovakia in the forming of European security system.<sup>49</sup> Other challenges have been formulated in a very standard and general way as follows: active participation in Central Europe in the sphere of establishing and developing good neighbourhood relations; using the chances of cooperation within the Visegrad Group; strengthening of democracy, legal state and fundamental human and civic rights; establishing social-oriented and environment-oriented market economy; managing the transition of Slovakia from an

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<sup>47</sup> Pavol Kanis, who resigned after a financial scandal at the beginning of January 2001 and was replaced by another representative of the post-communist Party of Democratic Left (legal successor to the pre-1989 Communist Party of Slovakia), Jozef Stank.

<sup>48</sup> Kanis, Pavol: "Speeches", in: [www.mod.gov.sk](http://www.mod.gov.sk), 2000.

<sup>49</sup> "Bezpečnostná stratégia Slovenskej republiky" /Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic/, (Bratislava: Ministry of Defense, 2001).

industrial to an information society.

## National Interests

Formulated in the document *Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic* (2001), like other states, Slovakia draws a distinction between "vital" and "important" national interests. Four "vital interests" have been specified:

- Guaranteeing the security of the Slovak Republic, its sovereignty and integrity;
- Safeguarding and developing the democratic fundamentals of the state, its domestic security and domestic order;
- Securing the lasting economic, social, environmental and cultural development of the society and protecting the important infrastructure of the state;
- Preserving peace and stability in Central Europe and spreading the zone of democracy, security and prosperity, including the full membership of Slovakia in NATO and EU.

In addition to the these, there exist six "important interests":

- Preserving peace and stability in the world and preventing tensions and crises, eventually solving them by peaceful means.
- Good relations with direct neighbours and development of mutually advantageous cooperation.
- Domestic stability based on a corresponding social consensus concerning vital and important interests of Slovakia.
- Transformation of the Slovak economy to an environmentally balanced market economy.
- Safeguard of social peace and stability based on the equality of all citizens regardless of political orientation, religious affiliation, gender, ethnicity and social classification.
- Reaching of environmental security within the framework of domestic and international structures.

From this enumeration it appears that the security decision makers, policymakers and politicians were not able to get deeply into the problems or to avoid generalisations and clichés. They approved such a formulation and division of national interests that results partly in overlapping goals, partly in clearly tautological definitions.

## Threat Assessment in the New Security Documents

To attain the objectives of the Program Declaration of the post-1998 Slovak Government,<sup>50</sup> the Ministry of Defence elaborated the strategic document *Concept of*

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<sup>50</sup> "Programove vyhlásenie vlády Slovenskej republiky" /Program Declaration of the Government of the Slovak Republic/, Section IV - "Domestic Security, Justice, Defense of the State and Foreign Policy", (Bratislava: Office of the Government), November 1998, pp. 33 - 36.

*the Reform of the MoD until 2002 (with the Outlook up to 2010)*, which was approved by the SR Government on 13 October 1999.

The objective of this text was to eliminate contradictions between the demands laid upon the MoD and the capacity of the state, on the basis of internal resource use. The declared goal was to contribute to the stabilisation of the activities of the Defence Department and to create conditions for successful integration of the Slovak Republic into NATO; and at the same time to initiate a solution of the whole system of defence of the Slovak Republic. The new concept of reform has followed the failed attempt to reform the army in three stages: 1993-1995, 1995-1997 and 1997-2000. The year 2000 should have been the year of the concluded reform of the armed forces. In the mid-1990s, however, it had been assumed that by 2000 Slovakia would be already a full NATO member.

Yet the document was proposing neither a security vision for the country, nor a comprehensive programme of the defence system, but only a reform within the MoD. Afterwards, the reform draft of a whole defence system was formulated under the title *Force 2010*. In fact, though, this means once more postponing real reform of armed forces until 2010.<sup>51</sup> The Concept of the Reform of the MoD until 2002 (2010) stirred, therefore, contradictory reactions both in army circles and among the expert public.<sup>52</sup>

A second important document is the *Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic* – still valid at the end of 2003 – which was presented to the public for an open discussion during 2000 and was approved in 2001 by the Parliament.<sup>53</sup> It represents more a generalisation of the security position of the Slovak Republic after the failed NATO integration of Slovakia in 1999.

The document summarizes and defines the security risks that can be faced by the Slovak Republic since 2000 in the following way.

1. The probability of a global war has remained very low after the end of the Cold War. In a long-term perspective, however, the risk of a large-scale armed conflict cannot be excluded. As unstable countries tend to increase their military capacity including the accumulation of weapons of mass destruction, hypothetically Slovakia still faces an armed threat.
2. Another source of security risk for Slovakia is formed by conflicts in unstable regions.<sup>54</sup> Due to the extreme nationalist, religious and ideological fundament these risks bear a long-lasting character.

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<sup>51</sup> *Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic: SR Force 2010*. Bratislava, Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic 2002, 53 pp. The analysis of this document for the present publication has been the task of my Slovak colleague Gabriel Kopecky.

<sup>52</sup> Bartak, Peter: "Vyuzivame poznatky a skusenosti z polskej cesty do NATO" /Using Know-how and Experience of the Polish Road to NATO/, Samson, Ivo - Strazay, Tomas: *Europska bezpecnost a proces rozsirovania NATO* /European Security and the Process of NATO Enlargement/, Bratislava 2000, pp. 11 - 14.

<sup>53</sup> "Bezpecnostna strategija Slovenskej republiky" /Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic/, Bratislava, Ministry of Defense, 2001.

<sup>54</sup> The document has localized this risk in the regions of South-eastern Europe and the Caucasus (pp. 7-8).



3. Non-controlled migration represents only a future – even if increasing – threat because Slovakia stands outside the main migration channels. Migration could easily develop into an actual threat as a consequence of regional conflicts.
4. International organised crime has in-between begun to threaten the vital interests of the Slovak Republic. The most distinctive manifestations are smuggling of arms, trafficking in women and children and money laundering.
5. "Criminalisation" of social relations. Here, the document mentions crimes that form modern domestic forms of criminality, particularly racketeering and criminality of minors. Further social security threats are to be seen in corruption, embezzlement, clientelism, xenophobia and racism.
6. Activities of foreign intelligence services. The document does not specify these services, but states that their activities will increase with the probability of Slovakia's NATO integration.
7. Interfering with the information system of the state as a consequence of information terrorism. This activity can lead to a total failure of the country's information system.
8. The document also criticizes implicitly the excessive dependence of the Slovak Republic on Russian energy sources claiming that "the excessive dependence on unstable sources of basic raw materials and energy, as well as of their transport", can result in a threat for the security of the state.<sup>55</sup>
9. Negative demographic development consisting in the aging of the population and in the resulting inability of the state to secure the social system.
10. Environmental threats that include industrial and technical accidents and natural catastrophes.

Here one can often see a repetition of the "national interests" of the Slovak Republic. What is striking is the mixture of politico-military and domestic security problems. The document, however, succeeded in catching some crucial "politico-military" threats almost by name (especially no. 2, 6, 8).

### **Resources and Instruments: Political and Military Resources**

Slovakia's participation in the programme Partnership for Peace (PfP) has remained a distinct element of engagement with NATO 1999-2003. The military-associated security activities of Slovakia within the programme are traditionally more explicit than security policy activities.<sup>56</sup> Also Slovakia supported the establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), and up to 2003 the associated military involvement has been on the increase. Hence, Slovakia appropriately took advantage

<sup>55</sup> "Security Strategy...", p. 9.

<sup>56</sup> Samson, Ivo et al., "The Foreign Policy and National Security of the Slovak Republic", in: Grigorij Meseznikov et al.: *Slovakia 1998-1999* (Bratislava: IVO - Institute for Public Affairs, 1999), pp. 168-171.

of its participation in the PfP programme, including taking part in the PfP exercises.<sup>57</sup> In looking for the objective to reach the NATO membership (invitation), it proved to be a successful strategy in 2002.

Even if participation in PfP did not provide guarantees within the meaning of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, it did provide the opportunity of consultations in case of a threat to national safety. Moreover, Slovakia, like many other countries, has always understood participation in the Partnership as a pre-accession activity intended as a support for integration plans.

The programme has been implemented in particular via the Individual Partnership Programme between the Slovak Republic and NATO (IPP), which has since 1994 been prepared annually. Cooperation is conducted in a number of areas, which have been decisive for reaching the minimum level of interoperability of the Slovak armed forces with the armies of the NATO member states. A quality breakthrough in the approach towards the IPP appeared after the Washington Summit (1999), in particular after the adoption of the National Membership Action Plan of the Slovak Republic (N MAP SR), when in 2000 the IPP clearly focused on the support of Slovakia's accession process aims.

#### *'Priorities' 2000 and 2003*

The objectives of N MAP SR reflected in the preparation of the crucial IPP for 2000, i.e. in the time Slovakia restarted its efforts to win a good position for NATO membership negotiations, were as follows:

- Conduct a reform of the armed forces of the Slovak Republic while exploiting the knowledge and experience of NATO's defence-related planning.
- Achieve the required level of interoperability and compatibility of the command and management structures, communication and intelligence systems, logistics and infrastructure.
- Increase of language training.
- Improve defence-related planning and procurement of resources.
- Plan the modernisation of armaments, technology and military materiel.

The reform priorities by the year 2003 were the following:

- Restructure and harmonise the armed forces structure to be comparable to the armed forces of the NATO member countries, and adapt it to the human, material and financial resources available.
- Develop the armed forces while stressing the improvement of operational skills, capabilities to operate within international groups, doctrines and administrative procedures; modernise the command, management and communication systems, plus specialised and language training of the key staff.

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<sup>57</sup> Samson, Ivo et al. "Integrácia SR do EU, NATO a OECD" /Integration of the SR into EU, NATO and OECD/, in: Kollar, Miroslav; Meseznikov, Grigorij: *Slovensko 2000* /Slovakia 2000/, (Bratislava: IVO - Institute for Public Affairs), p. 351-352.

- Decrease the military staff in number, optimize the proportions in the staffing structure, switch to professionals in the immediate and fast reaction forces – applying the criteria of intellectual compatibility with the staff in NATO armed forces – and improve the living conditions of soldiers, their social and health security.
- Gradually modernize the command, management and communication systems, plus armament and technology of the armed forces, and develop scientific and technology-related cooperation with NATO, exploit own defence industry potential and develop the defence infrastructure.
- Shape the defence and military capacities capable of contributing to the joint defence of the member countries after accession to NATO, provide training to the required numbers of military staff to extend Slovakia's representation within NATO and to adequately represent Slovakia within the NATO military structures and agencies.
- Foster the Operational Partnership and compliance with the standardisation requirements.
- Improve asset and fund management, increase the share of expenditures on development programmes.

Predictably, Slovakia also declared as a 'priority' activity for 2003 to rationalize the support activities of the defence sector, and eliminate positions not related to the combat power of the state.

In the field of Slovakia's preparation for NATO accession, several fundamental issues seem to be important. One of them has been the issue of *political stability*. It was imperative that agreement existed between the coalition and opposition about the country's basic course and that the issue of joining NATO was not disputed. Up to 2003/2004 there has been unanimity: the most powerful opposition entities according to public opinion polls, SMER and HZDS, have repeatedly declared their support to Slovakia's accession to NATO (and the EU).

Another concern has been *defence-related planning*, in particular with a view to stabilizing the financial resources allocated for defence. It is impossible to allow defence expenditures becoming subject of ambiguities while approving the state budget every year. The official government policy foresees an annual increase of defence expenditures by 0.1 per cent of GDP. With this pace of expenditure growth, the government expects to be able to reliably comply with pre-accession obligations.

Another issue has been the problem of establishing links between Slovakia's industry and the industries of NATO member countries, in particular the defence industry. The public is interested, too, if – apart from expenditures on defence related to NATO accession – membership would also mean positive economic aspects. This interest of the public is reasonable, as Slovakia is amidst a period of economic recovery linked with a temporary drop in living standards. The cooperation of NATO and its membership applicants does not have to and maybe should not be restricted to military and political cooperation, but expanded in the field of economic cooperation.

To co-ordinate domestic efforts, immediately after the Washington NATO Summit the Slovak Government had approved the programme of national preparation

under the designation PRENAME (Preparation for NATO Membership).<sup>58</sup> A special institutional basis was formed and the NP PRENAME (National Program of the Preparation for NATO Membership) could start its activities.<sup>59</sup> The NP PRENAME served as the necessary document for the adoption of the N MAP SR (National Membership Action Plan of the Slovak Republic) that has been monitored both by Slovak national ministries, and by the NATO International Staff.

For formulating the security goals of Slovakia within the PRENAME, the experience of NATO's newcomers in 1999 could be utilized. There exists a general consensus that the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland had an indirect impact on the security orientation of the Slovak Republic in several respects: army reform, compatibility and interoperability with NATO standards, technical and language preparation of Slovak officers, adaptation of a part of Slovak armed forces for NATO needs.<sup>60</sup>

The fourth ANP PRENAME (Annual National Program) Slovakia 2003 was approved in 2002 and in its five parts dealt with the MAP headings: political and economic issues, defence and military issues, resources related issues, security issues and legal issues.<sup>61</sup>

#### *Critique: the Garrett Report*

In 2000, US experts wrote an evaluation report on the defence situation of Slovakia. The team headed by General Joseph Garrett – and working in cooperation with experts of the Slovak Minister of defence and General Staff – came to disturbing findings.<sup>62</sup> Their *Study on the Defense Reform of the Slovak Republic* was very critical to the state of Slovak armed forces. According to Pavol Kanis, the former Minister of Defence of the Slovak Republic (until January 2001), the inquiry Report analysed “the historical state of the Slovak Army that has been reached after many years. Partly, the problems of the Army of the Slovak Republic have roots in the old regime, partly they are due to the lack of dynamic changes that took place in other countries”.<sup>63</sup>

The findings of the Garrett Report have not made been public, but even the few released details could be regarded as alarming for Slovakia's ability to reach its NATO integration objectives.

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<sup>58</sup> Document no. 480/1999.

<sup>59</sup> Vladny vybor pre pripravu Slovenska na vstup do NATO /Preparation Government Committee for the NATO Integration of Slovakia/, as well as respective working groups.

<sup>60</sup> Bartak, Peter: "Vyuzivame poznatky a skusenosti z polskej cesty do NATO" /Using Know-how and Experience of the Polish Road to NATO/, in: Samson, Ivo - Strazay, Tomas, ed.: *Europska bezpecnost a proces rozsirovania NATO* /The European Security and the Process of NATO Enlargement/, (Bratislava: Slovak Foreign Policy Association, 2000), pp. 11 - 18.

<sup>61</sup> *Annual National Programme Slovakia 2003*, Bratislava, September 2002, 35 pp.

<sup>62</sup> At the time the report was prepared, Gen. Joseph Garrett held the position of an assistant to the US Secretary of Defense. His team had elaborated similar studies on the defense situation in the Baltic states, Romania and Bulgaria.

<sup>63</sup> Kanis, Pavol. In: *Obrana /Defense/*, no. 17, 2000, p. 3.

- Slovakia has belatedly tried to revise its basic security and defence documents that do not correspond to contemporary defence needs of the state.
- There exists a deficit in planning and distribution of defence resources.
- If Slovakia wants to integrate into Western defence structures, it needs to build smaller and more professional armed forces fit for action.
- Most military formations do not reach the necessary personnel limit (in the average, they have only 70 per cent of the strength) and depend heavily on reserve mobilisation.
- In spite of the fact that the annual growth of the GDP has been calculated at 2-3 per cent in the next years, there exist no reliable standards in planning the resources.
- The system of defence in the Slovak Republic lacks a unified command: there still exist military and paramilitary parts of armed forces that are subordinate to three different ministries (Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications).
- In personnel policy, the Army of the Slovak Republic still acts according to the principles it inherited from the Communist regime.
- Maybe the most important deficiencies are to be found in the planning and implementation of military exercises that lack a coordination between land and air forces.<sup>64</sup>

In the recommendations for the Slovak Ministry of Defence, the Garrett Report proposed the system of defence planning for several years in advance, the centralisation of all military and paramilitary elements under one command (with the exception of police forces), change of personnel management, more efficient training (exercise) programmes. Some findings and recommendations of the Garrett Report met opposition in army circles. Certain reservations were expressed by the then State Secretary of the Ministry of Defence (namely concerning the problem of purchase of military aircraft which has not been recommended by the Garrett team).<sup>65</sup>

### *Catching up with Reforms*

Following the Garrett critique, Slovak experts produced three general security and defence documents that were approved by the Parliament soon afterwards (the *Slovak Security Strategy*, the *Slovak Defense Strategy*, and the *Slovak Military Strategy*).<sup>66</sup> There was also legislation: *The Constitutional Law on State Security in Times of War, States of War, Endangerment and Emergency No. 227/2002* and laws which secure the defence of Slovakia and at the same time create conditions for Slovakia's entry into NATO viz. the *Law on the Defense of Slovakia*, the *Slovak Armed Forces Law*, and the *Law on Conscription*.

The *Law on the Defense of Slovakia* above all defines the roles of state organs,

<sup>64</sup> These findings have been taken from the article by gen. Milan Stranava, "Studia reformy obrany SR" /Study on Slovakia's Defense Reform/, *Obrana (Defense)*, no. 17/2000, pp. 14 - 16.

<sup>65</sup> The State Secretary Jozef Pivarci in: *Obrana /Defense/*, no. 18/2000, p. 11.

<sup>66</sup> Details in: Meseznikov, G.; Kollar, M.; Nicholson, T.: *Slovakia 2002: Global Report on the State of Society (Defense)*, pp. 345 - 346.

municipalities and regional parliaments, as well as the responsibilities of legal entities and individuals in preparing the defence of the state.<sup>67</sup> The approval of the *Law on the Slovak Armed Forces* repeated the Law on the Slovak Army of 1993 and abolished the forces serving the Interior Ministry and the state railways firm.<sup>68</sup>

The *Law on Conscription* brought in one fundamental change: conscription will affect men from 18 to 55 years, apart from exceptional changes.<sup>69</sup> Another set of legislative procedures is represented by military doctrines.<sup>70</sup> The development of military doctrines unfolded in keeping with the needs of armed forces reform according to the *Force 2010*.<sup>71</sup>

Clearly, for Slovak military reform, 2002 was a crucial year. Without the accelerated process that gained momentum in 2002, Slovakia would not have been invited to NATO at the end of that year. And there is still much unfinished business.

## Last points

For practical reasons, the decade of reforms in Slovakia's security sector can be divided in the following way:

1. 1993 – 1995: time of identifying the problems;
2. 1996 – 1998: continuity of reform attempts;
3. 1999 – present (2003): transition from declamations to real reform.<sup>72</sup>

In all three periods, one can discover one basic moment – an effort to:

- define the place, role and capacity of armed forces in the new security environment
- reduce the financial requirements for maintaining the original armed forces
- reduce the numbers of armed forces,
- turn the personnel pyramid from head to feet (i. e. reduction in number of high officers and increase in number of rank-and-file).

Reform in armed forces would not have been sufficient without political progress in Slovakia. This progress in turn was possible only because of political pressure on the side of NATO and EU countries in the years 1994 – 1998.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> No. 319/2002.

<sup>68</sup> No. 321/2002.

<sup>69</sup> No. 320/2002.

<sup>70</sup> *Slovakia 2002* cited earlier.

<sup>71</sup> The analysis of this document is given in the contribution of my Slovak colleague Gabriel Kopecky.

<sup>72</sup> The characteristics of this period have been named after the paper by Vladimir Tarasovic (*Reform of Armed Forces*) translated by the author (I. S.) given at the conference on The Post-Prague Progress of NATO Candidates held in Bratislava in Summer 2003.

<sup>73</sup> Samson, Ivo: 'Slovakia: Misreading the Western Message', In: (Eds: Zielonka, Jan and Pravda, Alex) *Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe*, Vol. 2, Oxford 2001, pp. 363 – 382.

## VII. SLOVAKIA: SIZING AND SHAPING THE FUTURE FORCE

Gabriel Kopecky

After a peaceful separation of the former Czechoslovakia in 1993 the Slovak Republic became a new sovereign state. Since that time the government formed national institutions, including Armed Forces. The new Slovak armed forces assumed responsibility for sizable force structures, including a large number of bases and installations and significant equipment stocks throughout the country. A Warsaw Pact organisation, doctrine, and management system legacy was inherited as well.

Over recent years, a clear objective has been established to join the trans-Atlantic security structure. Due to a critical situation in the defence establishment, downsizing has occurred and several attempts at systemic reform were initiated. Even the most recent efforts, begun in 1999, did not provide a clear direction for the Armed Forces of the future nor did they satisfy NATO membership requirements. These reforms were severely underfunded and were not guided by appropriate defence planning documents, such as the Security and Military Strategies. Although training levels of the Army of the Slovak Republic (ASR) have increased marginally as a result of reorganising the Land and Air Forces, units are not trained to high combat readiness standards. The ASR was largely a product of the past, with legacy structures that were inefficient and unaffordable. A number of studies and assessments from outside sources confirmed the severity of the problems facing the ASR.

In 2001 a newly-appointed Minister of Defence decided that these must be addressed as a matter of urgency on the basis of up-to-date conceptual defence documents. A Steering Committee was established. The State Secretary of the Ministry of Defence was assigned as the Chairman. The Chief of the General Staff was designated the Deputy Chairman. This Steering Committee supervised five Working Groups, under the direction of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff. The mission of the Steering Committee and the five Working Groups was to develop the following documents:

- The Military Strategy of the Slovak Republic
- The Organisational Structure of the of the Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic
- Concept “The Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic – Model 2010”
- The Long-term Plan of Structure and Development of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic

All elements of the Slovak military, as well as advisors from the US, UK, Germany, and France, were represented in this work.

## **Method**

To determine a realistic but affordable future military force for the Slovak Republic, a methodology was developed to provide discipline and focus to the work. This methodology provides the analytical framework that focused first on determining required capabilities and then, based on an assessment of risk, determining those capabilities that are affordable. The methodology led to the selection of a Program Force – the peacetime force of the SR. Also reflected in the methodology, the strategic direction for military activities of the Republic was a precondition for this analysis and for the structural and systemic reform deemed necessary.

Given the current threat assessment the planning group was able to reduce the structure to a more realistic and affordable force by focusing the planning efforts to counter the more likely threat of Regional Armed Conflict. Analysis of several scenarios developed for this possibility led to the conclusion that more limited capabilities would satisfy the military needs of the Republic. These capabilities are reflected in the military organisation referred to as the Program Force.

An important criterion to be considered in developing the blueprint for SR Force 2010 was the annual funding level that could be expected for military activities. In this regard, the current commitment by the government of approximately 1.89 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for the MOD budget through 2005 was adopted as an overall target. With GDP currently at 1,058 billion SKK and forecasted to grow to 1,242 billion SKK by 2010, this equates to approximately 20 billion SKK in 2001 stable prices. In the force development process, this was the amount used as a datum. Of the total, personnel and operating costs represent 15 billion SKK (75 per cent) and investment costs represent 5 billion SKK (25 per cent). Beginning in 2006 the growth of the defence budget is expected to increase to a minimum of 2 per cent of GDP. This would be represented by annual growth of the defence budget by 1.3 billion SKK.

Here it is also appropriate to note that devising and planning implementation of a new blueprint for a nation's defences has implications for legislation. An urgent need for new acts and legal arrangement was elaborated in a special team of legal experts and the inputs from working groups were taken into consideration. Coordination with the Parliament and other ministries was an important part of work to avoid disharmony or conflict in different acts.

## **Outcomes: (1) General**

When most of the information was collected and understood, the work in five teams started. Everybody knew where we want to go, what we have to achieve and what are our limits. We were able to focus on the main areas of our work. Some examples of general accomplishment in our on-going effort are: new Security, Defence, and Military Strategies; reduction in military manpower; initiation of military structure reduction; Ministry Of Defence and General Staff re-design; reduction of excess



material; initiation of base realignment; equipment modernisation begun; increased English language education. (Currently, the need for a separate Defence Strategy text has been reconsidered and only Security and Military Strategy documents are foreseen for future.)

The process of development of “affordable forces” is straightforward. The objective is to develop the smallest possible structure of forces with which we may in our own respond to threats covered by military strategy, which are primarily oriented for most common scenarios created for regional conflict as the first step. It accepts a degree of tolerable risk (major armed conflict low probability, help from allies, in 2010 as NATO member). Availability of resources is taken into consideration (that means we assume current budget, today’s mechanics and possible evolution of population), but it has not been exactly defined yet.

In the second step there will be further elaboration on force details. In the third step there will be developed the cost of this force. In fourth step there will be further modelling of this force according to the next points:

- a) if we have any unemployed resources we can increase the proposed affordable force, and decrease the level of acceptable risk or,
- b) if there are enough resources, we can work on proposed affordable force and make it the programme force,
- c) if the resources are not sufficient we decrease proposed affordable force and increase the level of acceptable risk implying pressure on politicians, so that they increase availability of resources, or accept higher level of risk.

This approach enables proposal of the affordable force which balances probable threats, acceptable risks and available resources. In other word we will make the provision we can afford. We know that the resource constraints make prioritisation critically important.

The strategic goal is to build a smaller, but high-quality, force that is appropriately armed and trained; and to integrate that force into NATO's collective defence arrangement. This force must be capable of operating, as a member of a coalition organisation, across the entire spectrum of war, from High Intensity Conflict to Operations Other Than War. Additionally, the force must be capable of accomplishing all of the missions assigned in the Military Strategy. Analysis has shown that this future force must emphasise mobility, flexibility, and the leveraging of emerging technologies. To help deliver this it was decided that the Ministry of Defence and General Staff should be integrated and reduced in both size and complexity. This reorganisation was implemented from 1 October 2001.

## **Outcomes: (2) Force Structure, Organisation and Employment**

### *Land Force*

The Land Forces organisation will contain the Land Forces Headquarters, a light infantry brigade, a mechanized infantry brigade, an artillery regiment, an engineer

battalion, a signal battalion, a reconnaissance battalion, an NBC battalion, an electronic warfare battalion and a command support battalion. Both brigades will contain an organic tactical air defence capability. The structure is designed to meet all tasks and requirements of the Military Strategy, to support national and international missions, and to be NATO-compatible.

Much of the major items of equipments within the Land Force are considered obsolete or inappropriate for the new force structure. Major equipment upgrades will include the replacement of heavy, tracked combat vehicles with a lighter, more deployable wheeled combat vehicle.

#### *Air Force*

The organisational structure of the Air Force will consist of the following: an Air Force Headquarters; an Air Operations Control Centre; an AF tactical base with fighter wing and transport squadron; a helicopter base with helicopter wing; an air defence brigade; a radio location reconnaissance and warning battalion; a signal battalion, and a command support battalion and an NBC battalion.

Current equipment is old and obsolete. Most aircraft will reach the end of their technical life before 2010 and the cost of modernising the Air Force will be high. The plan for this modernisation is included in the Long Term Plan. The Air Force for 2010 is designed to meet all tasks and requirements of the Military Strategy, to support national and international missions, and to be NATO-compatible.

#### *Training and Support Command*

The Training and Support Command will consist of a Training and Support Headquarters; Training Command; Logistics Command; Signal Command; and the Bratislava Garrison Headquarters.

Training Command will be responsible for conducting Initial Entry Training (Basic Training and Advanced Individual Training) for new enlisted recruits; education of career NCOs; oversight of the Lest Training Center, and the conduct of reserve force training, upon their mobilisation. Logistics Command will have major responsibilities for logistical support throughout the ASR. This organisation will have a key role during mobilisation and for the support of deployed forces. Signal Command will be organized to provide strategic communications support to MOD and the General Staff and operational-level communications support to both the Land and Air Forces. The Bratislava Garrison Headquarters provides command and control for the various separate support units stationed within the Bratislava area.

#### *Employment of the Force*

The force structure outlined above was developed to counter the threats specified in The Military Strategy. Additionally, the force has been designed to ensure that it can be committed to meet all of Slovakia's international obligations.

As developed during the war gaming scenarios, the force has been designed to be able to be deployed and employed for all operational contingencies, both within the country and – as part of a collective defence arrangement – outside of Slovakia. The

deployment capability is made possible by the addition of strategic and operational logistic support units to the force structure.

Operationally, SR Force 2010 is structured to function as a joint force under the command of a designated Joint Force Commander. This joint force will be self-sustaining and capable of integration with other western-style coalition forces. The force can be employed as an up to two brigade joint task force, with supporting air, artillery, air defence, engineer, intelligence, signal and logistic units. For operations of a lesser scope, the force can be deployed/employed as a brigade or battalion joint task force.

### **Outcomes: (3) Other Matters**

#### *Personnel Reform*

The fundamental objective of personnel reform is to achieve an integrated personnel management system that incorporates all aspects of force sustainment – accession, development, assignment, compensation, and separation programmes or systems. This system of systems is essential to create and sustain a professional, modern force. It must be able to provide for the assignment of quality personnel with correct skills to the right unit at the required time.

A large number of military and civilian personnel will be separated from the Ministry of Defence to achieve planned strength for 2010. The objective of the separation programmes is to ensure compassionate treatment of soldiers and civilian personnel as a result of unanticipated separation from the military due to downsizing. Conducting the necessary reduction with compassion will not only ensure that soldiers and civilians are treated fairly, but will create a better future recruiting environment.

Increasing the number of professionals in the ASR will result in a higher quality military force, with increased readiness. Only those who meet established standards will be accessed into the military. Standards for individual performance will be created and enforced for personnel at all grades. An objective personnel evaluation system is needed to provide systematic performance reporting. A fair, unbiased, competitive promotion system will be implemented to identify individuals for advancement who possess the potential for increased responsibility and continued service. Conversely, an objective evaluation system will support forthcoming additional personnel reductions.

As part of the transition to a professional force, there will be a change in grade structure as well as the ratios among the personnel categories. The number of officers will decrease while the number of NCOs and junior enlisted soldiers will increase. The rank structure will consist of officers (O1-O10), warrant officers (WO1-WO3), noncommissioned officers (E5-E9), junior enlisted (E1-E4), and civilian employees structured according to government-wide civil service standards. SR Force 2010 will be much less top heavy.

Barracks, family housing and recreation programmes are key elements of an

effective Quality of Life programme. Modern personnel management practices in support of SR Force 2010 will require regular assignment rotation of personnel. Reassignment or rotation of personnel promotes professional development, enhances military experience, and improves unit effectiveness. Increased personnel rotation will require an improved military housing programme. The ASR housing programme must include new construction of family quarters and soldier barracks, renovation of existing facilities, implementation of housing allowances to help officers and soldiers procure housing in the private sector, and household goods transportation compensation.

### *Doctrine*

The General Staff of the ASR is developing the Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the SR. It will provide the guidance for the employment of air and land forces and will be NATO compliant. Doctrine will prescribe a strategic view of joint and combined military operations across the spectrum of war. Doctrine will include strategic guidance for the conduct of operations in response to non-military threats such as counter terrorism and natural disasters. This capstone manual will serve as the foundation for subsequent development of operational and tactical level doctrines.

### *Training*

A new training management system is being developed and implemented in order to support SR Force 2010. This system will place more control and responsibility for unit training with unit commanders. Commanders will analyse and define training tasks and set priorities based upon a thorough analysis of the missions assigned to their unit in accordance with training priorities established by periodic training guidance documents. Through this system, commanders will be able to prioritise training tasks to ensure that they focus their resources to achieve combat readiness for those missions they will most likely be tasked to accomplish.

To support the implementation of a new training management system, it will be necessary to develop, publish and distribute an overarching document that will effectively standardise training so as to achieve the necessary level of professionalism.

One of the most important changes associated with SR Force 2010 will be the creation of a professional NCO Corps. The NCO Corps will become the primary trainers for Initial Entry Training and for unit training. To ensure that future NCOs are properly prepared to execute the responsibilities that they will be given, a formal programme of professional development has been incorporated into the Long-Term Plan for SR Force 2010.

*Logistics*

With respect to logistical reform, logistics doctrine has the first priority. The goal of this doctrine will be to ensure compatibility of logistical structures, processes, and activities with NATO systems. This doctrine will also be based on the Security, Defence and Military Strategies.

The force structure for logistics will be changed to provide more responsive support and to better reflect western procedures. New logistics units and organisations will be established at all levels of the force. Staff responsibilities for logistics within the MOD and GS will also undergo realignment. These changes are more fully detailed in the Long Term Plan.

A key element of this new structure is the creation of the Logistics Command, which will be subordinate to the Training and Support Command (see above). It will serve as the material management centre for all supply, transportation, maintenance, and medical material management for the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic. The Logistics Command will control the material supply bases.

During the logistics transformation process provision of selected services such as food service, maintenance and administration of buildings, guarding of buildings and facilities, laundry and cleaning, repairs of commercial types of material and equipment and transportation services will gradually shift to the civilian sector.

The ASR's maintenance system will be converted to a four-level military recovery, maintenance, repair and replacement system with Organic, Direct Support, General Support, and Depot-level logistics.

*Core Basing*

A Core Basing Plan has been prepared. It consists of those essential installations required for housing, training, and support of SR Force 2010. As a result of an analysis of the basing needs of SR Force 2010, a significant realignment and reduction plan has been prepared. This analysis included the military requirements for SR Force 2010 as well as an analysis of the impact of possible base closures upon the regional economies. The base realignment plan that has been proposed provides the location of bases to be retained in support of SR Force 2010. The current plan calls for the retention of 23 major installations with 17 satellites for a total of 40 separate installations. Two additional Air Defence radar sites are currently being considered for inclusion to the list of satellite installations.

This radical change will go beyond the 2010 planning period. The details for the transition to this new basing concept are included in the Long Term Plan.

*Host Nation Support*

The development of a credible Host Nation Support capability is firmly linked to potential NATO membership. In this regard, there are two principal Host Nation Support Partnership Goals. The first deals with the creation of concepts for providing Host Nation Support. The second focuses on reception and onward movement of

NATO forces through the Slovak Republic. Related to these are specific logistics Partnership Goals that require the development of a single-fuel concept and establishment of fuel handling equipment for ground vehicles. These programmes will be realized over the course of the next years.

There are also a number of initiatives that focus on the upgrade of existing reception/staging support capabilities. This includes upgrade of NATO specified airfields and railheads. A centralized Host Nation Support database will be established by the end of 2004. This will include both military and civilian assets and resources, as well as data from other ministries.

### *Modernisation*

The following infrastructure modernisation activities are planned for the period to 2010:

- Reduce the quantity of military infrastructure based on financial analysis, effectiveness and the need for personnel and material;
- Establish the legislative preconditions necessary for disposal and transfer of unused and unnecessary facilities and material;
- Allocate sufficient funds, in phases, for modernisation of infrastructure elements to fulfil the modernisation plans of the SR Force 2010 Core Basing Plan.

Vital to any infrastructure modernisation and revitalisation plan is its environmental and ecological impact. Plans have been developed to convert heating facilities on installations that use wood and coal to natural gas burning facilities. There are also plans to modernize old fuelling and refuelling stations using modern storage tanks, and reconstruction of wash racks, parking areas, etc. to comply with environmental standards.

The ASR has large quantities of equipment, material, ammunition and armament that are rapidly reaching the end of their useful economic life. A considerable amount of this equipment and supply does not match current requirements or expected needs of SR Force 2010.

Without modernisation, over 75 per cent of land equipment and 90 per cent of air equipment of the ASR will be obsolete by 2010. Nearly 80 billion SKK will be required in this timeframe to address this problem. However, this estimate does not include potential costs associated with leasing or purchasing a replacement, multi-role combat aircraft for the Air Force.

A comprehensive acquisition strategy is being developed for the new multi-role combat aircraft. A part of this strategy will be a thorough review of the most effective way for financing this acquisition. An option under consideration is delayed long-term payment beginning in 2008 with aircraft delivery beginning in 2004. A tender, or series of tenders, will be released as part of the decision making process. A proposed plan for equipment modernisation will be developed in the Long Term Plan.

## **Conclusion**

The blueprint for Slovakia's future forces reviewed here emerged – as noted at the beginning of this Chapter – from an urgent 'defence review' exercise begun in 2001. This was run by a strong Steering Committee and engaged much effort in a relatively short time period. It is appropriate, in conclusion, to recount what was involved.

All products from each working group were subject of discussion and final approval at the meetings of the Steering Committee. These meetings were organised once a month or when needed. Between the meetings of the Steering Committee the work was evaluated and coordinated by an integration team, which was the body of all team leaders and top officials of the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff. The Minister of Defence himself visited meetings of the integration team frequently. All proposals had to be presented in form that would allow the Government and National Assembly to understand clearly each detail. General agreement was achieved that all documents, except a few very sensitive ones, should be unclassified.

When the work of the Steering Committee was finished, an approved document was submitted to the Minister of Defence. This was the last stage of work on the final document "Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic – Model 2010" at the Ministry of Defence. The next step was a request for approval from the State Defence Council. All documents related to security and defence matters have to be approved by this Council.

The final step in this process, before implementation of the plan, was approval of the document at the Parliament of the Slovak Republic. Special attention was paid to explain our plan in particular committees of the Parliament. Taking care of all details which should cause any problem among members of the Parliament was reflected in significant support of the document. About 70 per cent of deputies voted for approval.





## **Part C     Perspectives: National and International**



## VIII. MOLDOVA: REFORM REQUIREMENTS

Nicolae Chirtoaca

Like in many countries of South Eastern Europe the lack of security and stability is a major obstacle to the democratic stabilisation of Moldova that has already the negative consequences for individuals, groups and even the state as a whole. Therefore one of the main transitional challenges Moldova is still facing is Security Sector Reform (SSR). The very quick geopolitical changes, proliferation of new risks and dangers, especially of a non-military character, unsettled conflicts and frozen crisis situations have already a direct impact on the emerging new European security order, making the reformation of defence and security a difficult task especially for the small states that recently have appeared on the political map of the old continent.

Most of these countries face a wide range of security threats and risks, not just to themselves but to Europe as a whole. These include organised international crime, the drug trade, human and arms trafficking, illegal migration, political manipulation of territorial and ethnic conflicts and the insecurity of energy supply routes and infrastructure. To a large extent these problems are spilling over into the European Union (EU) through its new direct neighbours.

While those “soft threats” are real challenges for the EU’s eastern-neighbourhood countries, some of them also face risks and threats in the area of “hard security.” These trends are generated by post-Soviet instability and from current attempts to pull those countries into Russia’s political and security orbit. In Moldova the political and territorial separatism remains one of the main concerns and an obstacle in the process of state building and in the way of the reintegration of Moldovan society. The military, economic and political support provided to the separatists from outside the country’s borders, the Russian military presence on the left bank of the Dniestr river against the will of the Moldovan people and the decisions of the international organisations, lack of control over the eastern border with neighbouring Ukraine – these remain the immediate security threats for the country.

The enlargement of the Euro-Atlantic community of nations inevitably has to deal with the problem of securing and integrating its immediate perimeter. The existing “grey” areas of Eastern Europe prejudice long lasting security and stability. Therefore Moldova and Ukraine (and Belarus) – the new European “borderland” cannot be left without assistance in their search for reliable guarantees for secure and stable development. The weakness of these transitional states from one side and the post-imperial syndrome in Russia’s policy towards its “near abroad” creates a dangerous mixture generating permanent instability and growing risks. NATO and the EU cannot be excluded from this region’s security arrangements by accepting Russia’s primacy in re-creation of its own sphere of influence. Therefore it is important to estimate how the enlargement processes may involve Moldova and the

neighbouring countries, to examine what a changing security environment implies for them and what kind of security and defence arrangements are on offer.

Regarding its own provision for security, like many other Eastern European nations Moldova finds it exceptionally difficult to identify a successful model of security sector reform, reducing this process to the periodic downsizing of the armed forces and the redistribution of tasks among the institutions and organisations responsible for national security. The need to ensure the cost-saving and efficient inter-agency co-operation is also taken into consideration. Historical heritage and old mentality that still influence the state of mind and behaviour of political society plus perception of the exclusive role of the state by a big part of the society have a direct impact on the formation and functioning of the executive and legislative branches of state power. Therefore impartial analysis of the current state of democratisation of the national army in general and civil-military relations in particular – within the framework of SSR – is important for further actions aimed at democratic stabilisation of the country. The aspirations to reintegrate the country into Europe and complete transition toward a law-governed democracy and market economy create good preconditions to reach these objectives.

### **Security-sector reform: why and what?**

The reasons for wanting SSR in Moldova derive from the democratisation process as a whole, from the contradictions of the recent past, as well as from the unfinished construction of the nation and the state. At the same time the dynamic character of new threats and risks and the permanent lack of security and stability requires from the country a more pragmatic and realistic approach in efforts to address these issues. Difficulties in assessing the commonly accepted definition of SSR arise, however, since the sector itself is at the same time the building block of strategy and a tool driving democracy in the field of security and defence. The absence of a common and clear understanding as to what are the goals and instruments of the SSR has already produced problematic consequences:

*First*, SSR as a rule is not located in a broader context of democratic reforms in Moldova and adjustment of the armed forces, security services and law enforcing agencies of the state to democratic norms and mechanisms. The political control over the military by the democratically elected legislative and executive powers is considered enough for the democratisation of civil-military relations.

*Second*, SSR is defined in a context of adjustment to new risks and threats, taking into consideration the real economic and military potential of the country as well as the new geopolitical realities and the established balance between the potential and interests of the force structures and institutions inside the state. At the same time there are real conservative trends in attempts to address the challenges existing already in the security sector, on the basis of old approaches and policies (without re-evaluating what needs exist and thus to make them relevant to the circumstances in the country and at the regional and sub-regional levels).

**Third**, without shared conceptions and a common strategic approach to SSR, different stakeholders like government, civil society representatives and international institutions pursue different objectives and therefore commend sometime conflicting policies being focused on different aspects and priorities of the same processes. The growing number of issues in the area leads to a loss of focus and risks diminishing the efficiency of reforms.

**Fourth**, the new kind of civil-military relations is understood mainly as a need to correspond to requirements imposed from outside the country by multilateral organisations. In the absence of adequate understanding about the fundamental democratic norms that should regulate the relationship between civilians and armed forces, that form the checks and balances system, it is premature to speak about the concrete model of democratic and efficient control over the military to be implemented in the country. This is one of several sources of confusion in terms of exactly what policies, ideas and values should be considered as a basis for the reformation of the existing security and defence system.

The general assumption of political and democratic control of the military in Moldova is that the armed forces should be the neutral, apolitical servant of a democratic, civilian leadership and that their role should be limited to implementing the policy choices of that leadership, rather than engaging in domestic politics or playing a central role in determining the direction of foreign or defence policy.

From this perspective there is a range of factors which shape the current situation and can help identifying the vectors of further development. The democratic control of the military revolves around three distinct but inter-related issues:

- a) the military's role in the development of defence policy in particular and of the national security concept and strategy as a whole (in terms of force structure, defence spending, procurement and military strategy);
- b) the non-involvement of the armed forces and of the power structures in domestic politics, especially in the struggle for power as well as in the settlement of internal political crises;
- c) the clearly stipulated military role and impact on the formulation of foreign policy priorities, especially decisions on the external use of military force

Despite a certain degree of confusion in Moldovan society concerning the real content and the ways of SSR implementation there are already the key policy instruments in this field.

### **SSR and the New Concept of Military Reform**

On 26 July 2002 the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova approved a *Concept of Military Reform*. Officials have explained the necessity of this document by a need to solve a range of problems the Armed Forces are confronted with. The establishment of a new efficient and flexible system of military security able to guarantee the defence of territory, sovereignty, independence, territorial unity and integrity of the state is considered the main objective of the reform. Despite the fact that the *Concept*

has been developed exclusively within the framework of the MoD and therefore has a certain departmental character it has the features of the national security concept representing a complex of ideas, objectives and directions of activities followed by the assertion of force structure, mechanisms and budgeting procedures.

In this document is highlighted that the Republic of Moldova does not have enemies and therefore the probability of a major threat to the military security of the state is a minor one for the time being. The main sources of threats are regional instability and the emergence of a large diversity of non-military risks. For the first time the cross-border risks such as organised crime, illegal drug, weapon and strategic material smuggling and trafficking are listed in the official document. The *Concept of Military Reform* also considers as military threats the territorial separatism and the internal political, social and economic conditions capable to diminish the military potential of the state and the authority of the state.

The *Concept* asserts the leading role of the armed forces within the security arrangements of the state. The army bears a major strain and for the third time in a decade has to be reorganised in order to meet the new challenges and the new threats. One of the main objectives of the latest army reform concept is to transform it into a flexible, agile, and sustainable force with well determined tasks able to be the leading force in any crisis management.

The SSR agenda put forward in the *Concept* describes concrete goals which the government and the respective ministries should strive to achieve. There is only the problem of the central agency of the state that will assume all the responsibility for reform implementation. According to the *Concept* the president of the country and the presidency as institution plays the essential role involving in this process the government and its structures. The problem consists in the lack of real and reliable mechanisms to allow the head of state to put into practice the main ideas of the reform and to monitor the process itself. The Supreme Security Council lacks the resources to play an active role; and SSR is not a high priority for the governing majority as compared to stabilisation of the economic and social situation in the country.

The MoD can play the leading role in this situation but there is a risk that this ministry will try to pursue its own corporate interests without paying too much attention to the interests and co-operation with other state power structures involved in the process. In the favour of the special role the MoD should play is the fact that the military forces will be a key part of SSR. At the same time, without clear mechanisms for accountability, the armed forces potentially can constitute a threat to democratic governance and consume more resources than other parts of the security sector. The military forces should be oriented exclusively towards those tasks for which they are most appropriate. The latest *Law on National Defence* strengthens the leading role of the army by the creation of the General Headquarters and appointing the vice-minister of defence as its chief.

Effective police forces under civilian control and management is another essential element in establishing the conditions for community security and enhancing economic and social stability. At the same time organised crime is interested to infiltrate the law-enforcing agencies, provoking the antagonistic relationship between

the police and different sections of the citizenry. Building the capacity of police forces according to democratic standards is particularly important in the current situation.

Judicial reform is not yet finished in Moldova and this element of the democratic transition of the country is included in the list of priorities monitored by the Council of Europe. Judicial appointments are frequently politicised, trials can be subject to long delays, and corruption is a real problem. Effective and impartial judicial and penal systems can play a key role in reducing crime and in consolidation of justice and social stability. Building the capacity of judicial and penal systems, and encouraging reform in this area should stand high on the SSR agenda.

## **The way forward**

There are several objectives (or needs) to which attention should be paid. This is essential for Moldova.

*First*, to strengthen the civilian oversight and management of the armed and security forces. Without doubt larger civilian involvement in policy development and management is the key element of responsible governance in this sector. The competence and the professionalism of the civilian expertise as well as efficient independent institutions can ensure the civilian leadership for the security sector functioning according to democratic norms and principles. The reform agenda in this area could include:

- strengthening civilian expertise in ministries of defence, internal affairs, justice and special services through the training of experts and specialists;
- raising the decision-making capacity and competence of the standing parliamentary committees that monitor defence, internal affairs, policing and secret services;
- developing a concrete model of civil-military relations and of democratic oversight of the military according to democratic norms and the situation existing in the country;

In addition, there would be value in establishing independent research institutes (think-tanks) specialised in the problems of national security and defence to work in direct contact with the decision-making structures;

*Second*, to raise the level of transparency in security sector planning, management, and budgeting. Military and especially security forces are often unwilling to share information with civilians, and there are limited possibilities to develop specialists that will be in the future independent analysts in this area. A lack of transparency creates the dangerous trend toward the politicisation and abuse of the military and security services by the authorities or political groupings. Such a situation can undermine a country's long-term economic and political stability as well as the democratic development of the country. Theoretically such situations are regulated by the Moldovan legislature. Some categories of information about the security sector are considered confidential and are stipulated in a relevant Law but the

rest can be made public without the risk of compromising state security. In practice there is still a disposition to make secret much more information and data than the legal norms allow.

**Third**, to involve more actively the institutions and organisations of civil society in monitoring the security sector and in developing defence and national security policy, budget policy and resource allocation. These institutions and organisations require more assistance from the state and from international agencies to play a more visible role. Efficient monitoring that involves civil society organisations and the media is able to raise the efficiency of civilian control over the security sector organisations. These steps can be introduced in the SSR agenda in Moldova. Increased transparency in budgeting and improved auditing mechanisms can help to reduce the level of corruption and waste of resources in security sector programmes.

**Fourth**, to develop the international co-operation that promotes regional and sub-regional peace and security actively involving the participant countries in partnership. Both governmental and non-governmental sectors can play an active role in enhancing mutual security so that local problems do not become regional. Such co-operation can yield knowledge transfer and contribute to the change of mentality of participating Moldovan civilians and military, reinforcing balanced civil-military relations. Promoting regional confidence-building mechanisms within the framework of existing security arrangements can enhance mutual understanding between governments and reduce the risk of inter-state conflict. More attention should also be given to including civil society in regional dialogues.

**Fifth**, to consider as a priority conflict settlement and post-conflict transformation including the reintegration of the eastern part of the country currently controlled by the separatist regime. The settlement of this conflict can considerably enhance local and regional security by removing the source of destabilisation and the surplus of weapons and munitions that are not under the control of the Moldovan authorities. These efforts should be followed by concrete measures aimed at enhancing border controls as an integral part of security development programmes.

Respect for human rights and rule of law by the security sector organisations can be ensured by relevant training helping the police and other security forces to get the appropriate knowledge and an understanding of the code of conduct in a democratic society. Greater attention to such training would be a strong claimant for a place on a longer agenda.

### **The Transnistrian issue and the security of the new EU Neighbourhood**

The current status of the discussions on resolving the Transnistrian problem is still marked by the different stances of the parties involved regarding the future of the Moldovan state. Both the Moldovan government and the leadership of the breakaway republic agree in principle that a political settlement should include the establishment of a federation. But whereas Chisinau sees its Eastern region under control of



separatists to be an autonomous territorial-administrative unit of the country the Tiraspol leaders insist on a formula based on recognition of two 'equal' entities, possibly in a 'common state' as called for by a Russian 1997 proposal. The separatist authorities also insist on Russia and Ukraine as guarantors of a settlement, with the stationing of troops from these countries on Moldovan territory.

In terms of security and defence components of the process of conflict settlement, the discussions started in 1999, when both parties agreed to establish five 'common spaces'. There would be common border, defence, juridical, economic and cultural spaces. Transdnistria insisted on keeping separate military forces and its own policies concerning weapons and ammunition stationed on its territory. Moldova insisted on having a single military force. Demilitarisation of the state has also been discussed.

To keep a military presence and political tutelage under the guise of peacekeeping are central goals of Russian policy in Moldova. Russian troops act as "peacekeepers" between the legitimate government and secessionist forces that Russia itself has created and armed. The Kremlin "mediates" between the legitimate government and its own proxies, seeking political settlements that would legalise the separatists in power and would cast Russia in a new role as "guarantor" of such a settlement with its troops in place and a semblance of international mandate. Moscow has been pushing for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to develop a peacekeeping role, assuming the OSCE's role would be confined to authorising Russia itself to take the lead role to "guarantee stability" in ex-Soviet countries.

Unfortunately in Moldova the OSCE has proven incapable of enforcing its own resolutions on the withdrawal of Russian troops and munitions. At the 1999 Istanbul summit, the last that the OSCE was able to hold at heads-of-state level, Russia agreed to scrap or evacuate its arsenals from Moldova and all its troops from that country. Four years after signing on to those commitments, Russia retains to this day [late 2003] the greater part of its arsenals, and all the troops that were supposed to be evacuated by December 2002. (At Porto in late 2002 the OSCE extended the troop withdrawal deadline until 31 December 2003 "provided the necessary conditions are in place". At Porto the Russians also ruled out a reference to the "free consent of any state to any foreign military presence on its territory," although this principle is enshrined in the CFE Treaty.)

The authors of the International Crisis Group Europe Report N°147 (12 August 2003) came to the conclusion that "The conflict in the Transdnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova is not as charged with ethnic hatred and ancient grievances as others in the area of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and it is more conducive to a sustainable settlement. However, a "quick fix" in 2003, as envisaged by the Dutch Chairmanship of the OSCE, is also unlikely. To reach the sustainable agreement that is required if the forthcoming European Union (EU) enlargement is not to be compromised by a nearly open border with international crime and serious poverty, a comprehensive approach is needed that

takes into account the root causes of the original conflict and the factors that have blocked the settlement process since 1992”.

After the European Union and Russia had declared at their summit on 29 May 2002 that they would cooperate to resolve the Transdnistria conflict and the Netherlands identified a settlement as a priority for its Chairmanship-in-Office of the OSCE in 2003, the negotiation process gained fresh momentum in July 2002 when the so-called Kiev Document was presented by mediators as a new concept for a final settlement agreement based on the principle of “federalisation” of Moldova. A draft agreement was proposed by Russia and the OSCE, but finally was not accepted by the Moldovan government as a basis for further negotiations with the separatists. The current Moldovan leadership is still wary of “federation” for two reasons. First, “federation” as it was proposed by Russia under the auspices of OSCE covers a deal with the incumbent Transdnistrian leaders, cementing their control there, and awarding them a share of power in the central government. Secondly, this arrangement would hand Moscow a permanent lever of influence on “federalized” Moldova placing the country under the “guarantees” of Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE, an arrangement that would ensure multiple Russian representation (in its own right, via OSCE, and indeed via Kiev), while reducing the West to indirect representation through the OSCE.

Even so, in February 2003 President Voronin proposed the establishment of a joint commission to elaborate a constitutional settlement of a federal Moldova. Russia, Ukraine as mediating countries and the OSCE agreed with this initiative. Later the Moldovan president officially invited EU to join the process of peaceful settlement of the conflict. The EU had declared already its intention to become more involved. The European Commission decided to support the establishment of a joint Ukrainian-Moldovan customs post on the Ukrainian side of the border with Transdnistria in order to reduce considerably smuggling. Previous EU statements concerning the lack of prospects for Moldova to join the EU have also been softened in recent statements, although membership cannot be envisaged for many years. In addition, the EU has adopted a tougher position towards the Transdnistrian leadership, imposing a ban on travel to the EU by its leaders in February 2003, a decision supported by the US administration.

However, the EU had no part in these proposals, nor should it now. It needs to think up a European-style solution. The EU’s interest is to ensure that Moldova does not become a Russian military and political satellite, while most Moldovans want to become part of Europe. More broadly, the EU member states’ interest in a settlement derives from the following factors.

- Moldova’s deep economic and social crisis is partly a result of the high economic costs of the unresolved conflict and this situation transforms the country into a source of instability and different risks in the larger Europe;
- Transdnistria is a strip of land transformed over the past years by the transnational mafia structures into a criminal offshore zone and as such is a threat to security not only for Moldova but for the wider region;

- The paramilitary formations under the control of the separatists – and trained by the officers of the Russian military contingent located illegally in the eastern part of the country – present a real military threat to Moldova and for the region as a whole;
- The lack of effective control at the internal Moldovan boundary alongside the Dniestr river (so the border between the future EU (Romania) and Moldova will be all that separates Western Europe from Transdnistria).

It is evident that stability and prosperity on the expanded EU's new frontier will not be achievable without the settlement of this conflict.

Taking into consideration the factors that have impeded an agreement thusfar one can make a conclusion that a multifaceted approach is necessary based on:

- breaking-up vested interests, especially in the eastern part of the country controlled by separatist authorities and now a criminal haven;
- the unconditional withdrawal of Russian troops and munitions from the eastern part of Moldova and demilitarisation of the region;
- promoting democracy, rule of law and human rights in Transdnistria;
- strengthening the economic and democratic reforms in Moldova;
- settlement of the conflict on the basis of autonomy for the new Transdnistria within a territorially and politically reintegrated Moldova.

Moldova can become the test for the EU in the use of its peace-support capabilities, as part of developing its European Security and Defence Policy. The European Commission's Communication on Wider Europe Neighbourhood made public in March 2003 mentions such a possible support role. Moldova is also the country with a frozen conflict in which EU-Russia conflict settlement cooperation can be tested. These perspectives argue for an entirely new format for negotiations and post-conflict guarantees in Moldova. In this way the goal of de-militarisation of the conflict area can be achieved easily: Russia's troops would leave, and Transdnistria's own military formations would be demobilized.

## Conclusions

Over the years of independence, Moldovan society has gained certain experience in democratizing the military and reforming the national security system. From one point of view, the institutional and law making issues have been successfully accomplished. Moldova has already recognizable democratic structures in place. However, attitudinal change appears to be taking place over a longer time period than institutional or legal change.

In terms of civil-military relations, the principle of democratic (civilian) control over the armed forces has been recognised as a rule of the democratic game and partly institutionalised. Some efforts have been made to raise public awareness concerning defence planning and military budget approval. Within the society there is already some understanding of the necessity to ensure the accountability of the military, secret services and law enforcers to the elected public authorities. What has

been ignored until now by the Moldovan political establishment is that defence policy and decisions regarding the use of military force involve complex military-strategic and military-technical issues, requiring expertise which civilian leaders are unlikely to have.

The interdependence of the SSR and other modernisation agendas requires, however, a much broader approach in comparison with the existing one. The lack of generally applicable norms and criteria on SSR and its elements makes the problem even more difficult. Reform involves fundamental issues of governance. The problems Moldova is still confronted with are a result mainly of poor governance and failure to respond in an adequate way to the new challenges as a whole and to the changing structure of risks and threats in particular. The steady improvement of the conceptual approach to the problem this sector has to address is not followed by the concrete activities. The inertia of old approaches and conservative tendencies remain very visible.

One of the main tasks is to insure that both civilians and military work as a team on defence problems, avoiding counter-productive rivalry. At the same time security sector problems should become a real priority in the internal political dialogue as well as that with international organisations and institutions.

Commitments to agreed SSR objectives have little chance to lead to success without cooperation with continental and Euro-Atlantic organisations plus their support.

Moldova will become in a short period of time a direct neighbour of both NATO and EU. In this way however, Russia's near abroad has turned into NATO's and the EU's front yard. This should be the basis for any Western decisions in this part of South-eastern Europe. There are risks but also opportunities.

One opportunity is for the EU to play a decisive role in the settlement of the frozen conflicts in Europe: for example by deploying a peace-consolidation force to Moldova in order to create the necessary preconditions for the settlement of the Transnistrian dispute. (The EU is prepared to conduct the operation using certain NATO assets, in accordance with the "Berlin-Plus" agreement between these two organisations. The United States, which actually controls most of those NATO assets, favours a NATO-linked EU operation.)

One of the main strategic goals of the Moldovan state consists in stabilisation of its situation and escaping from a downward spiral wherein insecurity, corruption, criminalisation and underdevelopment are mutually complementing and reinforcing. The complexity of this stabilisation agenda and of strategy development means that the socio-economic, governance and security dimensions of reforms must be tackled simultaneously. Systematic consideration of what constitute the main goals of the planned reforms is of paramount importance. So is compatibility of the democratic rules and principles in SSR area with Moldova's particular background and political and social environment. The central objective is to ensure good and competent governance and efficient co-operation with the international partners.

## **IX. MOLDOVA: IMPLICATIONS OF NATO/EU ENLARGEMENT**

Vlad Lupan

The fall of the Berlin Wall marked the departure from the bipolar world and a radical change in the political and security architecture in Europe and globally. This process was augmented by the events of 11 September 2001. Against this background, the enlargement of NATO and the European Union became for a number of states objective processes on their way of returning to stability through unity of democratic values shared on the European continent.

Although the connotations for the development of democratic values and institutions are obvious, there is another not less important consideration – the pragmatic implications for the states in these processes. And, indeed, the states do operate with the criteria of national interests for the sake of their own citizens' prosperity and security. Therefore, the extension of NATO and EU and the establishment of a viable and trustworthy security system on both international and national levels are perceived as essential factors by a number of states in this part of Europe and their efforts plainly demonstrate that. Particularly relevant examples of such efforts were the actions taken to implement conditions, not least in the Security Sector Reform (SSR) area, stipulated in the Membership Action Plans (MAPs) of the countries aspiring to NATO membership, as well as commitments taken as a result of negotiations on accession to the EU.

It is clear that NATO and the EU are perceived by these countries as institutions through which they would achieve their security goals and for several of them the membership in these organisations is not such an historically-speaking long-term prospect. At this particular point the borders of both in South-eastern Europe will approach Moldova and Ukraine.

The direct security implications for these two countries are substantial. Not only the new members could directly benefit from enlargement, but the new neighbours too, since the organisations might also pay more attention to resolution of the neighbours' immediate problems. NATO and EU would look to guarantee security of their new borders, and would take steps to make impossible the outbreak of new problems and conflicts or the spill-over effects of such problems on these new borders. They would, therefore, be more sensible to events in the Republic of Moldova and subsequently would encourage Moldova to continue democratic reform, in order to become more stable and at least neutral to them. Proximity to NATO and EU would turn into an advantageous factor for Moldova, as the country would be placed in an area of priority interests of the West.

Although the Republic of Moldova is a neutral country and declared its desire to become only an EU member, this situation has anyway a particular relevance from both NATO and EU perspectives, since the country is facing economic difficulties and its security is compromised by a "frozen" conflict: each factors of anxiety for

these organisations. Because of the mentioned reasons, a dual EU and NATO engagement in Moldovan affairs might be considered as imminent.

### **SSR first steps in Moldova**

Despite all the impediments and problems on the way to comprehensive SSR, some steps were already taken by Moldovan authorities since the declaration of sovereignty and independence of the country. The old Soviet structures of KGB, Militia and Court system were transformed, while the Armed Forces were created with limited resources, mainly inherited in poor condition or in limited numbers from the Red Army.

#### *Security and Information Service (SIS)*

Thus, firstly, the local branch of one of the most secretive and to a large extent feared bodies in the former USSR, the Committee of State Security (**KGB**), was transformed into the Ministry of National Security through a Decree of the President of the Republic of Moldova of 9 September 1991. The conflictual events of 1990-1992 in the Gagauz and Transnistrian regions brought new aspects to the functioning of this service. At the same time, the processes of democratisation of the society, establishment of the new international relations and ultimately orientation of the country towards the European Communities required new approaches. Along with positive “opening” processes, new problems came along and new threats and risks to security were recognised. Therefore, subsequent modifications of the structure and activities of the Ministry of the National Security became necessary, adequate to the requests of the time and adjusted to the legal reform operated in accordance with Council of Europe requirements.

Hence, the process of reorganisation started by Parliament’s decision of 12 January 1998; and the Ministry of National Security ceased to exist on 23 December 1999 being replaced by the Security and Information Service (SIS) of the Republic of Moldova, which declared as its values the establishment of an institution based on European principles and generally accepted norms of international law in conditions of a democratic state. A less intrusive way of investigation was foreseen and the main burden for actions to be taken to enforce the law was placed on the shoulders of the Ministry of Interior and judicial bodies. In this context the SIS currently considers that the period of its construction came to an end.<sup>74</sup>

#### *Ministry of Interior*

Another institution that underwent transition changes was the **Ministry of Interior** (MoI) of the Republic of Moldova. After the declaration of sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova on 23 June 1990, a new legal statute, structure and competences

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<sup>74</sup> General information regarding the Security and Information Service of the Republic of Moldova can be found on the site of the SIS – [www.sis.md](http://www.sis.md) in the state language of the RM and in Russian.

were set and the process of construction of a new, national body for interior affairs started. On 13 September 1990 the Government of the Republic of Moldova adopted a Decision on the reform of the MoI, which foresaw the establishment of the National Police. This decision was confirmed in December 1990 by the Parliament through a Law on Police. New structures, mainly corresponding to those of the European states, and firstly France and Italy, were considered when building the new MoI. Currently, among other departments characteristic of Ministries of Interior there is also a Department of the Carabinieri (interior troops), having military structures, ranks and incorporating both recruits and contracted personnel, exercising similar functions as the Carabinieri in Italy and the Gendarmerie in France.

In an attempt to respond to the emerging problems and continuing its adaptation to the new realities the MoI decided to review the current legislation that governs its activity and has started the drafting of a new Law on Police.<sup>75</sup>

### *The Army*

However significant were the transformations within the SIS and MoI, there is no other more noteworthy change than that in the **Moldovan National Army**. The construction of the Army itself was also influenced by the outbreak of the military conflict in the Transnistrian region. Due to the crisis circumstances the Army had to quickly build its structures from the existing resources. Firstly, these were officers who returned to Moldova from the Soviet military structures, who operated with outdated concepts and considered the military doctrines no longer necessary for a small state like Moldova and unsuitable for internal conflicts. Secondly, it was the weaponry, not always in decent shape, which remained on the territory of Moldova after the withdrawal of the Russian Army units. In conditions of inadequate equipment and with an evolving internal armed conflict, the sense of emergency in constructing the armed forces was predominant.

With the Transnistrian conflict transformed in due course into a “frozen” one, the efforts of the Army were redirected on its own construction. However, with time and the more significant involvement of the former Soviet command personnel – who were objectively the most competent persons – as well as with limited funding possibilities, the Moldovan army became even more like a scaled-down version of the USSR armed forces. With other factors, including external ones, this influenced the entire course of action in the political-military field. As a result of the larger political circumstances, Moldova decided to declare its neutrality and build its forces accordingly – with the idea of sufficiency for temporary defence, until it could count on external help if it were threatened.

After numerous reductions, the Moldovan National Army is currently headed by the Main Staff and includes land, air and air defence forces and can be augmented by Frontier troops and Carabineer troops. It is composed of three motorised infantry brigades, one artillery brigade, an air force element, an air defence element and

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<sup>75</sup> General information regarding the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Moldova can be found on the site of the MoI – [www.mai.md](http://www.mai.md) in the state language of the RM, and eventually in English and Russian.

combat support units, all reporting to the Chief of the Main Staff. The current strength of the National Army is about 6,000, while the authorised strength is about 8,000 personnel. The authorised number of civilian personnel is 2,400. There are currently 2,113 civilian personnel, of which most are specialists [end-2003].

### **Strategy, Connections and Reform again**

As it was previously suggested, the leadership of the country, as well as the Army and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were mindful of the fact that an “isolationist” neutrality policy had to be counterbalanced by extensive external cooperation that would ensure the necessary help, experience and perhaps financial support. Therefore, the decision was taken to promote an active foreign policy, including in the field of military cooperation, and one of the most appropriate ways to implement such an approach emerged with the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative. The President of Moldova signed the framework PfP document on 4 March 1994 at NATO Headquarters.

The Government of Moldova recognises that the PfP programme served as an effective instrument of co-operation with new partners. Its positive results were favourably acknowledged given the fact that through a single source – NATO – Moldova was able to find and use the experience of several member-countries and partners in the improvement of their military forces, as well as to strengthen its own defence capabilities.

The first Individual Partnership Plan was prepared by Moldova in 1995, and since then the process is a regular practice. Moldovan military participated ever since in numerous PfP joint exercises and even hosted a number of them. Therefore, a part of the objectives set forth at the beginning of the armed forces construction were achieved.

At the same time, independence and creation of international relations channels also meant more “openness”. The contacts with former enemies, now current partners, resulted in additional effects – the ideas of civil control of the armed forces and the reform of the army according to the new democratic principles were penetrating the Moldovan society, including the military, and resulted in the first attempts to bring up the idea of the reform of the armed forces. These attempts succeeded with the MoD initiative in 1998 to start a reform, when the first civilian minister was directing the activities of this institution. After a period of extended and quite intense deliberations a *Concept of Military Reform* was sent to the Parliament, which approved it on 26 July 2002. Notably, the *Concept* mentions that one of the main directions in which the co-operation with other armed forces will be carried on is the “democratic command and control of the armed forces”. Phase II of the reform (2005-2008) includes the “creation of a civilian and military command structure of the Armed Forces with a detailed delimitation of the attributions in the sphere of political, administrative and military command”.

This *Concept* also states that it is intended to respond to the current geopolitical situation and the need to adapt to the new realities, risks, threats and



missions of military character. It recognises that the Armed Forces are in poor condition due to the lack of practical experience in the area of military construction and management, mistakes made and insufficiency of funds. It also recognises that although the current resources are insufficient, it is essential to correlate the needs, available means and economic development possibilities of the country. The document appreciates that fulfilment of military reform is not possible only through the efforts of the “force structures” and that merger of efforts would be necessary, including in the legal and financial matters.<sup>76</sup>

Additionally to the reform of the bodies directly involved in enforcing the security, transformations were brought to the very basis of the functioning of these structures. As mentioned, the reforms could not proceed without anticipated changes in the legislation and such adjustments came about as a result of two major factors – the urgent need to draft the necessary legislation for newly created structures, as well as in response to the international and especially European requirements. Thus, first of all the security sector related legislation was analysed and changed in accordance with the requirements set forth by the Council of Europe. Further changes are expected to take place on the way of Moldova’s European integration.

### **Moldova and NATO & EU enlargement**

The current processes of NATO and EU enlargement are already influencing the attitude of Moldova towards these organisations. Thus, in a context when neighbouring Romania will become in 2004 a NATO member and possibly in 2007 an EU member – and when Ukraine declared as its aim the membership in NATO and EU – the approach of the Republic of Moldova will naturally be directed at an increased cooperation with these organisations.

Against this background the NATO (PfP) Planning and Review Process (PARP) process is particularly relevant. It gave an opportunity to check Moldovan performances within the PfP and not least new possibilities for co-operation with NATO. The PARP document itself stipulates that Moldova attaches great importance to deepening its participation in the framework of PfP and PARP as tools to pursue the democratisation of its internal structures.

The NATO document also stipulates that in 2002, Moldova participated in four NATO/PfP exercises and in two other ‘in the spirit of PfP’ exercises. Financial constraints continued to hamper Moldovan participation. NATO confirms such a state of affairs by suggesting that the economic status of Moldova remains critical. This situation of severe underfunding has been repeated for a number of years and has had a severe impact on the ability to operate and sustain the armed forces. It mentions that the government has approved the general outline of a plan to implement a *Concept of Military Reform*, but it is not based on an up-to-date National Security Strategy nor on solid costing data. The *Concept* anticipated that the defence budget would have to be increased from 0.5 per cent to 2.5 per cent of GDP during the next 12 years. However,

<sup>76</sup> Concepția Reformei Militare, Monitorul Oficial al R.Moldova N. 117-119 din 15.08.2002

in view of the current economic situation and the fact that 11 other ministries will be competing for very limited resources, this is unlikely to happen.

On this more pessimistic background regarding a successful implementation of the *Concept* NATO experts recommend that Moldova conducts a thorough defence review, based on a revised National Security Strategy, as the old one was drafted in 1995 and does not cover new threats and risks. NATO recognised that Moldova will need external assistance to conduct such a review.

One of the possibilities that could be thoroughly considered to overcome this situation is adopting an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) – similar to Ukraine’s Action Plan with NATO – which, *inter alia*, covers very much the SSR issue. In this respect, it would be relevant to mention the ideas of a new Partnership circulated by Switzerland, which spin around the SSR. An important factor would also be NATO’s availability to assist the Republic of Moldova in the process of solving security problems and identifying new areas of co-operation.

Therefore, we could say that both interests of the Alliance and of Moldova for mutual co-operation increased, not least due to the approach of NATO borders to Moldova.

Another not less important subject for Moldova, resulting from EU enlargement, is the Wider Europe concept – or, in fact, new neighbours’ **border security** – in the context of the Transnistrian conflict resolution that has an important relation to an effective SSR. Currently, the central authorities do not have effective control over the entire border with Ukraine. In these circumstances the Transnistrian leadership seized the possibility to enrich itself from illegal border activities. Therefore, we are currently facing cases of smuggling, including cases of weapons proliferation, mostly Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). Their source is the paramilitary Transnistrian units and local Transnistrian factories in the Security Zone. The last ones are specifically designed for illegal markets. As the issue of SALWs, their proper control and their movement across borders was numerous times mentioned as an important element for a successful SSR, there is no need to further elaborate on the impact that it has over the SSR in Moldova.

From this perspective, we believe there is a need to organise a joint border control with Ukraine along the entire frontier and we perceive Ukraine co-operation as crucial to ensure success that would have an impact over the future of our border control services, a factor that has relevance for the SSR in both our countries.

From this perspective, it is recognised that the EU has already started to play a role in the border security activities and it should go further: “Until now the EU took some actions intended to support the Transnistrian conflict settlement. ... EU initiated three-sided negotiations between Moldova, Ukraine and the EU, regarding Moldova’s Eastern border management.”<sup>77</sup>

Returning to the EU Wider Europe initiative, or new neighbourhood – and the fact that an eventual EU Action Plan for Moldova might be drafted – we could assume that these would include appropriate provisions related to SSR. Simultaneously, the declared strategic goal of Moldova to become an EU member

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<sup>77</sup> Nicu Popescu, ‘the EU and Transnistrian settlement’, [www.azi.md](http://www.azi.md), Moldova Azi, 23 June 2003.

would also impose the country to take a number of actions to comply with EU policies in this respect.

### **SSR and the Transnistrian conflict**

It might be regarded as an axiom that the first problem that had an impact on the effective evolution SSR in Moldova from the beginning was the outbreak of the Transnistrian conflict in the Eastern region of the country.

So-called “state structures”, separate from the central authorities, were instituted by local leaders unhappy with Moldovan independence; and illegal military and paramilitary forces were quickly created. The military clashes ended with the signature of an Agreement between the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation on 21 July 1992, in Moscow, on the principles of the peaceful settlement of the armed conflict in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova.

As stipulated in the agreement a Joint Control Commission (JCC) was set up and a Security Zone (SZ) established. In order to implement the decisions of the JCC in SZ, the Agreement stipulated that this body should receive military contingents representing the parties involved in the implementation of this Agreement (Russian Federation, Republic of Moldova and the Transnistrian region itself).

The reality showed that the Transnistrian leaders perceived and used their military presence in the Security Zone, as well as the presence of the 14<sup>th</sup> Russian Army, as a shield for the construction of their "state structures", especially a Ministry of Security and a “Transnistrian Army” – institutions used by the separatist regime to control the population. There have been Russian troops in the area ever since. But a withdrawal agreement has been brokered by the OSCE.

Currently the withdrawal process is nearly blocked and the Russian Federation quotes the obstructive attitude of the separatist leaders. At this stage, we think that the Russian Federation might have not exhausted all the possibilities to ensure that the leadership of this region becomes more flexible, so that the Russian Federation could have complied with internationally taken obligations to complete the withdrawal by the end of 2003.

For the Republic of Moldova the issue of the withdrawal and subsequent developments in the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict is directly related to the future of its armed forces, police and other security structures; and NATO and EU have already paid sufficient attention to this situation. Thus, both NATO and EU are already supporting the OSCE efforts in withdrawal both financially and politically.

However, at this stage, the situation that derives from the Transnistrian conflict, which is categorised as a “frozen conflict”, reflects this labelling. The negotiations focus on such issues as political agreement. Some separate opinions regarding the demilitarisation of the region or entire country are already known. However, the negotiations do not produce real results since the separatist leaders insist on a union of two states or a confederation, which they call a “federation on contractual basis”, with unconnected and independent structures, a stance that comes

against the internationally and internally agreed principles of building a re-integrated Moldova. The opinions presented by the conflicting sides regarding the future status of the security structures are as diverging as the political views. The Transnistrian separatists are envisaging two separate Armies, Customs, Police, Security services, etc, while the Constitutional authorities have in sight projects of a state built on federative principles with asymmetric distribution of powers, one Army, one Customs and other unified security systems, as they represent the attributes of a state's independence and sovereignty throughout the entire territory.

### **Serious SSR soon?**

The reforms of the security sector institutions in Moldova are ongoing processes since the proclamation of sovereignty and later independence of the country. However, SSR is not an integrated process in Moldova: these are separate actions that are making a parallel movement in the same direction, creating an impression of a co-ordinated process.

Yet the Moldovan realities show that there is much to be done; especially, since the level of final support is sometimes unsatisfactory, mostly due to the country's economic profile, as well as due to the lack of expertise (as was recognised in the *Concept of Military Reform*).

Obviously, as the national knowledge on this subject is still insufficient, the reform could be more easily implemented with international support. Thus, the enlargement of NATO and the European Union up to the borders of Moldova, the recently declared EU policy on wider neighbourhood and the expressed strategic goal of Moldova to integrate in EU might be those factors that could provide new solutions and give a new momentum for SSR.

We may conclude with the idea that a future Transnistrian conflict resolution, as well as some positive signals from the EU on its greater and more direct involvement in Moldovan affairs, as well as a possible IPAP acceptance and implementation, would give some additional impetus for a sustainable and comprehensive future SSR in the Republic of Moldova.

## X. MOLDOVA AND TRANSNISTRIA

Dov Lynch

After the mid-2004 enlargement, the Republic of Moldova will lie in the immediate periphery of the European Union (EU). For Brussels, this small state is already a gateway into Europe for drugs and arms smuggling, as well as human trafficking. Throughout the 1990s, the EU did not address Moldova's conflict with Transnistria (*Pridnestrovskaya Moldavskaya Respublika* – hereafter, PMR), Moldova's easternmost region that has declared independence. As a whole, despite OSCE involvement, there has been little progress towards resolving the conflict. Failing a settlement, there is a danger that Moldova will become a black hole on Europe's border, radiating instability externally while collapsing internally.

The PMR is the centre of gravity of Moldova's weaknesses. The conflict between separatist Transnistria and the central Moldovan authorities occurred in a series of small-scale clashes in late 1991 and early 1992, culminating in a battle in the town of Bendery in June 1992. Compared to the wars in the Balkans and the South Caucasus, the conflict is not ethnically or communally driven. It was also of low-intensity and short duration, with relatively low casualty figures (about 1000 killed). Despite this low military start, the situation on the ground between the two parties has become increasingly militarised over the course of the 1990s. In and around the Security Zone that stretches north to south along the Dnestr River, there are a Russian-led peacekeepers, elements of Moldova's security forces and quite extensive Transnistrian forces.

This militarisation contributes to sustaining the status quo of a divided Moldova. The peacekeeping operation, and the mechanisms established to control the Security Zone, were effective throughout the 1990s in maintaining a cease-fire but have not contributed to settlement talks. These security arrangements have become counter-productive, as they work with an undesirable status quo rather than against it. New security arrangements must be designed to demilitarise the situation in the Security Zone as well as relations between the two parties. These arrangements should be primarily civilian, and should have the function of launching the process of demobilising the security forces on both sides of the Dnestr and eventually of integrating them. The EU is well placed to take the lead in designing and directing new security arrangements, working under the aegis of the OSCE and with its Mission, and with Ukraine and Russia.

The chapter is divided into four parts. A first part outlines briefly the military/paramilitary forces that are deployed in and around the Security Zone. The second part examines the international and regional factors that have opened a window of opportunity for settling the conflict in 2003-2004, and notes the countervailing trends. Third, the chapter discusses the state of affairs in the negotiations, including the informal proposal for a Peace Consolidation Mission to Moldova (PCMM) put forward by the Dutch Chairmanship-in-Office of the OSCE.

This section also examines the proposal put forward by the Russian government in November 2003 for a constitutional settlement of the conflict. The final section explores options for greater international, and especially EU, engagement to stimulate the demilitarisation of the conflict and its settlement.

### **Forces In and Around the Security Zone**

Moldova is relatively small country with a population estimated at just over four million.<sup>78</sup> For this size, it is quite highly militarised. This section outlines the forces that contribute to this trend.

The Moldovan armed forces are 7,000 strong.<sup>79</sup> The army contains 5,500 troops, distributed in three motor-rifle brigades, a guard battalion, special forces, an artillery and an air defence brigade. The Moldovan air force is limited in aircraft, having sold its fleet of MiG-29s to the United States, and in personnel (1,000). In addition, Moldova has around 3,400 paramilitary forces, mostly with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and including a carabineer force as national guard. In all, the equipment base of Moldovan forces is minimal and largely obsolete.

The PMR, with a population of 650,000, maintains a proportionally larger force. While exact figures are difficult to find, the PMR has an estimated 10,000 men under arms. These troops are distributed between the PMR guard - composed of four motor infantry brigades, a tank battalion, an artillery regiment and an air defence brigade - and various paramilitary forces. The latter include units of the State Security Ministry (MGB), a Black Sea Cossack formation and a substantial force under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The equipment base is stronger, and includes Mi8 helicopters and important numbers of mortars and artillery.

The Moldovan and separatist authorities also have separate border and customs services. The numbers are unavailable for the PMR, but they are deployed in posts in the Security Zone and on the border with Ukraine. Moldova has around 5,000 personnel in its border services, which are deployed only on the border with Romania. Both have retained conscription and the principle of reserves, while containing some contract elements.

Moldova also hosts relatively large numbers of foreign troops. After the Soviet collapse, the Russian Federation inherited the former Soviet 14<sup>th</sup> Army, deployed mainly on the left bank and in control of extensive equipment and ammunition stocks (some 42,000 tons). The Army has since been transformed into an Operational Group of Russian Forces (OGRF), composed in 2003 of between 1,300 and 1,500 troops, mainly officers. At the Istanbul OSCE Summit in 1999, Russia pledged to withdraw the OGRF and repatriate/destroy the equipment stocks by 31 December 2002. Unable to complete the commitment, the deadline was extended for Russia by twelve months by the Porto OSCE ministerial.

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<sup>78</sup> <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/md.html>

<sup>79</sup> For the latest figures, see *The Military Balance 2002-2003* (IISS: London, 2003) and *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment* (2003).

Finally, the Moldovan state is divided into two by a Security Zone that stretches north to south along the Dnestr River. The Security Zone was created in July 1992 after an agreement between the conflicting parties and Russia to deploy a trilateral peacekeeping operation. Initially, the peacekeeping operation was composed of mainly Russian troops (five battalions), and included limited numbers of Moldovan (three battalions) and Transnistrian (two battalions) forces, distributed in checkpoints in three sectors of the Security Zone. In 2003, the peacekeeping operation stood at an estimated 1,000 troops, deployed in thirteen posts – some Russian only, others trilateral. In addition, a military observer mission was launched in 1992, with ten observers each from Russia, Moldova and Transnistria (this was enlarged to include Ukrainians in 1998).

There are four facets of the militarisation of this conflict to be noted. First, contrary to the July 1992 agreement, the Security Zone is not demilitarised. The PMR has deployed units of its armed forces, as well as separatist border guards and customs points. These units block the normalisation of relations and exchanges across the Dnestr.

Second, the Joint Control Commission (JCC) – the mechanism created to control the peacekeeping operation – allows the right of veto to its Moldovan, Russian and Transnistrian co-chairmen in determining the agenda of the weekly meetings and in voting on questions resolved. This procedure has allowed the separatist authorities to block Moldovan attempts to demilitarise the Security Zone and to expand the role of international actors.

Third, as a result of these security arrangements, the PMR has made great strides to the consolidation of its separatist independence and self-declared statehood. Over ten years of peacekeeping they have acted as a shield behind which Tiraspol has created all the institutions of statehood.

Finally, the presence of the peacekeeping force and the Security Zone are used now in the political rhetoric of the separatist leaders as a justification of Moldova's threat to PMR. These arrangements allow Tiraspol to mobilise fear as a political resource and to strengthen their myth-making about the 'war of 1992' as a revanchist act of brutal aggression. The separatist state survives off fear, isolation and external threat – the 1992 peacekeeping arrangements play to this.

### **A Window of Opportunity?**

Negotiations have been underway to resolve this conflict since 1992. Three external actors have taken the lead in the talks – Russia since mid-1992, the OSCE, following the deployment of an observer mission in April 1993, and Ukraine, since 1998.<sup>80</sup> High-level Russian attention, in particular by then Foreign Minister Y. Primakov, led the parties to sign an agreement in Moscow on May 8, 1997. The Memorandum 'On the Basis for the Normalisation of Relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria (PMR)' seemed to open the way for an accommodation of Moldovan

<sup>80</sup> On the OSCE Mission, see <http://www.osce.org/moldova>

demands for respect of its territorial integrity and the PMR pursuit of self-determination. The Memorandum stated that the parties would seek to establish 'state-legal relations.' In particular, Article 11 declared: 'The parties shall build their relations in the framework of a common state within the borders of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic as of December of the year 1990.' However, following the agreement, talks between the parties centred on defining the meaning of 'common state.' Serious differences have blocked attempts by the OSCE to determine a division of competencies within the framework of territorially integral Moldova.<sup>81</sup>

Faced with continued obstruction by the separatist authorities, Chisinau withdrew from talks between September 2001 and May 2002. Moldova rejoined the negotiations in mid-2002 at the insistence of three mediators, who presented a new discussion framework, known as the Kiev Document, in June 2002. The Kiev Document proposed a federal structure as the basis for relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol, and determined levels of divided and shared competences, new federal institutions, and a system of international guarantees. Despite international pressure, talks never gathered pace (it took six months to discuss the first four of forty-two articles). The basic divergence between Moldova and the PMR on future relations blocked serious progress.

A number of factors - international, European and regional - have woven together since late 2002 to open a new window of opportunity. These forces are five-fold.

First, the framework of the talks has changed. In February 2003, the Moldovan President, Vladimir Voronin, proposed the creation of joint commission in which the two parties would develop a new constitution on a tight time-line. For six months, three experts from both sides would work within the Joint Constitutional Commission to draft a new constitution that would settle the question of Transnistria's status. Then, for two months, the draft would be presented for public discussion, and by February 2004, a referendum would be held to ratify the new constitution. By February 2005, Voronin proposed that new parliamentary elections be held following the new constitutional provisions. After initial agreeing to the proposal, the separatist authorities delayed starting work in the Joint Constitutional Commission for several months. The two sides exchanged draft constitutions in early August.

Second, the Dutch Chairmanship of the OSCE in 2003 gave priority to conflict settlement in Moldova. The Dutch government has stressed the link between the talks on political settlement and those on the security guarantees - both were to advance together in a 'transitional period.' As a result, parallel to the talks being held in the Joint Constitutional Commission, the Dutch government launched discussions on future guarantee and security arrangements. In July 2003, the Netherlands put forward an informal 'Food-for-Thought' paper with options for a peace consolidation force to replace the current peacekeeping operation.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> See *Basic Documents in Pridnestrovian Conflict Resolution* (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung: Kiev, 2000).

<sup>82</sup> *Food-For-Thought Paper, Peace Consolidation Mission Moldova* (unpublished, July 2003).



Third, at the wider European level, 2003 saw the birth of the EU as a security actor. In 2003, the EU launched three missions – in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. These operations have been mandated tasks from law enforcement and ceasefire monitoring to security and humanitarian crisis management. Over 2,000 police and military personnel have been involved in the three operations.<sup>83</sup> The military operations, in particular, are the first test cases of the Union's ability to apply some of the military policy instruments envisaged under the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal. More widely, the Iraqi crisis stimulated thinking on the development of a EU Security Strategy, written by Javier Solana and approved in draft at the Thessaloniki Summit.<sup>84</sup> A major point made in the Security Strategy is the need to have a belt of well-governed countries on the EU's borders. The EU is developing a strategic view of the states on its borders.

Fourth, linked to its emergence as a security actor, the Union started discussions on participating in a new security arrangement in the Moldovan conflict, under the aegis of the OSCE, at the informal request of the Dutch Chairmanship. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) – the committee of fifteen ambassadors in the Council – discussed the question on a number of occasions from late May 2003. The PSC also tasked the Council Secretariat to develop options for EU involvement in conflict settlement, including through possible civilian/military arrangements.

In fact, the EU Council has taken a more targeted stance in the conflict since late 2002. On 4 December 2002, the EU Council issued a statement highlighting Transnistrian obstruction as the main problem in the settlement talks. This was followed by a similar statement by the Greek Presidency on 29 January and a joint action on 27 February 2003 that stated: 'The Council [...] considered the obstructionism of the region's leadership and their unwillingness to change the status quo to be unacceptable. The Council therefore decided to apply targeted sanctions in the form of a travel ban against certain Transdnistrian leaders responsible for the lack of cooperation in the search for a political settlement.'<sup>85</sup> The EU has sought to work in coordination with the United States (US). The travel ban on the separatist elites was undertaken jointly with Washington. The US and the EU have also started to work together with Ukraine to clarify Moldovan-Ukrainian border relations.

A final factor opening a window of opportunity was the deadline of 31 December 2003 for the withdrawal of Russian equipments, arms and troops from the OGRF. Between March and June 2003, Russia withdrew thirty-two trainloads of equipment, representing approximately 16,500 metric tons and leaving in Moldova still about 25,500 metric tons.<sup>86</sup> After June, the process was halted, because of Transnistrian obstruction and Tiraspol's desire to negotiate with Russia over its gas debts.

<sup>83</sup> See discussion in D. Lynch and A. Missiroli, *ESDP Operations* (Forthcoming on EU ISS website, [www.iss-eu.org](http://www.iss-eu.org), 2003).

<sup>84</sup> Javier Solana, 'A Secure Europe in a Better World,' Thessaloniki European Council, 20 June 2003. <http://ue.eu.int/pressdata/EN/reports/76255.pdf>. (Final text published December 2003.)

<sup>85</sup> Council Conclusions on Restrictive Measures against the Leadership of the Transdnistrian Region of the Moldovan republic (Adopted 27 February 2003, Brussels).

<sup>86</sup> See 'OSCE Envoy says delays threaten timetable,' by Roland Eggleston, *Radio Free Europe* (19 September 2003).

The combination of these factors brought significant - and novel - international attention to Moldovan conflict settlement. It also stimulated some progress in the talks between the two parties. The involvement of the EU is particularly interesting, given Moldova's declared European vocation and the wide range of tools the Union can bring to support the talks and the settlement process. Still, one should note three countervailing trends. First, the electoral cycles in Russia (parliamentary elections in December 2003 and presidential elections in March 2004) and Ukraine (presidential elections in 2004) complicate the international community's ability to exercise pressure on the two states to make constructive contributions to settlement. Second, as important, Transnistrian obstruction has not changed. The strategy of the separatists remains that of seeking to gain time through negotiations, which defuse the pressure on them, give them space to consolidate and create the pretence of good will rather than the reality. Their objective of a loose confederal relationship with Moldova has not changed.<sup>87</sup> A final point is that, for all its new attention to Moldova, the EU is very busy with its own house-keeping. As such, the international context may not be so conducive to conflict settlement, either in terms of Chisinau-Tiraspol relations or in terms of developing new security arrangements to replace the Russian-led peacekeeping operation.

### **The State of Affairs**

As a result, the settlement process became blocked in late 2003. The Joint Constitutional Commission devoted its attention first to the chapter on human rights of the proposed future constitution. Even this relatively 'non-political' chapter (it was chosen for this reason) posed difficulties. In all, Moldova and the separatist PMR remain divided on three questions. First, regarding the future reunified state, the Moldovan government seeks the creation of a federal state with a centre and two subjects. By contrast, the PMR still insists on a confederation - even if they call it a 'federation.' The Transnistrian vision would have the future state follow a model similar to that agreed between Serbia and Montenegro, where a free vote on independence will be possible in three years time.<sup>88</sup> For Tiraspol, the new constitution should be based on the principle of equality between Moldova and the PMR, and a treaty-based contractual relationship.

The parties also disagree on the appropriate mechanism for leading the negotiations. On 11 September 2003, Vladimir Voronin proposed that the EU assume a formal role in the negotiating mechanisms - that is, the format of the five, which include the two parties and the three mediators (OSCE, Russia and Ukraine).<sup>89</sup> The Transnistrian authorities insisted on the enduring utility of the existing framework for talks.

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<sup>87</sup> See the PMR vision/proposal for the new constitution, published by the official press agency of the left bank, Olivia Press, in August 2003.

<sup>88</sup> Interview by author with PMR 'Foreign Minister,' V. Litskai, Tiraspol, 13 September 2003.

<sup>89</sup> Opening speech to a Council of Europe conference on frozen conflicts in European security, organised in Chisinau, 11-12 September 2003.

The two parties also disagree on the nature of security guarantees. In the Kiev Document, both signed up to the principle of considering new security arrangements in an ill-defined 'transitional period.' For Tiraspol, this period would start *after* an agreement in the Joint Constitutional Commission and with the implementation of an agreement. The Moldovan authorities seek to define the 'transitional period' as starting *during* the talks. The Dutch government also took the position that discussions on new security guarantees had to run concurrently with the constitutional talks. In the words of Ambassador Adriaan Jacobovits in October 2003: 'We know that a political settlement cannot be reached when we do not have also an agreement on a peace consolidation force.'<sup>90</sup>

Moreover, the PMR has voiced its opposition to EU involvement in any security guarantee operation. Quite the contrary, the separatist leaders seek to reduce the parties involved in peace consolidation on the ground and to preserve as many as possible of the structures set up in July 1992. Tiraspol has also stated that it would welcome a bilateral Russian guarantee to a future settlement with Moldova. Valery Litskai, the separatist Foreign Minister, declared in September 2003 that the best solution would be a 'Russia guarantee similar to that of Great Britain to Cyprus.'<sup>91</sup> The Moldovan government has been keen on guarantees for an agreement reached with the left bank of the Dnestr that ensures a reduced Russian military presence, an internationalised peace consolidation mission and wide international involvement. As a result, Moldova has heartily welcomed discussions in Brussels on a EU role.

In addition, the Russian government has come out openly as well as behind the scenes against a change in the current negotiating format. A long list of high-level figures in the Russian Presidential Administration (Aleksandr Voloshin and Dmitry Kozak) and government (Vyacheslav Trubnikov) visited Moldova and the PMR after Spring 2003. In a statement of 21 July 2003, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' spokesman, Aleksandr Yakovlenko, declared: 'One should however avoid any statements or initiatives which complicate the already very difficult negotiations and prematurely distract the attention of their participants from the most vital substantive issues of settlement and lastly that are taken without a prior diplomatic discussion with the use of the well-oiled negotiating mechanisms.'<sup>92</sup> The Russian government has argued that discussions on new security arrangement were premature and counter-productive. These should be conducted *after* a settlement agreement has been reached. At a more fundamental level, Moscow perceives little need to change the peacekeeping operation currently in place, 'the effectiveness of which is confirmed by more than ten years experience and which no one casts doubt upon.'<sup>93</sup>

In the meantime, the Transnistrian authorities continue to consolidate their self-declared independent statehood. In September 2003, the Tiraspol authorities announced their preparation of a new round of privatisation of firms on separatist territory. And in Moldova the notion of a 'federal solution' has become increasingly

<sup>90</sup> See interview in Basapress, Chisinau, Moldova (6 October 2003).

<sup>91</sup> Interview by author with PMR 'Foreign Minister,' V. Litskai, Tiraspol, 13 September 2003.

<sup>92</sup> See report by Information and Press Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Moscow: 21 July 2003) available on [www.mid.ru](http://www.mid.ru)

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*

discredited, at least in the eyes of some sectors of civil society.<sup>94</sup> It is difficult to judge the depth of public discontent with the notion of federalism. However, the Communist Party government in Chisinau will be forced at one point to tackle intellectual and opposition challenge on this account.

By late 2003, Moldova found itself in an uncomfortable position - caught between a EU that was not quite convinced or certain of its future security role in the conflict, and a Russia that was more certain and that had the means to act on its interests. On 11 March 2003, the Commission published its Communication on *Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours*, which launched a debate about EU policy to its new neighbours.<sup>95</sup> The political and security role of the EU receives strong emphasis in the Communication.<sup>96</sup> In particular, it contained a pledge that the EU will take a more active role in seeking conflict settlement in Moldova — in mediation, post-conflict reconstruction and security arrangements. The EU has taken from the Communication the idea of developing Action Plans jointly with its new neighbours. The Moldovan government has voiced its desire for a joint Action Plan, and a Moldovan strategy document for European accession was presented to Brussels in October 2003.

Apart from these declarative advances, however, Moldova has made little substantive progress in preparing the country for European integration.<sup>97</sup> Nonetheless, Chisinau did resist in 2003 Russian pressure to turn more eastwards in political, security and economic terms. Voronin turned away demands for bilateral Russian guarantee mechanisms in the conflict and refused to join the CIS Joint Economic Space, created at the CIS summit in Yalta in September 2003.<sup>98</sup> For all the new pluck to be found in Chisinau, one may query how long Moldova can hold off sustained pressure from the east without greater European support, given its economic dependence on Russia and the multitude of political ties it has with Moscow.

The Russian proposal, developed and put forward by the deputy head of the Russian presidential administration, Dmitry Kozak, on 16 November 2003, illustrates the pressures under which the Voronin government is operating. The proposal consists of a 'Memo On the Basic Principles of the States Structures of the Unified State.' Under its terms, Moldova would become the Federal Republic of Moldova (FRM) within its 1990 borders. The FRM would be based on the following principles: it would be united and democratic, demilitarised and neutral, and contain two Federal Subjects (the PMR and Gagauz formation with all their state organs and powers, and symbols). Moldovan would be the state language of the FRM, and Russian would become an official language. Federal Subjects would be given the right to exit the

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<sup>94</sup> See the activities and publications of the Moldovan Institute for Public Policy, <http://www.ipp.md>

<sup>95</sup> *Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbour* (Commission Communication COM(2003) 104 final: Brussels, 11.3.2003).

<sup>96</sup> For a full discussion of the Communication and its implications for the new eastern neighbours, see the author's 'The New Eastern Dimension of the Enlarged EU,' in Judy Batt et al (eds), *Partners and Neighbours: A CSFP for a Wider Europe* (EU ISS Chaillot Paper no. 64: Paris, September 2003).

<sup>97</sup> Even at an institutional level, the Moldovan government lacks the necessary governmental resources to prepare the country. Voronin created a department for European integration, but it is subordinate still to the ministries in question.

<sup>98</sup> The CIS Joint Economic Space is to include Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakstan.

FRM, through a referendum on the territory of the Federal Subject, if the FRM should change its status or suffer a loss of sovereignty. The FRM would have three institutions: a Senate, with twenty-six members (four Gagauz and nine PMR, and thirteen from the House of Representatives); a House of Representatives (with seventy one members); a Federal President and a Constitutional Court (with eleven members: six from the House of Representatives, one Gagauz, four PMR). All legislation in the FRM would have to be 'confirmed' by the Senate. In a transition period, the PMR would retain its military formations. Moreover, there would be no review of PMR laws enacted since 1992.

To all intents and purposes, Voronin seemed to have agreed to sign the unilateral Russian proposal and was only convinced to the contrary by two factors. First, Moldova's political forces and society united for the first time in ten years against the Russian proposal. Second, the international community, through the OSCE, voiced criticism of the proposal. Voronin begged off signing at the last minute, much to the ire of the Kremlin, where the presidential plane had been readied for a brief 'signatory visit' to Chisinau. The Moldovan president stated that he would confer with the OSCE and the Participating States at the Maastricht ministerial summit before proceeding. In early December, the Maastricht meeting failed to produce a joint statement because of differences over the Moldovan question and Russia's failure to fulfil the obligations agreed at the Istanbul Summit of 1999 (concerning Georgia and Moldova). Diplomatic exchanges have gone cold since Maastricht between the US, the OSCE and the Russian Federation, with the US calling for a return to discussions in the established framework and for the speediest Russian withdrawal from the PMR.

The 'Kozak plan,' as it is now known, was so riddled with problems that one wonders if the Kremlin seriously expected it to succeed. In many ways, the proposal contained the worst of previous documents that had been put forward, with too many joint powers between the federal centre and the subjects, and too vaguely defined. The PMR was recognised as a state formation in the proposal, and provided with over-representation in the federal centre, to such an extent that Moldova itself may have been transnistrianised. Certainly, the PMR would have been in a position to block serious movement of Moldova towards the EU. Moreover, the proposal was strangely silent on the question of security guarantees. The presumption, made clear in a subsequent statement by the Russian Defence Minister, was in fact that Russia would deploy a peacekeeping operation of 2000 troops to guarantee security during the implementation of the agreement. The content of the proposal was so flawed that it would not have been acceptable to the OSCE. Russia's style also alienated many. The tone from Moscow was almost arrogant on the question of the status of the Russian language in Moldova – always a prickly question in this small country. The unilateral nature of the initiative also irked the participants in the five-sided format, who have invested significant time and energy to the question since the early 1990s.

The results are quite gloomy. The Moldovan president may have lost the slim confidence he had acquired in Europe by appearing dangerously equivocal. Certainly, he has not gained in domestic popularity for his manoeuvrings. Moscow has been

‘burned’ in the process, by Moldova’s last minute rejection of what was planned as a surprise coup, and by the OSCE and important Participating States, which have come down firmly against Russian unilateralism. The only clear winners are the leaders of the PMR. The negotiations have gone on ice.

### Options to Stimulate Progress

Before discussing options, it is important to accept a starting premise: The current situation in Moldova and in the conflict should be seen as a system, or as a logic, that sustains itself thanks to supporting factors in Transnistria, Moldova and the wider region.<sup>99</sup> Recognising the difficulty of changing the entire equation in a single sweep, the international community should rather seek to alter a few of the ‘x’ and ‘y’ factors in the equation that sustains the status quo. Five measures might be considered at the outset.

First, the discussions underway on new security guarantees should be continued. The principle must be established for *parallel* discussions on a new constitution and a peace consolidation force. In fact, the deployment of such a force would best be tied to a calendar date and not a moment in the constitutional talks themselves. New security arrangements on the ground are in themselves important to stimulate settlement. The current peacekeeping operation, and its command and control mechanisms, have done little to demilitarise the conflict, either at the level of rhetoric or in terms of forces deployed in and around the Security Zone. Rethinking the security arrangements in the Security Zone would be a first step towards the demobilisation and integration of the two parties’ security forces.

The Dutch ‘Food-for-Thought’ paper is an interesting starting point but not optimal. According to the paper, a peace consolidation force would consist of two components: first, a limited military operation of several hundred armed troops, deployed under the aegis of the OSCE for an initial period of six months; and second, a civilian component of unarmed civilian observers (60-100) deployed for a longer period of time. The paper also envisaged the appointment of an OSCE Special representative to provide overall oversight to both components. The paper developed two options for a military component. The first would be a full-fledged OSCE operation, commanded through the Military Committee and with troops from willing member states. The second, and more preferable option - because of the OSCE’s lack of experience and planning capacity - would be for the OSCE to mandate another organisation to undertake the operation, such as the EU.

Despite being an improvement on the current peacekeeping operation, the proposal contains a number of dangerous ambiguities. Most importantly, there is no need for a military operation on the ground – the Moldovan-Transnistrian conflict was never heavily military in shape. A new security arrangement must work against the

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<sup>99</sup> See the author’s *Engaging Separatist States* (United States Institute of Peace Press, forthcoming, Spring 2004), and also ‘Post-Soviet Conflicts and Separatist States,’ in *International Affairs* (Vol. 78, no. 4, October 2002).

artificial militarisation that has emerged since 1992.<sup>100</sup> Moreover, the area of deployment for the peace consolidation force is not defined in the paper. In order to move to demilitarise the conflict, the principle of the Security Zone must be abandoned. Normalised and free relations must be allowed between the banks of the Dnestr. Any new operation should have a free-ranging and mobile zone of responsibility throughout all Moldova. The Dutch paper also sets a 50 per cent limit for one single troop contributor. Discussions in the OSCE in the early 1990s over a possible operation in Nagorno-Karabakh had set a 30 per cent ceiling - there are good reasons for returning to the lower ceiling. Contrary to the Dutch proposal, a new security arrangement led by the EU, with Russia and perhaps Ukraine, and mandated by the OSCE, should have a civilian and police focus. The basic objective must be to promote the demilitarisation and normalisation of relations between the two parties.

Second, the EU, in particular, should consider further measures to press the Transnistrian leaders towards settlement. These measures could include the freezing of Transnistrian assets in European and North American banks, as well as the institution of a EU-wide 'refusal-to-deal' with companies active on the left bank. In addition, the EU could offer technical support to the registration of Transnistrian firms in Moldova and assistance to their contribution to the state budget. Sticks must be combined with carrots to press and induce the Transnistrian leaders to settle the constitutional process.

In addition, the EU and the US must continue to work with Ukraine to increase control over the 400km border between Moldova and Ukraine which lies beyond the control of Chisinau. Coordinated work between Brussels and Washington was instrumental in securing agreement to a Moldovan-Ukrainian customs protocol in May 2003. The precedent could be taken further with renewed focus on the Ukrainian border. In particular, the Moldovan proposal for internationally monitored joint customs points on the Ukrainian side of the border could be raised with Kiev. The EU and the US are well placed to push on this front, given Ukraine's declared European aspiration and desire for NATO membership. With regard to Moldova's other border, with Romania, the question of non-regularised relations between Moldova and Romania could be raised within a EU context.

Fourth, within the framework of the 'Wider Europe' discussion, the EU should press forward with the development of a joint Action Plan in 2004. The development of closer ties between the EU and Moldova will provide vital support to President Voronin and counter-balance other sources of external pressure. In this respect, the international community should consider supporting the launch of an information campaign in Moldova to stimulate public debate on conflict solutions and the notion of federalism – the terms of the debate must be recaptured from the anti-federal view in order for a future agreement to stick with Moldovan society.

Finally, the international community must seek the quickest possible fulfilment from Russia of its obligation to withdraw forces and equipment from the left bank. Failing the deadline of 31 December 2003, three-monthly extensions might

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<sup>100</sup> The operation proposed in the author's *Russia Faces Europe* (EU ISS, Chaillot no. 60: Paris, May 2002), which launched many of these discussions, has a non-military structure.

be considered within the OSCE. Pressure must be maintained to ensure this is completed early in 2004.

### **Dilemmas**

There are three broad dilemmas complicating conflict settlement and the future of Moldova, which must be noted.

First, might greater international/European support to Moldova in the settlement process actually derail the talks by stimulating greater Transnistrian (and Russian) obstructionism? How can this danger be offset?

Second, would the creation of a 'federated Moldova' actually undermine Moldova's desire for European integration by allowing the Transnistrian authorities too much say over political and economic developments in the state as a whole? How can a settlement be reached that preserves Moldova's 'European vocation' while integrating the left bank?

Finally, how can the Transnistrian authorities – and the Russian government – be convinced of the need to change the current security arrangements in a transitional period before a final political settlement?

The answers to these vital questions remain unclear.



## **XI. MOLDOVA AND UKRAINE**

**Alexander Rahr**

The new eastern border of the EU will present the West with different neighbours, from an increasingly authoritarian Russia, a stagnant and dictatorial Belarus, a divided Moldova, an uncertain Ukraine to the conflictual region of the South Caucasus. The EU is frightened by such instabilities and is actively seeking possibilities for conflict resolution.

Recent policy statements stress the need of a joint European strategy towards Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. While Belarus seems to be in a process of partial reunification with Russia and will be reluctant to cooperate with the EU, Moldova and Ukraine are eager to emancipate themselves from the dominant Russian neighbour by means of closer ties with the West. In other words, Russia's former "near abroad" is now becoming the EU's "near abroad".

Imminent NATO expansion and the EU enlargement will have a serious geopolitical impact on Moldova and Ukraine. Both countries are welcoming – and not resisting – the expansion of the Western military and economic structures to the former Soviet borders. Consequently, Chisinau and Kiev want ties to NATO and EU at the earliest possible stage. They will do their outmost, to convince their Western partners, through intensive and concrete cooperation, to be granted candidate or associate status certainly for EU membership in the nearest future.

At the end of the 1990s, both countries formed – together with Georgia, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan – a new strategic alliance, GUUAM. Collaboration of the group generally included issues of security policy, but a close military cooperation, proposed by Baku, has not been favoured by Moldova. GUUAM was designed to become an alternative to the CIS, but got paralysed half-way through. Nevertheless, it may become an important regional partner of the EU and NATO, should the West position itself strategically beyond the Balkans. So far, there is no consensus inside the EU on such a move. However, the fragile security situation on the South-East European continent may require the extension of the Stability Pact for the Balkans to the Black Sea region and the Caucasus.

The recent events in Georgia, which brought young pro-Western politicians to power through a velvet revolution, may now accelerate the rapprochement between EU and the Caucasus. The significance of GUUAM may grow. Energy flows from the Caspian Region to the West through the territories of transit countries such as Georgia and Ukraine may increase. Georgia's radical orientation towards the US and the EU could facilitate similar steps in Ukraine and Moldova.

Ukraine and Moldova have several opportunities to enhance their strategic cooperation with NATO and, particularly, the EU. They can assist each other on the way into the West. For example, Ukraine could take a stronger mediator role in the long-standing conflict over the separatist republic of Transdnier, which was a territorial part of the Ukrainian Republic in the early days of the Soviet Union.

Transdniester has become a vivid example of how business, crime, security services merged together with the state structures. The Transdniester conflict's resolution is a new priority for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

### **Ukraine's involvement in the Transdniester conflict**

The major threat for Moldova's and Ukraine's national security consists in the presence of the Transdniester conflict. While the international community, including the UN, has attempted to deal with this issue, it has chosen not to become militarily involved in Moldova itself. The UN preferred that Russian peacekeeping forces should be posted in Transdniester. The obligation of Ukraine to be another mediator in the settlement of the conflict and a guarantor of security of the parties became an important contribution to the resolution of this problem of international security.

The most important issue between Ukraine and Moldova remains the settlement of the dispute. Ukraine is part of the tripartite mediating team, along with Russia and the OSCE. As Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma said during a visit to Chisinau, "the Transdniester problem is important not only for Moldova ... it is indisputably important for Ukraine, too, for we are interested to have a stable state as a neighbour."

### *Mediation and peacekeeping*

Moldova needs Ukraine's assistance. All political forces in Moldova understand that Moldova's territorial integrity is only guaranteed if Ukraine's sovereignty is not questioned. Some Moldovan newspapers had suggested that Ukraine wants to push Russian peace-keeping troops from Transdniester and place its own troops in the separatist republic only for the reason of adding Transdniester to Ukraine's territory. The risk of Ukrainian expansion into Transdniester was seen as a concern, particularly through the activities of Ukrainian nationalist movements such as UNA-UNSO in Transdnistria.

However, Ukrainian politicians assured Moldova that Kiev needs Moldova as a solid partner in its desire to join the EU and as an ally in escaping Russian dominance inside the CIS. Both suffer heavily from their dependence on Russian energy. At the same time, Ukraine wishes to see Moldova's territorial integrity also strengthened; a reunification of the neighbouring state with Romania is not in Ukraine's interests (Kiev and Moscow had formerly shown solidarity in keeping Romania out of any mediator role between Chisinau and Tiraspol). Ukraine may have supported Transdniester's special autonomous status in the face of a Romanian-Moldovian rapprochement, but in the case of a further EU-enlargement Kiev will certainly push for membership of Transdniester as an integral part of Moldova in the EU. Thirty per cent of Transdniester population consists of ethnic Ukrainians and a civil war on the territory of Moldova would automatically draw Kiev into the conflict.

Under the 1999 OSCE accord, Russia had agreed to withdraw its tens of thousands of tons of military equipment and troops from Transdnier by the end of 2002. But Moscow failed to observe the deadline. Russia is not interested in an ultimate settlement of the conflict in the region because it would deprive Russia of the levers of strengthening its military presence in the region. Such a presence is a way to keep an eye over Ukraine, which is the main political “rival” in the CIS. Russia has serious differences with Ukraine on many security issues, such as the latest Tusla conflict (following quarrels over the division of the Black Sea Fleet and the status of Sevastopol). More than 52 percent of soldiers and sergeants of the 14<sup>th</sup> Army were recruited from the local population of the Transdnier Republic, which calls in question the very ability of the Russian contingent to stay neutral fulfilling peace-keeping functions. Operative Groups of the Russian Army located in Transdnier are considered as “protection” for the Black Sea fleet dislocated in Sevastopol. Russia may think that without military forces in Transdnier and without infrastructure there, the presence of the Russian navy in the Black Sea could be jeopardized.

Russia keeps its troops in Transdnier also for bargaining reasons, to negotiate benefit from the West in more important areas. Therefore, Moscow is unlikely to withdraw its troops and support the Ukrainian peace-keeping mission. But Russia reduced its forces in the security zone in 1997 from six to two battalions because the fulfilment of their functions required essential financial expenditures.

Ukraine may regard the Russian troop presence at its Western borders negatively and as a risk for its own security. However, Kiev has, so far, remained a spectator in the Transdnier negotiations, not willing to challenge Russia, since it had neither capacity nor the political will to compete with Moscow on this issue. At the same time, Kiev has to protect the interests of the Ukrainian minority in Moldova in order to avoid an eventual process of the moving of the Ukrainian population to the country of their origin: that could trigger humanitarian problems. Ukraine also must have felt discomfort at its border with Moldova because illegal traffic and criminality causes problems for the population in the Western part of Ukraine.

Ukraine was included in the tripartite mechanism at the initiative of Russia which wanted the negotiation mechanism to look less Russian. The Transdnier leaders were afraid of the prospect of a complete Russian withdrawal and preferred the Ukrainian peace-keeping forces over NATO-ones.

In 1998, Kiev took a major step to push for Russia’s withdrawal. In March of that year, Ukraine initiated a meeting of the guarantors and conflicting parties who had signed the Memorandum on Principles of Normalisation of Relations between Moldova and Transdnier. The Odessa conference considered shrinking the security zone, the cut-down of peace-making units, decrease of check-points, and restoration of bridges destroyed during the armed conflict. However, the implementation of further arrangements on the unconditional withdrawal of military stocks and the destruction of additional arms were blocked by the Transdnierian leaders. The latter demanded guarantees for the security of their “statehood” which Chisinau could not accept.

Ukraine promised to facilitate Russian troop withdrawal through its territory. Kiev and Moscow agreed on the principles of transit. Ukraine also agreed to provide necessary transport means for Russian troops and cargos. The agreement envisaged security measures during the transport and allowed Ukraine to control the moving of stocks, ammunition and military hardware. That, in turn, excluded the possibility of their “vanishing” in the territory of Ukraine.

### *Trade and customs*

Sandwiched between Moldova proper and Ukraine, Transdnister has become an increasingly destabilizing factor not only for the region but also for European security. The separatists are producing and smuggling drugs, arms and human beings into Ukraine and Russia, which reportedly earns the Transdnister regime an estimated one billion US Dollars annually in illicit revenue.

There is evidence that arms, smuggled from Transdnister, have ended up in the hands of international terrorist networks. Moldovan sources expressed the opinion that local Ukrainian officials were benefiting from the trade with Transdnister. The EU has repeatedly urged Ukraine to act against the contraband, if it wants better political and economic ties with the West. Ukraine had to support the economic blockade for Transdnistria under the pretext that companies from the separatist republic acted illegally and damaged Ukrainian interests. An idea had been voiced to implement a common custom space between Moldova and Ukraine that could positively influence the Transdnister conflict settlement as well, requiring Tiraspol to abandon the role of “customs abyss”. But Transdnister introduced a system of benefits in the trade relation with Ukraine. Many Ukrainian goods, imported into the Transdnister republic, were freed from duties. At the same time, the Transdnister authorities introduced custom barriers on goods imported from Moldova.

In the past, the EU thought of using largely economic methods to solve the crisis. The existence of the separatist republic of Transdnister is largely dependent on its trade with Ukraine and transit of goods through Ukraine. A recent Ukrainian-Moldovan accord forces the Ukrainian custom services to forbid products from Transdnister which are not registered in Chisinau to pass through Ukrainian territory. Goods manufactured in Transdnister are, under that blockade, not supposed to be transferred via Ukraine either.

The EU wants Transdnister to adopt a more flexible attitude in its negotiations with Chisinau. But from the point of the Moldovan leadership, Ukraine hesitated to introduce tough actions. Moldova’s steps to suppress large-scale smuggling across the porous Ukrainian-Moldovan border at the segment controlled by the self-proclaimed Transdnister republic were necessary to stop the budget losses which Moldova suffered. The problem of deployment of Moldovan customs officers at joint Ukrainian-Moldovan border crossing points turned, however, into a political rather than technical issue. Relations between Kiev and Chisinau soured during this

dispute at the end of 2001. Even the presidents of both countries exchanged harsh statements accusing each other of interference in the other country's internal affairs.

Until today, both states do not have a free trade zone. Cross border cooperation is one of the areas in which effective transformation is possible and will be favourably perceived and supported by the EU. It stimulates economic growth and higher standards of living on both sides of the border and assists to improve conditions for the investment climate. Ukraine and Moldova could then be promoted into the European communication and transportation networks. The potential of cross-border cooperation has been largely underexplored by Moldova and Ukraine while it could have become a major vehicle for reducing challenges and shocks of the emergence of new division lines between the enlarging EU and the non-accession countries.

Taken together, the challenges have created the risk of marginalizing Ukraine and Moldova's integration process into Europe.

### *EU may ask Ukraine to take greater role*

The status of guarantor and peacekeeper considerably improved Ukraine's image in the West, but also helped the West to use Ukraine as a counterweight against Russia's dominance in Moldova. The further step of Kiev in the strengthening of its peace-making mission is now to compete for the leading role in the operation. If the EU decides to activate its ESDP in the Transdnister crisis management, Ukraine will receive a historical opportunity to directly assist the West and make itself indispensable in a crucial peacekeeping operation directed towards stabilizing the eastern flank of the European continent. Ukraine has to pass the test whether it has the capacity and will to stabilise its neighbourhood or whether it becomes itself an element of instability. The latter development will close the door to EU and NATO.

Ukraine could get a historical chance to emancipate herself from Russia in security affairs on the territory of the former USSR, a step which Kiev had been reluctant to do in the past 13 years since the demise of the Soviet Union. But Ukraine could strengthen its authority vis-à-vis EU and Russia simultaneously by positioning itself as a mediator between the EU and Russia in elaborating the terms of an ESDP-engagement in Transdnistria. Ukraine could demonstrate its diplomatic skills and its adherence to European crisis management on a much larger scale than it has done so far in the Balkans and Iraq.

It will, however, be difficult for Ukraine to play the role of honest broker, given the suspicion from Russia that Kiev is turning to become an advocate of Western interests on the post-Soviet space and given Western reluctance to see Russia and Ukraine moving closer to each other on security issues affecting Europe as a whole.

Shortly before the OSCE meeting in Maastricht in December 2003, which had the Transdnister subject high on its agenda, Russia made an attempt to solve the Transdnister issue in its own way. In mid-November, Moscow put forward a plan

which called for Moldova to become an asymmetrical federation, with Moldova, Transdnister and the Gagauz region receiving the status of equal subjects. Russia then promised to demilitarize the federation. The official Moldovan government and the heads of the Transdnisterian republic seemed to have accepted the plan. It failed to materialise, however, because the OSCE and Ukraine were left completely at the sidelines of the peace process. Russia made an attempt to lock the ESDP out from that region. Russia wanted to stay in the area as main arbiter. The Russian plan was rejected by the EU on the grounds that it would “Transdnisterise” Moldova as a whole.

The EU should develop a security partnership with Ukraine and Moldova within the new framework of the ESDP, which, of course, should not be directed against Russia but should incorporate Russia. The OSCE has, unfortunately, become weaker in its role as the main instrument of peace and stability in the post-Soviet space. The development of a ESDP-mechanism – more modern and up-to-date to the new realities of world politics – may suit the conflict solutions in Moldova and other states of the former USSR better. The ESDP can soon substitute the OSCE.

### **Ukraine at a crossroads**

Ukraine faces presidential elections in the autumn of 2004 which will decide the future foreign political orientation of this country. Should the reformist camp under Victor Yushchenko win, Ukraine will almost certainly orient its diplomacy more towards EU and NATO. The West will give Ukraine new support for its economic reform policy. The prospects of integration with the West rather than with Russia will grow. However, Yushchenko’s victory is far from being assured. The camp of the present head of state and its powerful associates among business circles will do everything to prevent Yushchenko from taking over from Kuchma. Should the EU and NATO abandon Ukraine, it may orient itself to the “common economic space” – a renewed CIS consisting of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus.

As long as Ukraine feels squeezed between the West and Russia and lacks the economic muscles to develop a stronger foreign policy, Kiev’s diplomacy also vis-à-vis Moldova and other neighbouring states will be half-hearted and not decisive. Ukraine is a weak partner for the EU in the Transdnisterian conflict, at least at the moment. Kuchma’s stance makes it quite difficult for the West to determine where he really stands: firmly with the EU or in reality close to Russia.

Ukraine should probably first develop the political will to be a real subject in the conflict resolution – a main actor in its own right – rather than a tool used by the West and Russia to balance each other. Ukraine could become a country which with skilful diplomacy might help to reconcile Russian and EU interests in the region.

Ukraine gets a further chance to acquire EU and NATO membership by the end of the first decade of the new century. The question of Ukraine’s admissions will not be decided by the countries of the old Western Europe, but next time by the new EU-member states from East Central Europe. Will Ukraine benefit from the new

decision-making circumstances or will the East Central European states close the door for the integration of Ukraine in Western structures?

As of today, one can assume that Ukraine will face a new “window of opportunity”. The East Central European states will feel more secure if Ukraine is part of an enlarged NATO. Although the old West and the new EU-member states will almost certainly face huge financial burdens during the first year of EU-expansion to the East, a reform-oriented Ukraine will not be treated as an alien in the bigger Europe.

However, Ukraine continues to face most serious obstacles and challenges on its way to full-fledged integration. Many of them are home-made. The restructuring of Ukraine’s military forces has not shown positive results. The bureaucracy is still locked in former Soviet thinking. A proper civil-military relation, like in other applicant countries, has not been established. It is unimaginable that present Ukraine agrees to a joint air-control with Western powers. On the economic front too, many problems remain to make Ukraine a realistic candidate for EU-inclusion in the near future.

As of today, unfortunately for Ukraine, the Schengen-regime is installed in East Central Europe to “protect” these countries from “challenges” coming from Ukraine. Illegal migration, drugs traffic, trade with human beings are threats which the EU today faces directly from countries like Ukraine.

The Ukrainian elite do not know still what it means to be invited into NATO and receive applicant status for EU-membership. There is a dramatic lack of experience and also the political set-up of the country’s leadership hinders the integration processes. In Ukraine, the constitution had to be changed in order to open the way for Kiev into NATO and EU. Ukraine is dealing with NATO only through Partnership for Peace structures, which have to be improved, reformed according to the new requirements. There is an Action Plan between Ukraine and NATO, but Kiev is unwilling to proceed without a clear signal that membership is close. The same situation exists in the framework of Ukraine-EU co-operation within the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA). Only a radical rethinking of the leadership, like in Romania and Bulgaria in the second half of the 1990’s, can bring a breakthrough.

Besides internal problems, a major stumbling block is Russia. Can Ukraine join NATO and EU against Russia’s will? Many experts doubt that Ukraine could preserve its internal stability in an atmosphere of hostility. As the Tusla-conflict in November 2003 has shown, border issues between Russia and Ukraine can still emerge anytime. In order to integrate Ukraine into NATO and EU, the West would have to accommodate Russia, i.e. to offer Russia something very important.

It is difficult to forecast, how the security architecture of future Europe will develop over the next decades. Priority is given today – at all levels – to the preserving of the transatlantic strategic alliance, of which NATO is the principal element. However, the EU plans to establish the ESDP as a second major pillar of the old continent’s security architecture for the new century.

It may be the case that by the time Ukraine joins NATO, the ESDP will have taken over many of the OSCE present tasks. Ukraine is therefore well advised to

focus its security agenda on all Western pillars. So far, Kiev has done little to move closer to ESDP. By doing so, Ukraine may gather additional support to restructure its security sector.



## **XII. UKRAINE'S REFORM ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND CHALLENGES**

James Sherr

'Defence reform' has become one of the orthodoxies of our time. It has also become a cliché, and like all clichés, it can be used to say very much or very little. The status quo in Ukraine threatens civic accord, national security and statehood. These dangers will remain unless the country's force structures are transformed in function, capability and ethos. Transformation, not reform, is what is needed, and it is needed for three compelling reasons:

- The security structures that Ukraine inherited from the USSR were not only unsuited to present day needs. In today's context, their survival would be pathological because they were designed for purposes antithetical to those that are now so urgent: becoming a democratic state in spirit as well as form – and, in relations with neighbours and one's own citizens, shifting from intimidation, pressure and coercion to a pattern of cooperation, dependability and trust.
- If the process of transformation is confined to Ministry of Defence Armed Forces and not extended to other security and power structures, it will not only be incomplete, but distorted, and it will become a dangerous source of tension within the state.
- Changing the character of security structures is inseparable from the broader enterprise of changing the relationship between state and society. The two processes cannot be insulated from one another. Stagnation and failure in one sphere corrupt and undermine what is achieved in the other.

The term 'reform' also underestimates the magnitude of the challenge and the tenacity of the Soviet legacy that Ukraine has inherited. Overcoming this legacy demands will, courage, expertise and conviction. It also demands money. Yet even if these commodities become plentiful in the short term, the struggle will still be long term. It is essential that Ukraine's partners in this enterprise have requirements and standards, but it is equally essential that they have knowledge and patience – and that they give credit where credit is due.

### **Accomplishments**

Twelve years after the Soviet collapse, what has been done is less significant than what remains to be done. But what has been done is important, and the term 'accomplishments' is by no means out of place. Failure to acknowledge these accomplishments by Ukraine's partners merely adds fatalism and demoralisation to what is already a supremely difficult exercise.

The fact that troops of the Soviet Armed Forces, MVD and KGB numbering 1.4 million men were substantially reduced and thoroughly resubordinated – all of this without conflict and upheaval – was a contribution to European order second only to

the country's unilateral nuclear disarmament. But it was an early and finite contribution, not an ongoing and dynamic one. Fortunately, such a dynamic has emerged (although it is repeatedly hampered and thwarted) and its potential is greater than it often appears to be. This is because a critical mass of state officials, security professionals and independent experts understand the dangers inherent in the Soviet legacy as well as the post-Soviet status quo.

Their insights and apprehensions were well expressed in Ukraine's first National Security Concept), drafted by the analytical staff of the National Security and Defence Council under the stewardship of its Secretary, Volodymyr Horbulin, and adopted by the *Verkhovna Rada* (parliament) in January 1997. The Concept assaulted the general war ethos (which has been inbred in the Soviet trained officer corps of Ukraine) by stipulating that in conditions where both state and society were weak, the prime security challenge would be to forestall and resolve local crises, emergencies and conflicts and prevent them from being exploited by actors (internal and foreign) with ulterior political ends. Proceeding from this analysis, the Concept identified 'the strengthening of civil society' as the first of nine security challenges for Ukraine. On 19 June 2003, the *Rada* adopted an updated and far more detailed document, the Law on Foundations of National Security, which is the product of extensive interagency work. Less concise and focused than its predecessor, it nevertheless contains elements of wisdom and boldness, giving due attention to the connections between a distorted economy, dysfunctional bureaucracies, criminality and threats to the state. Both national security documents stress that 'reform' is an imperative for the entire security sector and not the Armed Forces alone.

The State Programme of Armed Forces Reform and Development 2001-5 (adopted in July 2000) represented the first serious step to give these principles definite content. Imprecise and unrealistic as some of the Programme's aims and targets have been, they have been revised under pressure of expert criticism and unforgiving economic reality. The Programme was also supplemented by others, including the Concept of the Armed Forces 2010 and the State Programme of Armed Forces Transition Towards Manning on a Contract Basis. The current Defence Review, conducted in close consultation with NATO (and provisionally scheduled for completion in June 2004) is likely to iron out the inconsistencies and point the Armed Forces in an unequivocally clear (and realistic) direction.

The standard Western response – 'these are only programmes, what's needed is action' – partially misses the point. The pre-requisite for intelligent action is agreement about the nature of the problem and the answer to it. Unlike the operation of a market economy, national defence must be a planned activity. Failure to produce a tight correspondence between national security policy, military doctrine (the purpose and the priorities of armed forces) and military programmes (detailed schemes for their development) will lead to waste, confusion and, in the worst case, breakdown. In comparison to its former Soviet neighbours, Ukraine has shown a considerable degree of coherence, the fundamental aims and priorities of its defence policy are sound and the ethos behind it is increasingly Euro-Atlantic. It is impossible to reach this point until a lot of stereotyped thinking has been overcome. Whilst it

would absurd to say that a mental revolution has occurred in Ukraine's Armed Forces, at least it has begun.

A second, but closely related accomplishment is the NATO-Ukraine relationship. Well before the conclusion of a Charter on Distinctive Partnership (July 1997), this relationship was unprecedented in scope and intensity for a non-member state. In contrast to the Russian Federation, Ukraine's preoccupation has not been status, rights and a 'seat at the table', but the development of military-political and military-technical cooperation at working level. Several months after the adoption of the State Programme, Ukraine's then Minister of Defence, Oleksandr Kuzmuk, stated that the aim of NATO-Ukraine cooperation was 'to support defence reform in the country'. Today this is accomplished through several distinctive mechanisms, notably the Joint Working Group on Defence Reform. From 2001 Ukraine also became an active participant in NATO's Planning and Review Process (PARP). Consistent with this ethos, the State programme of Armed Forces Reform and Development 2001-5 was submitted to NATO Headquarters for review at the same time as it was submitted to President Kuchma, and both the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan and the Defence Review have been developed in close consultation with NATO. This is an astonishing record for a military establishment which viewed (and to a fair extent still views) transparency as a threat to departmental interests and national security.

## **Dilemmas**

The first of two key dilemmas is posed by Ukraine's declaration of 23 May 2002, which states that the 'ultimate goal' of its policy is NATO membership. NATO is a collective defence organisation. Ukraine has based its policy and planning on the assumption that it might – and most probably will – be obliged to defend itself. National armed forces 'closely resembling Euro-Atlantic standards and practice' were already a stated aim of the State Programme 2001-5, yet these forces, with good reason, were designed to act independently and, if necessary, alone. Even before the adoption of this programme, Ukraine made a noteworthy if finite contribution to collective defence by assigning contingents of forces to NATO-led peace support operations – indeed by 2003 over 20,000 Ukrainian servicemen had served in peace support operations under the aegis of NATO or the UN – but these decisions were made in the context of a distinctly national defence policy. To what extent should this change if Ukraine advances beyond the stage of NATO-Ukraine Action Plan to Membership Action Plan? To what extent would any such change force revisions to current and projected command-and-control, force structures, procurement systems, training and career development – and at what cost?

The considered answer inside Ukraine as well as NATO is that these changes should be evolutionary and as consistent as possible with current plans and programmes. The most authoritative scheme for these will emerge from the Defence Review, and it is no accident that this Review has been taking place in close consultation with NATO. There is no incompatibility between collective defence and

a robust national defence capability, and Alliance members have varied in their allocation of resources between the two. NATO's assiduous fostering of Ukraine's national defence capability was never intended to direct Ukraine down a path that would make membership unfeasible. To the contrary, Ukraine's geographical position almost dictates that it provides the key contribution to its own defence even if it becomes a NATO member. To be sure, the collective guarantee provided by membership would decidedly alter (and presumably improve) the geopolitical context and even Ukraine's definition of itself. But in straightforward military terms, it is likely to provide 'value added' rather than a replacement for national defence.

The second dilemma is more radical and less forgiving. But it is also misunderstood in Ukraine. The State Programme and its sequential refinements were drawn up before two events which have significantly changed Ukrainian threat perceptions: the war on terrorism and, perhaps more dramatically, the so-called Tuzla crisis of autumn 2003, in which the Russian Federation set out unilaterally to resolve a long-standing border dispute by constructing a causeway under the protection of Ministry of Emergency Situation troops in the Kerch Strait – without, incidentally, incurring any public reproach on the part of NATO.<sup>101</sup> Since 2000, the justification put forward by Ukraine's MOD for force reductions (from 314,000 in 2001 to 160,000 in 2005) has been twofold: economy and the nature of the threat.<sup>102</sup> However, both justifications have been simplified and distorted in Ukraine.

First, many in Ukraine wrongly equate economy with impoverishment and force reductions with a less capable force, whereas the clear emphasis by NATO and two Ukrainian Ministers of Defence has been modernisation and quality. Ukraine's substantial military forces have been dangerously deficient in combat training and combat ready equipment, and maintenance of personnel, logistics, barracks and other facilities have until recently consumed 80-90 per cent of expenditure. There is no question that resources allocated for defence are grossly deficient. But would anything short of an economic miracle rescue a force of this size?

Second, and understandably, the Tuzla crisis has been a rebuke to those who believe that Ukraine faces no threat of direct aggression in the foreseeable future. The combination of perceived Russian aggressiveness and perceived NATO indifference has led more than one respected commentator to call for a reconsideration of the fundamentals of defence policy and seriously 'contemplate forceful resistance to a state whose military potential significantly exceeds that of Ukraine'.<sup>103</sup> But does Tuzla refute long-standing threat assessments or validate the long-standing view that local provocations and crises are distinctly possible and that 'multi-component' (MOD and non-MOD) capabilities are required to prevent the escalation of such crises into 'regional war'? As long ago as 1997, the General Staff determined that the

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<sup>101</sup> At the height of this crisis, Russia's Prime Minister, Mikhail Kasyanov spoke of the necessity to remove (*ubrat'*) Ukraine's border troops and the Chief of the President's Administration went so far as to state that if Ukraine resisted, Russia should 'drop a bomb'.

<sup>102</sup> These are MOD figures released in November 2003. Both quantify military personnel in MOD subordinated Armed Forces. MOD civilian employees bring these totals to 415,800 (2001) and 200,000 (2005). The autumn 2003 totals were 288,600 servicemen and 94,400 civilians.

<sup>103</sup> Valentyn Badrak, 'The Right to Use Force' [*Pravo na silu*] in *Zerkalo Nedeli* [Mirror of the Week], 17 November, 2003.

role of Armed Forces in this *schéma* would be to ‘set up a zone which would make it possible to direct or influence the processes occurring outside it’. Although Ukraine’s then Minister of Defence, Army General Volodymyr Shkidchenko declared in 2002 that ‘the probability of a large-scale and prolonged war is low’, he went on to say that ‘transient, limited, possibly very fierce local interstate conflicts’ remain possible. There is nothing wrong with these assessments except Ukraine’s failure to act on them.

## Deficiencies

Today, Ukraine’s military leadership is doing most of what can reasonably be done to transform the Armed Forces without money. As already noted, money will not overcome the harm caused by misguided policies, incoherent security concepts and flawed military programmes. But without money, even the best concepts and programmes are stillborn. Today the dynamics of modernisation, stagnation and decay are precariously balanced in the Armed Forces. Major General Valeriy Muntian, Assistant to the Defence Minister for Budget and Financial-Economic Activity, is convinced that without a sustained (and delivered) increase in financial support, ‘the Armed Forces have no more than five years til self-ruination’.

The absence of money illustrates the core problem in a nutshell. For without real and sustained reform in the country, how can the army be financed? Today, Ukraine’s real GDP is probably twice the declared figure, but it is only declared (or discovered) income that is taxable. Who will declare income or pay taxes so long as the laws of the country discourage legal business, local bureaucracy strangles independent entrepreneurship, tax inspectors behave like pirates and judges consider themselves ‘practically defenceless’? Given these connections is it too much to hope that phrases about economic and political reform in the MOD’s Action Plan are not just eyewash for NATO, but an expression of self interest?

Apart from money, the glaring deficiency in programmes of defence reform is that they focus on *defence* reform, rather than reform of the security structures as a whole. Today these structures include Internal Troops and a vast array of specialist forces within the domain of the MVS (Ministry of Interior) and *militsia* (police), the civilian and military components of the SBU (Security Service of Ukraine), troops of the State Committee on Defence of the State Borders, Ministry of Emergency Situations, State Customs Service, Tax Police, and the Main Directorate for Struggle Against Organised Crime and Corruption. This one-sided focus on the Ministry of Defence (unwittingly perpetuated by PfP, which initially focused simply on the integration of *armed forces*) has already produced a schizophrenic security culture inside the country. Unless the problem is addressed, this schizophrenia – divergences in transparency, professional standards, working culture, corporate ideology and even geopolitical sentiment – has the potential to become a security problem in itself.

The origin of the discrepancy between the MOD Armed Forces and the two core security structures, the MVS and SBU, continues to leave its mark. The USSR

Ministry of Defence was an all Union structure without analogues at Union Republican level. Unlike the Soviet Armed Forces, the MVD was organised strictly on territorial (republican) lines, and the KGB USSR had centralised analogues in each of the Union Republics. In the latter cases, the Soviet collapse left behind coherent structures; in the case of the Armed Forces it left 'ruins and debris'. A second aspect of the Soviet legacy – 'divide and rule' – is also felt. Ukraine's Armed Forces, like their Soviet predecessors, still do not have the right to conduct their own counter-intelligence activity (which is performed by a department of the SBU, heir of the Third Chief Directorate KGB USSR). 'Divide and rule' is more conspicuously observed in the pronounced proliferation of security structures that has occurred since independence: a proliferation which the disbanding of the National Guard (December 1999) still has not finally checked. Finally, a third and most damaging aspect of this legacy, the ethos and working culture of these entities, has undergone only limited transformation. In the USSR the KGB and MVD functioned as instruments of administrative control over society. In post-totalitarian conditions, their successors are widely perceived as instruments of 'influence' and pressure. In themselves, these perceptions are enough to undermine the 'long term' aspirations articulated in Ukraine's declaration of 23 May 2002,

Contemporary socio-political differences have compounded these historical ones. The roles of the Armed Forces are to defend state sovereignty and territorial integrity, insulate the country from external conflicts and, in the worst case, defend the country against external opponents. In sum, they are not a component of internal political struggle. Yet the military and civilian components of the other structures (not to say *militsia*) are on the cutting edge of the relationship between state and society and subject to all of its strains and distortions. For this reason, the importance of securing a proper level of funding – and thorough transparency about where funds originate and who they reach – cannot be overestimated. If the state cannot fund *militsia*, border guards, customs officers and tax police, somebody else will. No one should be surprised when these professionals lose their professionalism and become entrepreneurial with the powers they have at their disposal. In member states of the European Union, the connection between business and 'power structures' is virtually nil. Today, such connections are rightly taken for granted in Ukraine.

Given these discrepancies, the third discrepancy – the NATO-Ukraine relationship – has not always diminished these contradictions. With the significant exception of the MChS (Ministry for Resolving Emergency Situations and the Consequences of the Chernobyl Catastrophe), NATO simply has not established the networks and 'habits of cooperation' with non-MOD bodies analogous to those it has established with the Armed Forces. Since NATO began to recognise this deficiency in about 1999 (and more emphatically since 11 September 2001), Ukraine's border troops and customs service have indicated genuine openness to such cooperation (and with the EU as well). But elsewhere, the response to such overtures has been formal and formalistic.

How will Ukraine's three Operational Commands be able to direct 'multi-component operations' without training, standards and levels of cooperation that are

truly joint? Will Ukraine be able to resolve (and hopefully avoid) complex emergencies without a common working culture and common language between MOD armed forces and other force structures or without a basis of trust between them, local civilian authorities and society at large? Is trust, not to say proper financing and accountability, possible to secure when budgets and staffing levels of many of these bodies are treated as state secrets and programmes of reform – those that exist – remain unpublished?

## Two remaining challenges

Ukraine not only inherited power structures from the USSR, but a culture of administration. The question is whether this culture and its norms and practices continue to serve Ukraine's interests. The administrative culture of most NATO states is radically different. This difference should not lend itself to mindless imitation, but it needs to be considered. In NATO Headquarters and many national defence ministries, much policy is initiated and much of it made at mid level by committees: committees that are civil-military and interdepartmental in composition, with access to most information relevant to their responsibilities. In the experience of these NATO members, the result has been a clear relationship between ideas from below and directives from above. This style of decision making helps to break down departmental barriers and knit institutions together. It also helps to ensure that decisions are implemented swiftly and intelligently, because subordinates have participated in the process and have enough information to know what they are doing and why. This approach, centres on increasing the *horizontal integration* of institutions. It is in plain contrast to the Soviet approach to administrative problems, now revived by President Putin: strengthening the 'administrative vertical'. It is far from clear that the latter approach offers the best route to improving the motivation of individuals and the performance of institutions.

A second and related issue is the information sphere, a sphere of activity rightly given prominence in Ukraine's 1997 National Security Concept and since. But are the challenges correctly understood? The widespread term 'global information order' suggests that they are not. The fact is that a 'global information order' does not exist. Information disorder exists. In these conditions, a shrewd information policy will aim not to suppress information, but to create trust. This is not because information cannot be suppressed. It can. But even within one's own country, one will never suppress enough, and the mere act of suppressing it, which *cannot* be disguised, fans distrust, even when trust in the state becomes vital to its survival: when in the words of President Kuchma, it is essential that 'people pull together at a critical moment'. Should one need to remind Ukrainians of the consequences of the Soviet regime's attempts to suppress information about the Chernobyl catastrophe?

Moreover, outside one's own country, one will hardly be able to suppress information at all. If Ukrainian authorities and news media do not provide full and timely information about military accidents, environmental disasters, banking

scandals and arms smuggling, then other interested parties certainly will, and these parties might not have Ukraine's interests at heart. Already, a large amount of 'facts' that appear about Ukraine in Western newspapers comes from Russian sources. Many of these Russian sources – official, semi-official and 'private' – are so forthcoming, so 'comfortable to deal with', and Ukraine's official sources so defensive and irritating to deal with, that a number of Western journalists simply have acquired the habit of consulting the former rather than Ukrainians about what is happening in Ukraine. Here, too, there is a historical reason for this discrepancy. Ukraine never experienced a 'Gorbachevian revolution'. Of course, the Gorbachevian revolution failed. But it produced a whole new class of people who knew that the USSR was losing the information struggle and knew why it was losing it. This class and its descendants understand the competitive and disordered conditions in which information is produced, exchanged and believed. It was overwhelmingly Russian, not Ukrainian, and today it serves Russia. Instead of such a class of 'information technologists', Ukraine has a corps of journalists, analysts and professionals who believe in the truth. But today they are regarded as a threat by the state authorities, rather than an asset. Until this changes, Ukraine's 'information policy' will continue to damage Ukraine's interests.

In conclusion, the transformation of defence structures has become a reality in Ukraine, and an influential network of professionals and experts have devoted their careers and souls to sustain it. The challenges to be confronted are formidable. The first of these is resources: in the short term, securing enough finance to limit stagnation and prevent 'ruination'; in the long term, securing the social, economic and political preconditions for long-term finance. The second challenge is to extend this transformation to the wider security sector. This challenge is directly connected to the most important challenge of all: diminishing the gap between state and society in Ukraine.



### **XIII. UKRAINE: REFORM ISSUES AND DEMOCRATIC CONTROL**

Grigoriy Perepelitsya

With a new international security architecture actively forming, the most significant imperative of which is partnership and cooperation, in Ukraine as elsewhere special attention is paid to the enlarging NATO and European Union as the key international structures in Europe. The basis of this process is a natural striving of European states to join a unified Europe. Security-Sector Reform should proceed in the context of Euro-Atlantic integration.

The second round of NATO's enlargement to the East, as well as the first one, answers the main strategic interests of Ukraine and creates very good incentives for security-sector reform to promote Ukrainian integration to the European economic and political structures, as well as security structures offering security guarantees.

Neighbourhood with new NATO members gives new possibilities for Ukrainian integration to the European security structures. It will lead to closer cooperation of Ukraine and NATO as well as other European structures. Moreover, NATO will be extremely interested in maintaining Ukrainian independence, and that is why it will have to provide political support and render assistance for Kiev's joining European political and economic structures.

The second stage of NATO enlarging should add to the stability and security at the south-western borders of Ukraine. If NATO's enlarging also means spreading stability through Central and Eastern Europe, then joining this process by Ukraine, that strives to be in the European collective security system, is absolutely natural.

The second stage of NATO enlarging also means its transformation from a military organisation to an organisation that protects democratic values. Thus, despite the disputes between European members of NATO and the USA, both will need this organisation. For Europeans NATO alongside the European Union is still a key institution of new political Europe.

Ukraine has created the ground for cooperation with NATO and the EU. But now there must be other actions. Conditions require a new concept that should help transition from deepened cooperation to membership. Unfortunately Ukraine lacks agreed political strategy and tactic of getting membership. The Alliance cannot expand forever. To be quick is therefore of great importance. The international environment changes so dynamically that Ukraine is already late with applying to join NATO. There are no reasons for Ukraine to wait 20 years. It is of extreme importance to accelerate the process and start reforms necessary for Euro Atlantic integration in order to win favour at the NATO summit in 2004.

During the last meeting of the Ukraine – NATO commission on 3-4 June 2003 in Madrid, NATO Secretary General Robertson stated that from the beginning of the year there was done a lot to overcome the absence of trust from the part of the NATO to Ukraine. The meeting also noted shortfalls in accomplishing by Ukraine the Action Plan "Ukraine-NATO" as well as the Tasks Plan for 2003. These concerned the

military components of the plan such as insufficient investment, lack of qualified staff, inadequate foreign language training, and delays in forming of civil structures in the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. It is not random that NATO pays significant attention to the military component. After all, as Mr. Robertson stated, “reforms in the defence and security sphere are the fundamental basis for Ukrainian reaching of its strategic goal – Euro Atlantic integration”.

Generally the Action Plan implementation provides for Ukraine approaching the criteria of gaining NATO membership. So there is the question to what extent Ukraine has met these criteria at this moment in comparison with other candidates for entry. Future members should satisfy the basic principles, implemented in the Washington Pact, such as democracy, human freedoms and other correspondent conditions. In general Ukraine meets most of the criteria as to NATO entering. However, the country has significant problems as to some:

- Abiding to the principles of law and respect for human rights;
- Establishing proper democratic and civil control over its armed forces;
- Keeping the course of reinforcing stability and prosperity by observing principles of economic liberty, social justice and responsibility for environment preservation;
- Demonstrating an ability to make its own military contribution to collective defence as well as to implement new tasks, and readiness to take liability for gradual improvement of its defence ability;
- Accomplishing standardisation and achieving interoperability.

As far as purely military criteria are concerned, the main problems fall under at least two headings. A reform in the defence and security sphere is exactly intended to make Ukraine closer to these criteria.

The problems are explained mainly by the very limited number of officers of new European generation in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as well as by restricted budget allocations for reinforcing. The main direction for improving the state of Armed Forces' financing is reducing the quantity of Armed Forces, outdated armaments and infrastructure without cutting the share of GDP allotted for the military budget.

Progress towards standardisation and interoperability is at a very early stage. It is possible to say about definite changes only concerning the interoperability of forces and means that are allotted for taking part in common action for peacekeeping. The main problem is the absence of decisive actions from the state and military leadership as to raising the Armed Forces to NATO standards. Moreover, the military-technical policy of Ukraine is aimed at preserving a monopoly of Russian armaments as well as military technology on its internal market. Requirements are planned in perspective to accomplish just with Russian options of armament as well as military equipment from domestic production made in cooperation with Russian enterprises and companies. *Russia will be given priority also in modernisation of all kinds of arms equipment of the Ukraine Armed Forces.*

So the top-priority tasks of reforming defence sector in the context of Ukraine integration to NATO should be completion of a defence review and realisation of the

tasks stated in the Action Plan of Ukraine – NATO. The next important step is to launch an intensive dialogue as to membership in NATO and joining the Membership Action Plan process in order to start the definite preparation for entering NATO. After this, preparation requires the following:

- completing and producing the recommendations of the “Defence review”;
- changing information policy in Ukrainian mass-media concerning NATO’s image;
- taking diplomatic actions in NATO countries in order to form a positive international attitude as to Ukraine entering the Alliance;
- strengthening the state border and signing with the European Union an Association Accord;
- reinforcing control over Russia’s military presence and creating preconditions for withdrawal from Sevastopol;
- elaborating and attaining NATO standards in the sphere of control over air space;
- standardisation of communications and procedures in order to achieve operational alignment;
- optimisation of the structure and function of the military organisation of the state;
- establishing a well-balanced system of military industrial cooperation;

In addition, the country must execute economic and political reforms that are able to provide prosperity and stability, without which Ukraine cannot be a valuable member that deserves trust. Among the main demands of NATO are forming a democratic society inside a country and establishing democratic civil control over its security and defence sector.

Ukraine assumes definite enough liabilities in relations with NATO and the EU as to implementation of democratic control over the National Armed Forces. These liabilities are fixed in such international texts as: the framework document of the “Partnership for peace” programme and the Charter of strategic partnership between Ukraine and the European Union.

Such international support has pivotal importance for civil society development and implementation of democratic civil control over the Armed Forces in Ukraine. Given the course of Ukraine towards expanding international cooperation in the security sphere it can be expected that civil control will progress in Ukraine.

As NATO and EU expand towards Ukrainian borders the attention to civil control over the security and defence sector of the country will grow. Yet civil structures are only slowly forming within the military organisation. The appointment of E.K. Marchuck as minister is the first significant contribution to forming civil structures in the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. But the problem here is on the one hand lack of competence of civil experts in the security sphere, on the other hand distrust to civil leadership from the side of professional militaries. Also there is a lack in Ukraine of experienced political managers who are educated and skilled enough in the military sphere, who have experience of state administration and who constitute a loyal elite. We also need civil experts in the sphere of defence and security.

We have not enough political support of the Armed Forces in political parties, civil organisations, and independent mass media. There is low trust from the side of militaries concerning the competence of civilians in the defence sphere. So a majority guessed that appointment of the civilian minister will not influence on the state of the Armed Forces positively. Although simultaneously many expect that he will be able more suitably to represent the Armed Forces and country: as political administrator, to present and protect the interests of the Armed Forces in the Rada and Government; and to exert effective control over discipline in the Armed Forces. For the most part militaries treat political leaders as temporary figures. There is little public discussion of military problems both from the side of militaries and politicians themselves and from the side of society.

The main job of the civilian minister and of civil control, in the militaries' opinion, is to protect their social rights and interests, enhance the prestige of military service, elaborate and implement decisions aimed at reinforcing military security of the country. Ukraine considers civilian appointments to the key positions inside force structures as well as conditions of their work as important to the making of well-weighed, well-founded and well-balanced decisions. However, formal staff appointments are not the same as creating the integrated system of democratic control in the state bodies of the security and defence sphere. For this problem civilian leadership is not enough. The appointment of a civil man as defence minister still does not provide civil control over the Armed Forces, because there are still the same militarised structures as existed under a military minister.

That is why it is also necessary to establish in force departments balanced proportions between civil people and military staff as well as definite differentiation of their authorities and functions, plus educative programmes regarding security matters for civil personnel.

The significant condition of establishing civil control over force departments already has its legal basis. The Law "About democratic civil control over military organisation and law-enforcement agencies" of 19 July 2003, is the important act. According to this law validity and appropriateness of applying armed forces inside and outside the country, as well as issues of export and import of armaments, military technical cooperation, conversion and privatisation of defence enterprises, programmes for armed forces and law enforcement agencies development and others are subject to civil control.

Such control can be exercised both through public organisation and elected representatives, and also by private application to the Human Rights Commissioner of the Supreme Council of Ukraine or other state bodies on the basis of other legislation. Thus, both state bodies and civil institutes participate in control over the defence and security sector.

The Constitution of Ukraine forbids using the Armed Forces of Ukraine as well as other formations with the aim of restricting citizens' rights and freedoms or with the aim of destroying constitutional order, removing power bodies or creating obstacles for their activity. According to the Constitution there is also not permitted

establishing and activity of organisational structures of political parties.<sup>104</sup> The principle of apolitical Armed Forces is stated also in the Law “About social and legal protection of militaries and members of their families.”

One more important element of the legislative base of security policy of Ukraine was the Law “Concerning basis of national security of Ukraine”, passed on 19 June 2003.

“According to this Law the Strategy of national security of Ukraine and Military doctrine of Ukraine are elaborated and approved by the President of Ukraine, and by them the guidance principles of military establishment, as well as activity directions of the state power bodies in particular circumstances are defined with the aim of timely finding, removing and neutralisation of real and potential threats to the national interests of Ukraine. The strategy of national security of Ukraine and Military doctrine of Ukraine are the documents that are obligatory for fulfilling and serve as the ground for elaborating definite programmes in correspondence with components of state policy of national security.”

The Law contains a general description about basic definitions and grounds for establishing a Ukrainian national security system. Along with this there has been formed the list of definite national interests of Ukraine and threats to these interests. There are defined in the Law basic definitions, legal mechanisms of identification of national interests and threats of vital importance, and the system of national security and mechanisms of its guidance, democratic control over subjects of its providing and other important issues that require legalisation are strictly defined.

The military doctrine must be consistent both with the basic Law and the Strategy of national security. In the process of elaborating conceptual documents in the sphere of national security and defence civilian people take an active part; they are domestic and foreign experts, representatives of scientific circles, deputies, leaders of political parties. Such wide representation of civil society allows consideration of topics that are included in the drafts fully, permits estimation, and links militaries and government from one side and society from the other.

However, this legislative base is still not sufficiently provided with a system of normative documents that regulates the decisions on definite issues in this sphere. Imperfection of this normative base is one of the reasons for the low efficiency of civil structures’ activity as well as activity of civil officials in the force departments of Ukraine. Because frameworks of the civil personnel activity and its relationship with militaries are not regulated by such normative acts there are rather often tensions and disputes inside these force departments. Hence, the issues of the top-priority as to enhancing the role of civil officials over military structures are the following:

- Elaborating and approving the structure of the civil bodies in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the quantity of civil personnel there;
- Defining the authority of the (civilian) Defence Minister and his deputies;
- Working out the documents that regulate the procedure of appointment of civilian personnel in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

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<sup>104</sup> Constitution of Ukraine (1996).

The reasons why these are important is explained in the following paragraphs.

In Ukraine there is also the necessary institutional base for the national security system. It consists of both nongovernmental organisations and governmental bodies of different power branches: legislative, judicial and executive. All these bodies are civilian by nature and structure. The most developed part of this institutional base are the executive power bodies. The pivotal place among them belongs to the Council of National Security and Defence of Ukraine (CNSD). The CNSD has functions and authority which are definitely regulated by the Constitution and laws, as well as mechanisms for managing the national security system. In general this system cannot, however, work constantly and efficiently relying just on one body and without proper participation in the process of the components of civil control of other power structures of legislative and judicial power.

Such limited nature can lead to the substitution of democratic principles with the authoritarian methods of control over force structures, when civil ministers and civil personnel of force structures can be appointed just according to the principal of personal devotion to the President or loyalty to the party, the leaders of which belong to the President's entourage.

Another problem of implementation of democratic control over the security sphere is control over intelligence service and special forces' activity. This problem is of a big concern even for parliamentarians of the countries with developed European democracy. The secret character of intelligence departments' activity does not allow parliaments and society to exert proper control over them. The problem of no less importance is the power structures freedom to act as they want inside a country. Under the conditions of transition such uncertainty can create a real threat to democracy.

The implementation of civil control in the security and defence sphere is significantly complicated by lack of civil society structures in Ukraine. This impacts the process of political parties forming and assumption by them of the interests of different social sections of the country's population.

The point is that there is no full-fledged party system in Ukraine, which could present the interests of civil society in the state power bodies. Proceeding from this, political parties do not bear any political responsibility to society, as well as for its turn the government cannot be accountable to parties represented in the Parliament.

The mechanism of effective civil control from the side of society can be exerted only when its interests in the Parliament will be represented by the ruling political party or ruling coalition, which would bear political responsibility for the Government's activity, including activity of civil ministers of force departments. In Ukraine there is no such pivotal political precondition.

Thus, at this moment we should work a lot at making the system of democratic control over security and defence sphere meet the criteria of civilized countries.

#### **XIV. UKRAINE: THE ARMED FORCES AND BEYOND**

Oleksiy Melnyk and Leonid Polyakov

Transparency and democratic accountability in the functioning of security structures are essential elements in the maintenance of a democratic society, such as the one that Ukraine is aspiring to build. When equipped with undistorted knowledge, individual citizens – who are naturally concerned with ensuring their own security and that of their society and their state – can effectively hold government authorities and security structures accountable for providing that security. A high level of transparency limits the chances for abuse of power, enhances the responsibility of security authorities, and therefore increases the effectiveness of the security structures they oversee.

Therefore, it should be no surprise that progress in Ukraine's security sector reform (SSR) has been noticeably dependent on the achieved level of transparency and overall democratic development. The case of Ukrainian SSR also demonstrates that the progress of reform in each individual security structure depends predominantly on the level of democratisation in that institution – transparency, accountability, and introduction of effective civilian democratic control. The most successful examples of reform can be found in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which are more transparent and, consequently, more trusted by the population. The major non-military structures – principally the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Security Service of Ukraine – remain basically unreformed from the time of their creation in the early 1990s. The result is a considerable gap in the development and reform of military and non-military security structures<sup>105</sup>.

Fortunately for Ukraine, its SSR problems have received particular attention from democratic organisations like NATO and the European Union, whose enlargement to Ukrainian borders is providing a generally positive effect. Through practical assistance for reforms and regular feedback mechanisms, NATO has contributed to the establishment of international norms for military planning, force restructuring, and democratic control in the Armed Forces. EU efforts have been primarily limited to supporting the reform of Ukraine's Border Service. However, overall the attention of NATO and the EU to the operation of Ukraine's non-military security structures has been declarative rather than practical.

When considering the prospects for Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic aspirations and associated SSR requirements, it is significant that the reform priorities declared by NATO and the EU coincide with those of Ukraine's population. In setting

<sup>105</sup> For simplicity, this article uses the western concept of 'military' as meaning 'national Armed Forces' and 'non-military' as all other security services. However, the official Ukrainian classifications are more complicated. For example, Ukraine's Security Service (inherited by the country from former Soviet KGB) simultaneously performs law-enforcement, political intelligence/counterintelligence and military counterintelligence missions. It also contains paramilitary contingents with employees having the legal status of military servicemen. The Ministry of Internal Affairs also includes paramilitary Interior Troops whose personnel wear military uniform and are legally considered as military, in addition to structures like criminal police, traffic police etc., whose employees have a rank structure and uniform similar to those of the military, but do not have legal military status.

requirements for candidates, both organisations focus on security primarily in terms of upholding the rule of law, human rights, social justice, and citizens' well-being. As these are the same issues that concern Ukrainian citizens, efforts to expand SSR well beyond defence to include law-enforcement structures will likely receive considerable public support.

Thus, there are good grounds to expect that the dual EU and NATO enlargements will have a positive impact on the speed and depth of Ukrainian SSR, on the condition that enlargement is accompanied by a further qualitative strengthening of both organisations' security co-operation with Ukraine.

### **Military dimension of SSR in Ukraine**

The first attempts at military reform in Ukraine – in the early to mid-1990s – were hampered by a lack of experience in state building, a poor legislative basis, vague political objectives, a lack of qualified experts at the state level, and continued Soviet-style thinking. As a result, these first efforts at reform basically sought to rebuild Soviet-style forces and structures on a smaller scale. It took years for the political and military leadership to realise that the Soviet military heritage of some 800,000 military personnel and thousands of tanks, personnel carriers, artillery pieces and aircraft was more of a liability than an asset.

The early approach to military reform was also conditioned by the overall political and economic realities of the new Ukrainian state. During the early years of Ukraine's independence, the principal focus of attention was on control of those non-military security sector institutions that were capable of influencing internal political and economic competition. As the military sector was not a principal priority in this respect, Ukraine's political elite concentrated its efforts on the subordination of military formations – removing them as a political factor – rather than reforms that would have addressed the real needs of the Armed Forces and defence policy. This neglect was assisted by the non-existent role of civil society in the early 1990s, which prevented the Armed Forces' popularity in society from significantly influencing the political agenda.

National priorities continued to shift as time passed: from control over military formations and the establishment of formal signs of national sovereignty in 1991-92 to problems of the economic survival of the nation in the years that followed. Ukraine's mighty internal potential rapidly disappeared due to the absence of effective economic reforms, and from 1991 to 1995 GDP dropped by almost 50 per cent. In the absence of a direct military threat, the authorities and public focused on other sectors, such as the political, economic, social and energy sectors.


In the face of neglect and apathy, in the 1990s Ukrainian military was basically left to reform itself as it saw fit, within the framework of shrinking budgets. The failure to make sufficient reductions in force structure in the face of declining resources led to a situation where over 80 per cent of the MoD budget was (and still is) spent on the maintenance of personnel, leaving little left for either investment or maintaining the readiness of current forces. Faced with budget cuts, downsizing, and



operational fuel shortages under conditions of a deteriorating economy, combat training was reduced below minimum required levels, resulting in force readiness below minimum requirements. This not only affected national security, it also affected safety within the Armed Forces, as demonstrated by a number of fatal accidents involving the military.

In recent years, however, these developments have elicited a growing concern on the part of Ukrainian society, particularly coming against the background of the deteriorating international security situation. This concern, combined with the traditionally high level of popular trust enjoyed by the military (see Diagram 1) and the increasing activity of civil society, has the real potential to facilitate meaningful actions in military reform.

DIAGRAM 1



Thus, even given the weakness of Ukraine's democratic institutions, the country's media, NGOs and the population at large have begun to develop a rather vocal and critical public debate on issues of defence reform. These "public" factors are complemented by "government" factors: the interest of certain elements of the Ukrainian military establishment in reforming itself (in contrast to non-military security structures), declarative support on the part of authorities, and a low appetite for political interference. As a result of this convergence of factors, the growing public debate will very likely contribute to producing positive results.

In the 2000-2002 period the critical mass of the above factors, plus the available experience of Ukraine's more successful neighbours to the West, prompted the Ukrainian authorities to take a number of strategic decisions that could be considered steps in the right direction: setting the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force as a priority; promoting a change to professional (i.e. contract) service; and, most importantly, setting the ambitious strategic goal of joining NATO in the future. These

have been accompanied by practical achievements: the accumulation of experience through participation in international peacekeeping operations and international military co-operation; modest successes in developing capabilities in some “low-cost” areas (e.g. CBR protection, combat engineering and transport aviation); and the gradual accumulation of experience from the country’s own attempts to reform.

The decision to seek NATO membership has provoked a more intensive reform process. The creation of the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan/Target Plan, which includes specific SSR objectives, was a key first step. However, the Action Plan/Target Plan’s impact is limited by their generally declarative contents and by a Ukrainian approach that focuses on targets as specific, limited steps to be taken, rather than as a part of a systemic transformation.

The need for systemic transformation can be readily seen in the area of developing military interoperability. Ukraine’s current approach is to train specific units to NATO standards in preparation for specific events. However, these standards conflict with the Soviet-era standards and procedures still used for regular combat training. While some initial steps have been made – for example, the Ukrainian National Defence Academy has well-established Multinational Staff Officer’s courses and is adding courses in Euro-Atlantic Integration – for the most part there has been no systemic review of curricula and training at military education institutions. The side-by-side existence of two standards – NATO and Soviet – causes systemic tensions that waste resources and reduce overall effectiveness.

Unfortunately, lessons learned from defence reform efforts – as shown by the evolution of reform programmes such as the ‘State Programme of Reformation and Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine through 2005’ (adopted in 2000) to the ‘Concept for the Structure of the Armed Forces-2010’ (adopted in 2001); and the ‘State Programme of Transition of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to Manning with Contracted Servicemen’ (adopted in 2002) – have yet to address the need for systemic transformation, focusing instead on quantitative factors (and step-by-step reductions to ever-shrinking targets). As a result, current plans are still unrealistic. Technological advance means that the cost of military equipment for a given sized force doubles in price every 7-10 years, while the early stages of personnel reductions and all stages of professionalisation require considerable additional financial resources. Such factors have been ignored for many years in allocating funds to the national defence budget. As a result, even under the most optimistic scenario of economic development, Ukraine will not be able to afford 240,000 servicemen (as stipulated in the ‘Concept for the Armed Forces-2010’), or even 180,000-200,000 (according to the latest declarations of the Defence Ministry) if it also wishes to meet its goals for maintaining a high level of combat readiness and developing professional Armed Forces. The goal of creating a professional Rapid Reaction Force (with about 40,000 servicemen) may be a realistic goal, but only if a more radical reduction of the remainder of the military – the Main Defence Forces – takes place in the very near term.

Fundamentally, reform can only succeed if it can get in front of the current cycle of step-by-step reductions and ever-thinner distribution of scanty resources. The

Ukrainian authorities have recently made promising declarations, but the associated actions are still inconsistent or non-existent. What is needed is a concentration of resources and consistency of reform measures, founded on strong political will and clear definition of priorities.<sup>106</sup> But in the absence of a direct and visible large military threat, the country's leadership, which is concerned primarily about short-term political issues, is unlikely to become sincerely concerned about addressing long-term issues related to military reform. Two factors that could overcome this lack of interest are pressure either from the Ukrainian public and civil society and/or from Ukraine's democratic partners in the West. However, the ability of Ukraine's population to influence the top officials' decisions is still limited by weak democratic institutions, and Western partners seem reluctant to publicly pressure Ukraine on defence reform issues – partly because co-operation in this area is deemed a success story, and partly because more attention is being paid to the need for democratic reforms.

However, since even current defence reform plans have already gone beyond the list of problems that the military could resolve without the assistance of the civilian authorities and the support of a solid economic base, Western partners and civil society in Ukraine should consider that progress in defence reform will help highlight the urgency of democratising the entire system of state governance, including reforms in the political and economic spheres.

### **Non-military dimension of SSR in Ukraine**

Only recently has the issue of SSR in Ukraine moved beyond issues of downsizing, restructuring, and establishing democratic civilian control over the Armed Forces. Thus, non-military (law-enforcement) security structures remain in the same essential form as the non-transparent (even to parliamentary control), non-reformed and non-trusted replicas of their Soviet predecessors the KGB and militia (police) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This is largely due to the high level of involvement of these structures in the continuous struggle for political power in Ukraine and the parallel process of redistribution of property. Unfortunately, this involvement has been to the detriment of their primary mission – to fight criminal security threats – and to their reform to meet democratic standards.

While in hard economic times the Ukrainian law-enforcement structures have usually been given the priority of scarce resources<sup>107</sup> over the military, these same resources have not been used efficiently, due in part to the remaining cumbersome structures<sup>108</sup> but also due to the absence of outside oversight – either by Parliament or

<sup>106</sup> See: "Transition to Professional Armed Forces in Ukraine: the Problems and Prospects", Razumkov Centre analytical report. *National Security & Defence*, 2002, No.5, p.21.

<sup>107</sup> See, for instance, O.Havrylenko. "Does Ukraine Need a New Military Doctrine?" *National Security & Defence*, 2000, No.1, p.43. "The government financed the "National Defence" budget item at a level of 51.5 per cent of the quarterly plan [1999], the Border Troops – 43.6 per cent, the Internal Troops received 72.1 per cent of the planned amount, the National Guard – 72.2 per cent, and the Security Service – 82.3 per cent. Everyone may draw a conclusion without difficulty. What is difficult is proving that Ukraine is not building a police state."

<sup>108</sup> See note 1.

public organisations – over the use of these resources. In addition, the common practice (until very recently) of appointing the heads of security structures solely on the basis of their loyalty to the President – rather than taking into account their professionalism – put additional limits on the reform of law-enforcement structures to improve democratisation and effectiveness.

This approach certainly did not help in promoting public trust and support; rather, it resulted in a number of political scandals that affected the police and security services. These have included the murders of journalists Georgiy Gongadze and Igor Alexandrov and accusations against police and security in staging, or improperly handling, high-profile investigations into the assassinations of prominent opposition politicians (like Viacheslav Chornovil, the leader of the democratic party “Rukh”, who was killed in a traffic accident prior to the presidential elections of 1999) and “inconvenient” officials (like Valeriy Malev, head of the state arms-trading company “Ukrspetsexport”, who was killed in a traffic accident during the “Kolchuga” scandal<sup>109</sup> in fall 2002).

The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), is rather small in numbers, less visible, and has moderate support from the public. Although comparatively few, accusations against the SBU include involvement in coercive actions or eavesdropping against the political opposition. In contrast, respect for the police is far lower. Neglect by police of the actual needs of the population, as well as numerous cases of abuse of authority and criminal acts performed by police, suggest that the country’s leadership is not serious about democratising and improving the professionalism of police in order to provide real security to its citizens against the criminal world. Official concerns about law and order are rather declarative, and usually take the form of pressure from the highest police authorities on lower police structures to report a rosy statistical picture. The result is a disincentive to registering crimes, as well as cases of violence and even torture during investigation or detention. According to the 2003 Report by the Human Rights Commissioner of the Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) Nina Karpachova, “Tortures [during detention by police] are cruel, humiliating the honour and dignity of people, which has a systematic character for Ministry of Internal Affairs structures at the stage of investigation, and demonstrates about the brutal human rights violations and abuse of authority.”<sup>110</sup>

Such a situation in the non-military security structures naturally had to come – sooner or later – in contradiction with the democratic aspirations of the majority of Ukrainian society. Thus, through the media, the Parliament, and political parties of democratic orientation, society has started to pay more attention to the activities of security structures. Significantly, even many representatives of the executive and pro-presidential political parties appeared to be voicing concerns about the unreformed state of law-enforcement bodies. According to the former Head of the State

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<sup>109</sup> “Kolchuga” is a Ukrainian-made anti-aircraft passive electronic detection system. The possibility of supplying Kolchuga systems to Iraq was – according to the former presidential bodyguard Major Mykola Melnychenko – discussed between President Kuchma and Malev.

<sup>110</sup> See: Internet site of the Commissioner of the Verkhovna Rada on Human Rights, Reports of the Commissioner [2], <http://www.ombudsman.kiev.ua>.

Commission for the Defence-Industrial Complex of Ukraine Volodymyr Horbulin:<sup>111</sup> “We never came close before to the issues of reforming other [non-military] security structures. Life itself poses the question of how to approach the reform of security structures, the SBU in particular.”<sup>112</sup>

Former Ukrainian Defence Minister Olexandr Kuzmuck (currently a member of Ukraine's Parliament within the pro-presidential political bloc) on many occasions expressed his criticism of the fact that “after the dissolution of the USSR the number of [Ukrainian] Ministry of Internal Affairs personnel increased three fold, Internal Troops [of the Ministry of Internal Affairs] – four fold, and the SBU – six fold, while the Armed Forces were reduced to three times less.”<sup>113</sup>

To a certain extent, the almost total lack of progress in the reform of law-enforcement structures, while rooted in local Ukrainian factors and legacies, was also the result of a lack of attention from Ukraine's NATO and EU partners, who, during the 1990s, focused their security sector co-operation with Ukraine almost exclusively on defence issues. Only after the September 11 terrorist attacks did Ukraine's Western partners start putting more emphasis on “new/soft security threats” (of a generally criminal nature), and, consequently, encouraging reforms of law-enforcement bodies and intelligence services. This dimension of common interests is already reflected in Ukraine-EU documents and in practice; for example, both the EU TACIS programme and the USA individually provide material and financial support to Ukraine's Border Service. However, compared with the scale of defence co-operation, where Ukraine has some 600 co-operative events with NATO countries every year, co-operation with both NATO and EU in the area of law-enforcement is still in its embryonic state.

A major shake-up in the leadership of Ukraine's law-enforcement structures in the middle of 2003, which was accompanied by promising declarations, made some observers hopeful that SSR in the non-military area would accelerate. However, several months later the promised improvements have yet to materialise. In the case of Ukraine's law-enforcement structures, the distance between public and official attitudes to the problem of reform continues to widen. The evident lack of political will of the country's authorities to take real steps in democratising police and other law-enforcement bodies (Procurator Office, Tax Police, Customs) is one of the major factors contributing to the very low trust of the population in both the authorities and the law-enforcement structures. Progress in this dimension of Ukraine's SSR will remain problematic until Ukrainian society is mature enough to put meaningful pressure on these structures to democratise.

<sup>111</sup> After this Commission was disbanded at the end of 2002, Mr. Horbulin was appointed to the post of the Head of the National Centre for Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine. He is also a former Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine,

<sup>112</sup> Intervention during the DCAF-sponsored conference “Parliamentary Control in the Sphere of Security and Defence”. Kyiv, September 26-27, 2002.

<sup>113</sup> See: “O. Kuzmuk points to the threat of turning Ukraine into military-police state.” *Defense-Express*, November 12, 2002, <http://www.defense-ua.com/rus>.

## **Effect of NATO and EU enlargements on SSR in Ukraine**

Since early independence, Ukraine recognised the need for a multinational approach to security. This has included contribution to many UN peacekeeping operations, including NATO-led operations in the Balkans, as well as participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace beginning in 1994. Ukraine also has reached a significant level of military co-operation with its Western neighbours through multinational efforts like the Polish-Ukrainian Battalion and most recently participation within the Polish sector of responsibility in Iraq; the Ukrainian-Romanian-Hungarian-Slovakian Tysa engineering battalion; NATO's Transcarpathian flood control pilot project; and BLACKSEAFOR. These multilateral efforts require the development of interoperability, which, through the 1990s, increasingly meant matching NATO standards. Failure to meet these standards through peacetime training means that ad-hoc arrangements must be made; this causes difficulties and may present a deadly threat for soldiers and for a mission.

As Ukraine's Western neighbours continue integration into NATO, their armed forces will increasingly operate according to NATO standards and procedures. In addition, other security sector structures – border control, intelligence services, law enforcement, judicial systems – will continue reforming to meet overall NATO standards for democracy and rule of law, as well as more specific EU standards in the area of Justice and Home affairs. As a result, even without its goals of NATO and EU membership, Ukraine would need to continue progress in SSR toward meeting EU and NATO standards – just to maintain effective co-operation with neighbours to the west.

This challenge will be greatest for the non-military security sector institutions, which have the least experience in international co-operation. Border control issues will become crucial, particularly driven by Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and – after 2007 – Romania's implementation of the Schengen regime. This will firstly increase the need for Ukraine to co-operate effectively along its western frontier; secondly, it will also raise the need to strengthen Ukraine's border regime along its eastern frontier, in order to prevent Ukraine's becoming the westernmost outpost of a Eurasian zone of illegality and cross-border crime: trafficking in humans, drugs, arms, WMD, and so on. With regards to regional co-operation in the area of intelligence and law enforcement, Ukraine's ability to meet NATO/EU standards will affect its inclusion into regional efforts at transnational policing and counter-terrorism.<sup>114</sup>

Realising Ukraine's declared intention to join NATO and the EU will require an even greater focus on SSR. Three key issues will need to be addressed by a comprehensive and systemic approach: 1) establishing democratic norms in the security sector, 2) ensuring a security system that meets modern needs at affordable cost, and last, but not least, 3) political factors. In the area of democratic standards for NATO and EU membership, Ukraine will need to meet overall requirements for


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<sup>114</sup> For more details on the issue of fighting new security threats in the region, see, for instance L.Polyakov. "New Security Threats in Black Sea Region", a chapter that will appear in *The Black Sea Region: Cooperation and Security Building*, edited by Oleksandr Pavliuk and Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze, which will be published by M.E. Sharpe in cooperation with the East-West Institute.

democracy, supremacy of law, and human rights, as well as more specific requirements for the security sector; for example, democratic civil control, ensuring effective border regimes (that simultaneously form a barrier to criminal activity and allow the free movement of legitimate people and goods across the border), and standards of law enforcement behaviour.

In order to maximise momentum towards reform, Ukrainian authorities should fully utilise today's favourable political factors – the Euro-Atlantic course is overwhelmingly supported by parties and Government, and the population as a whole understands that the required reforms match their needs and the country's shortcomings (see Diagram 2). While these are factors in favour of progress, other factors retard progress. This includes varying motivation and sincerity among various elements (i.e. the expert level, senior Security Sector officials, the political level, and society), which undermines political will and practical impact.

DIAGRAM 2




\* Respondents were allowed to mark no more than three options.

The importance of broad public support for NATO and EU membership bids cannot be overestimated as a factor in consolidating political will. For instance, the Czech leadership's failure to mobilise citizens' (and official) support for the NATO


air campaign in Kosovo in 1999 caused doubts among NATO members in the new partner's loyalty and reliability. On the other hand, the Slovakian experience, where during 18 months 10 per cent of the citizens changed their mind in favour of NATO accession (see Diagram 3), is an example of the effectiveness of public informational policy if it is conducted properly and continuously.

DIAGRAM 3



But when Ukrainian authorities prefer trips to Brussels and meetings with NATO and EU officials over visits to Berdychiv and talks with Ukrainian people, it should be no wonder that the citizens' attitude towards NATO is unstable and highly dependent on international developments. It is characterised by a high degree of ambivalence (see Diagram 4). Therefore, in Ukraine the factor of public attitudes toward NATO is so far a negative one.

DIAGRAM 4



Public opinion, however, will not change the reality of dual NATO/EU enlargement, which has become one of the great phenomena of modern history. This process will force Ukraine –regardless of the political leadership – to increase efforts to meet NATO/EU standards, in order to maintain regional co-operation and meet



common challenges. The process itself will also build its own dynamic; as the country's Western neighbours are moving to EU/NATO standards, continued co-operation will provide means for transferring knowledge and culture. In addition, NATO and EU enlargement to former "fraternal Socialist countries" can only increase Ukrainian citizens' demands for change, particularly in area of democratisation. Linking democratisation and reform (which public supports) to NATO/EU accession (toward which the public is ambivalent or hostile) will be key to changing attitudes and strengthening political will.

## Conclusions

The people are the ultimate holders of legal power in democracies. But when, as in Ukraine, they are gaining the necessary level of knowledge to evaluate the situation, but still lack the necessary power of influence it, they either watch passively, or try to struggle. Informed citizens usually attempt to make authorities accountable and security structures more democratic, open and effective. But when people know little, they will surely be passive, and will not stimulate the improvement of security structures, which in turn will lead the security structures to either stagnation and degradation, or possible descent into abuse.

The most important effect of dual NATO/EU enlargement for Ukraine is evident – it is Ukraine's foreign policy strategic course of Euro-Atlantic integration. This Euro-Atlantic course requires commitment to democratic values of transparency and accountability. Although the criteria of NATO membership, by contrast to those of the EU, are formulated in a very general manner, even that brief list has its priorities – political and economic issues prevail over defence and security.

Even without the Euro-Atlantic course, changes in the Ukrainian security neighbourhood would increase the importance of meeting NATO and EU standards, even if just to maintain the current level of regional co-operation. Participation in PfP and NATO-Ukraine mechanisms has been a driving force for deepening such co-operation, which is now having a growing impact on the country's development.

However, we should admit that to date the influence of NATO procedures on internal processes in Ukraine is mostly limited to the Armed Forces. To effectively promote change, Ukraine's co-operation with an enlarging NATO and EU will need to better match the priorities for SSR – especially in the non-military area – in terms of identifying "needs and options" for the country's SSR, and then working to achieve higher security and save resources. But this process can only be effective if Ukraine gives priority to SSR and acts in systematic way. Action cannot be limited to agreeing an Action Plan with NATO and the EU (and perhaps eventually participation in MAP); it must be supported by national procedures that are aimed at supporting a process of systemic transformation. These national procedures must: clearly identify national security interests and link them to tools (structures) and resources (budget and personnel); bring together planning (via the President), budgeting (via the Government and parliament) and execution (responsibility); and develop political and societal consensus on security needs and the price to be paid.

Ukraine has now accumulated a certain amount of knowledge and experience in security sector reform, in particular through co-operation with NATO and the EU. However, this knowledge has yet to be effectively applied to the practice of SSR in Ukraine, especially with regard to the non-military security structures. Further progress will depend on the ability to expedite the democratic political and economic transformations in the country, which determine the success of SSR. This process will be supported by Ukraine's NATO and EU bid, which will require Ukraine to meet high standards of democratisation. However, the challenge of generating public support remains. In this respect, linking democratisation and reform (which the public supports) to NATO/EU accession (which the public is ambivalent or hostile to) will be key to changing attitudes and to the success of SSR in Ukraine.

## **Part D     Priorities**



## XV. AGENDA FOR MOLDOVA

David Greenwood and Peter Volten

In Moldova's security politics the issue of Transdniestria is ever-present. That is inevitable. For so long as the former Soviet republic is divided 'the construction of the nation and the state' is unfinished and development of the country's economy is thwarted. For so long as the Russian Federation helps sustain the secessionists, there is a risk that 'proper' Moldova will find fulfilment of its European vocation difficult if not impossible. For so long as the rulers in Tiraspol maintain – and evidently profit from – an environment in which illegal migration, smuggling, human- and drugs-trafficking (and criminality generally) flourish, the powers-that-be in Chisinau – of whatever political stripe – face the danger that the territory they control may become infected too (as may, indeed, have happened already.)

Renewed efforts to resolve the long 'frozen conflict' were a feature of 2003. Two developments were instrumental: President Voronin's initiative in shifting the negotiating ground by proposing exploration of constitutionally-based federal options; and a shift from formal interest to concrete involvement on the part of the European Union (EU). In the event, however, nothing came of these endeavours. At the year's end the constitutional talks were 'on ice' and the EU's engagement had accomplished little. It was business as usual for the secessionists, and the Russians had in effect abrogated an undertaking to withdraw their troops from Transdniestria.

Thus the immediate prospect is that the issue will continue to cast its shadow over the affairs of the Republic generally and security-sector policy-making in particular. Reform is frustrated by the authorities' uncertainties about the fundamental question: 'what do we want armed forces for in present circumstances?' Little serious attention is paid to transparency-building because it is seen as a matter of secondary importance. Action to implement the 2002 Concept of Military Reform is therefore slow to materialise; and it is anybody's guess when matching prospectuses for reform will appear covering interior troops and police forces (not to mention the judiciary).

What can Moldova do to escape this impasse? One option is to wait and see how events unfold. This is what one of our Moldovan contributors appears to be advocating when he says that NATO and EU enlargement up to the country's borders, the Union's 'wider Europe' policy and Moldova's strategic goal of EU integration '*might* be those factors that could provide new solutions and give a new momentum to [Security-Sector Reform]' (Emphasis added.)

There is an alternative, however. It is to start at once on things that are going to have to be done whatever course the Transdniestria issue takes. There are several such things, all necessary steps en route to the integration goal, all responsive to the EU's 'wider Europe' thinking and the imminence of its (and NATO's) enlargement; and all practical propositions for Chisinau's short-to-medium term policy agenda.

**1. Measures to improve accountability and transparency in the conduct of defence and wider security-sector affairs, including legislative oversight.** There are general ‘good governance’ arguments for action under this heading, of course. Early action should commend itself to Moldova, however, because the basic bargain offered by the ‘wider Europe’ initiative is that ‘in return for concrete measures demonstrating shared values and effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms, all the neighbouring countries should be offered the prospect of a stake in the internal market ... accompanied by further integration and liberalisation to promote the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital’. This is quite apart from the domestic benefits likely to accrue for Moldova in countering incompetence and corruption in the public service.

Whether the motivation is ‘demonstrating shared [democratic] values’ or introducing ‘institutional reforms’, there should be explicit acknowledgement by the authorities of their obligation to reveal, explain and justify what they do and what they spend, and by elected representatives of their responsibility to hold ministers, top officials and officers accountable. Appropriate procedures should be put in place on that basis: for provision of information to the legislature and for interrogation of the executive branch. Introduction of arrangements for day-to-day parliamentary liaison on the Romanian model should be considered. In the specific area of ex post financial accountability, the competence, independence and effectiveness of the national audit bureau should be assured.

Moreover, ‘the right to know’ how the business of government is being conducted – in the security area as in any other – extends to the media, interest-groups and other civil society institutions. There should be no excessive resort to ‘need to know’ restrictions. The 2002 Concept of Military Reform says that Moldova plans dialogue with other countries on ‘democratic command and control’, but there is no need to await the outcome of more exchanges of views before taking action here.

**2. Overhaul of the central organisation of defence and of non-military security-sector bodies.** The 2002 Concept refers to this also. Specifically it promises ‘creation of a civilian and military command structure of the Armed Forces with a detailed delimitation of the attributions in the sphere of political, administrative and military command’ – but at an unspecified time in the period 2005-2008. In this area, however, there is little merit in putting-off to tomorrow what could be started today. The clarification of civil direction and ‘attributions’ of authority is something that should also be done for other ‘armed structures of the state’. Under this heading as under the last, what is proposed falls under the rubric of ‘demonstrating shared values’ or introducing ‘institutional reforms’ that is the essence of the ‘two-way street’ approach envisaged by the EU in its relations with neighbours and would-be members.

This is not the place for elaboration on what such an undertaking might entail. Suffice it to say that among the features of a sound system one looks for, among many other things, safeguards against the abuse of presidential power (and the substitution of ‘regime security’ for ‘national security’ as the organisation’s rationale) and measures to ensure that the uniformed military cannot act as ‘a law unto themselves’.

**3. Progressive steps towards an all-round strengthening of border controls (for persons and goods).** Although this question has been considered hitherto mainly in the context of the Transdnistria issue, with particular reference to the effort to extract from Ukraine a commitment to joint posts on that part of the Moldovan state frontier that borders the breakaway entity, it is in fact a more fundamental matter. In fact, it is a precondition of any progress towards the implementation of 'wider Europe' notions in EU-Moldovan relations that Moldova should *fully* control *all* its external borders. (From mid-2004 there will be a NATO interest here as well.)

Nor is this simply a matter of producing a watertight frontier. The border regime required is one that simultaneously forms a barrier to criminal activity of all kinds while allowing the free passage of legitimate traffic (persons and goods). Needless to say, this is a challenge with which many others are wrestling, especially in South-Eastern Europe. Accordingly, Moldova should exploit its regional connections in addressing the problem: for example, through the South-East European Co-operation Process (SEEC), the Southeast Europe Co-operation Initiative (SECI) and the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe.

**4. Conduct of thorough-going Defence Review (as advised by NATO), using the opportunity to prepare for introduction of a coherent system for resource allocation that would serve as a valuable tool for future military decision-making.**

The Constitution of Moldova proclaims the permanent neutrality of the country, ruling out membership of military blocs. However, a decade ago it was decided that this should be counterbalanced by extensive external co-operation, so Moldova has taken part in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme since its inception. (The Framework Document was signed on 4 March 1994.) This has involved participation in the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) in which the Republic's defence dispositions are scrutinised by NATO Headquarters staff.

The 2003 PARP 'round' resulted in a recommendation that – based on a revision of the 1995 National Security Strategy – Moldova should conduct a Defence Review, an exercise for which assistance might be available. The country should take this advice and begin relevant work during 2004/5. A focused approach similar to that adopted by the Slovak Republic in 2001/2 might commend itself. Moldova should explore trade-offs among capabilities, cost and risk, perhaps using the method employed by the Bulgarians in preparing their Plan 2004 (in the later 1990s) and subsequently used by them to develop a coherent planning, programming and budgeting system as a basic tool for resource allocation in defence.

Moldova should aim to use as a vehicle for ensuring implementation of the Review's outcome(s) – but not as a substitute for the exercise itself – the device of an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), similar to Ukraine's Action Plan with NATO. This is an idea floated by one of the Moldovan contributors to the present volume.

In our view these should be Moldova's priorities in the months ahead, whether or not there is headway in resolving the Transdnistria question.





## XVI. AGENDA FOR UKRAINE

Peter Volten and David Greenwood

Ukraine aspires to join both NATO and the European Union (EU). So far as NATO is concerned, the country is not preparing for early accession through participation in the Membership Action Plan (MAP) process. However, it has a long history of working-level co-operation with the military organisation, pursued since mid-1997 under a Charter on Distinctive Partnership and latterly on the basis of a NATO-Ukraine Action Plan. There is, for instance, a functioning Joint Working Group on Defence Reform. Since 2001 the country has also taken an active part in NATO's full annual Planning and Review Process (PARP). To date, though, a key assumption underlying military provision has been that – notwithstanding the contingents Ukraine has sent over the years to serve on multinational peace-support operations – the armed forces must be capable of acting independently and, if necessary, alone. The question is: should this change if the country envisages a shift to MAP-status; and, if so, with what implications for force structures, force levels, equipment, deployment, training and so on – and at what cost?

This complex question is currently being addressed in the major review which is provisionally scheduled for completion in June 2004. When it is completed Ukraine will have to decide on the tempo of implementation and priorities. If showing readiness for NATO membership is then a firm goal, the country will also have to pay attention to its capacity to sustain an appropriate, affordable and acceptable defence effort *and* to practise democratic-style civil-military relations in running it.

The last requirement is also relevant to the quest for EU membership or, what is the immediate future prospect, for a good neighbourhood relationship with the Union in line with the latter's 'wider Europe' initiative. The basic bargain that the EU offers here is – in the words of the Commission's March 2003 Communication on the subject – 'the prospect of a stake in the internal market ... accompanied by further integration and liberalisation' as a *quid pro quo* for 'concrete measures demonstrating shared values and effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms.'

A test of Ukraine's seriousness of intent here – whether seen as an indicator of 'shared values' or as a key 'institutional reform' – will be the successful subordination of all the country's non-military security-sector organisations to legitimate direction and democratic control. Almost without exception these law-enforcement structures and agencies remain unreformed, unaccountable and non-transparent; and all who have contributed to this volume from or on Ukraine attach the highest priority to remedying this state of affairs.

Like our contributors we also think reform here should top Ukraine's policy agenda in the short-to-medium term.

**1. Address the problem of the country's unreformed, unaccountable and non-transparent power structures by conducting a comprehensive Security and Law Enforcement Review – a counterpart to the current Defence Review (2003/4) – under high-level ministerial direction.** There was a major shake-up in the leadership of Ukraine's law-enforcement structures in the middle of 2003, accompanied by reform pledges. However, by the end of the year the promised improvements had yet to materialise. A high-profile 'review' format might be a suitable way to revive interest in the challenge. Giving visibility to the non-military organisations' appetite for resources, coming on the heels of publicity for the armed forces' finances, would be appropriate too. In addition the inquiry would cast light on who directs the police and security services, and thereby perhaps explain such episodes as the murders of journalists Gongadze and Alexandrov and of prominent opposition politicians (like Viacheslav Chornovil, the leader of the democratic party "Rukh", who was killed in a traffic accident prior to the presidential elections of 1999) and "inconvenient" officials (like Valeriy Malev, head of the state arms-trading company "Ukrspetsexport", who was killed in a traffic accident in fall 2002).

What most stand in need of illumination, though, are the statistics that caused concern to former Defence Minister Olexandr Kuzmuck (currently a member of Ukraine's Parliament within the pro-presidential political bloc): that 'after the dissolution of the USSR the number of [Ukrainian] Ministry of Internal Affairs personnel increased threefold, Internal Troops [of the Ministry of Internal Affairs] – four-fold, and the SBU [Ukrainian Security Service] – six-fold, while the Armed Forces were reduced to three times less.'

**2. Evaluate critically the outcome(s) of the Marchuk Defence Review when known (mid-2004?), identify the highest priorities, and arrange their earliest possible implementation.** The reason for inclusion of this item is straightforward. Ukraine has conducted reviews before – supposedly once-for-all exercises in identifying 'needs' and (preferred) 'options' – but has often failed to follow through. That should not be allowed to happen this time. The judgement of two of our Ukrainian contributors is apposite here: that the defence ministry needs to 'get in front of the current cycle of step-by-step reductions and ever-thinner distribution of scanty resources'; and to end the habit of 'promising declarations' that lead to 'associated actions' which are 'inconsistent or non-existent'.

It will take time to digest the results of the Marchuk review, so implementation is unlikely to be contemplated before the final quarter of 2004. At that stage, though, there should be no delay. As it happens there should then be a 'window of opportunity' in the aftermath of the presidential ballot.

If Ukraine has been encouraged at NATO's Istanbul Summit in June 2004 to actively prepare for accession, it will at this point already be committed to the country's first MAP-cycle (2004/5). This will be a powerful aid to self-discipline in preparations, if the experience of the last 'neighbourhood states' to earn membership invitations is anything to go by. Each of this trio – Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria – gained hugely from participation in the MAP procedure.

**3. Take steps to strengthen civilian direction of the National Armed Forces and civilian input at all stages of defence decision-making, and to develop effective legislative oversight of security affairs.** The end-2004 ‘window of opportunity’ for getting prompt implementation of the Defence Review’s recommendations should also be exploited to take steps in the direction of ‘democratic-style civil-military relations’ in Ukraine, a precondition for NATO entry laid down at the very start of the Organisation’s post-Cold War enlargement and a subject of MAP scrutiny. The necessary legal base exists in a 2003 Law; but one of our Ukrainian contributors says that there is a need for a complementary set of ‘normative documents’ to enhance all-round civil control of the military. This is assured at the highest level, because of the pivotal place occupied by the Council of National Security and Defence (CNSD). However, this body’s dominant position raises problems of its own: ‘authoritarian methods of control over force structures’ based on appointments made ‘according to the principle of personal devotion to the President or loyalty to the party’. Lower down, Ukraine has neither balanced proportions between civilians and military staff nor definite differentiation of their functions and authorities. Nor are there adequate security education programmes for civilian personnel. The result, our author says, is a lack of competence of civil servants (and ‘experts’) and a profound distrust of the civilian leadership from the side of the professional military.

Regarding legislative oversight, the word ‘develop’ is used in this heading advisedly – and not optimistically. There are no *political* parties in the Ukrainian Rada, as that term is generally understood, but rather groups called parties which represent ‘interests’. As a result, holding the executive to account – for its performance in the security domain or any other – is arbitrary and capricious, leading our local author to write, rather plaintively, that ‘we should work a lot at making the system of democratic control over the security and defence sphere meet the criteria of civilised countries’.

**4. Prioritise transparency-building in the conduct of defence affairs, wider security-sector affairs and generally; and make this the business of dedicated professionals.** This item deserves its place on Ukraine’s policy agenda for the short-to-medium term for several reasons. First, in the absence of effective legislative oversight the onus of holding governments to account falls on think-tank analysts and academics, the print and broadcast media. They require and should have access to the information they need to fulfil this function. Secondly, the role of free media in disseminating public information as well as providing critical feedback is of prime importance in times of change, when popular understanding can contribute to success and alienating citizens spells failure. (It is not for trivial reasons that NATO regards positive public attitudes to the Organisation as an indicator of a would-be member’s readiness for entry.) Thirdly, there is the wider issue of state-society relations in Ukraine on which subject one of our authors offers the encapsulation: ‘a shrewd information policy will aim not to suppress information but to create trust’.



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